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THES I S SUMMARY
This thesis is divided into two parts, each consisting of two self-contained chap-
ters. The ￿￿rst part provides new ￿￿ndings in the economics of personality, and
well-being.
Chapter 1 studies the implications of ‘personality mismatch’. Mismatch in
labour economics has generally been treated as a ‘black box’. Therefore, thewell-
being impact on a poorly matched worker is not well understood. I ￿￿nd that
workers whose personalities are more poorly matched to the requirements of
their job have substantially lower levels of life satisfaction, and a lower wage.
Chapter 2 is the ￿￿rst study that attempts to uncover the determinants of
well-being prioritisation. There is no consistent evidence of variation in prior-
ities over the life cycle. Life satisfaction is the most valued aspect of well-being
throughout life, yet people overestimate the relative value placed by others on
happiness. Well-being prioritisation is strongly in￿￿uenced by well-being levels
and by individual ￿￿xed e￿fects such as personality, health level, and smoking fre-
quency.
The second part of this thesis explores two novel ideas previously unconsid-
ered. It represents a ￿￿rst attempt at providing some insight to these issues.
Chapter 3 develops a model describing how consumers might adjust for a po-
tential bias in extreme online review scores. A randomised experiment ￿￿nds that
individuals do not seem to be making such adjustments. Hence, there are nega-
tive implications for consumer welfare from false or biased extreme reviews.
Finally, Chapter 4 is an ambitious investigation into how personality char-
acteristics of workers within an economy may in￿￿uence the composition of its
industrial output. Big Five personality factors are predictive of future industry
change, but further work needs to be done to verify this. This work highlights
the relevance of personality data in the analysis of long-standing economic is-
sues.
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FOREWORD
In the heyday ofmathematical economics, Leontief (1971)made a bold and hon-
est statement of the fact that empirical evidence in support of theoretical as-
sumptions in economics was severely lacking. Whilst more and more complex
models were being employed, their correspondence to the real world became
less and less clear. This, he said, was largely responsible for the relative isolation
of the discipline when compared with other social sciences.
With this thesis, I wish to emphasise the fact that human behaviour and cog-
nition is the fundamental building block of any economic system – a fact ac-
knowledgednearly a century agoby J.M.Clark (1918). By applying insights from
psychology (aswell as fromothermodern sciences, such as computing), I believe
we can addressmanyproblems in economics that havebeen exhaustively concep-
tualised, yet poorly understood in practice. One hopes that in the coming years,
this uni￿￿ed approach will be appreciated as a necessity. As Thaler (2016) argues,
this would take economics back to the way it ￿￿rst began – an intuitive and open
discipline, based upon observation and evidence.
xix

Part I
P ERSONAL ITY AND WELL - B E ING

1
PERSONAL ITY MI SMATCH AND WORKER
WELL - B E ING
Mismatch in labour economics has generally been treated as a ‘black box’.
Therefore, the well-being impact on a poorly matched worker is not well
understood. This chapter is one of the ￿￿rst to study the implications
of ‘personality mismatch’. Workers whose personalities are more poorly
matched to the requirements of their job have substantially lower lev-
els of life satisfaction, and a lower wage. This relationship holds even
when job satisfaction is accounted for, suggesting that a personality mis-
match at work has welfare implications outside the work environment.
Amismatch in Conscientiousness has a relationship with earnings that is
twice as strong as that of experience. These ￿￿ndings imply that achieving
a goodworker-occupation personalitymatch is important inmaximising
the well-being of an economy.
1.1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Understanding unemployment and labour market ￿￿ow is a classical line of re-
search in economics. There have been numerous models in economics explor-
ing job search andmatching (e.g.Mortensen andPissarides, 1994; Shimer, 2007).
The traditional research focus in this area has been to uncover the form of amis-
match function that abstractly explains the matching of unemployed workers
to vacancies. However, the mismatch function is a ‘black box’. It is designed to
explain the high-level Beveridge Curve relationship that describes the empirical
observed negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies.
The ingredients of the mismatch function have not been explicitly tested
(Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). Its determinants are commonly thought of
as being related to factors such as education, ability, and geographic mobility.
However, insights from behavioural economics about individual characteristics
3
4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿
have proved to be important in the analysis of labour market issues (Dohmen,
2014). A key aspect of individual heterogeneity from psychology that has only
recently been explored in economics is personality (e.g. Almlund et al., 2011;
Borghans et al., 2008; Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua, 2006). Employers spend
considerable time and e￿fort on the recruitment process in order to ￿￿nd a suit-
ably matched worker. Workers also spend considerable time and e￿fort making
sure they choose the ‘right’ job for them.
In the past few decades, it has come to our attention that unemployment
has important implications for an individual’s subjectivewell-being (e.g. Blanch-
￿￿ower and Oswald, 2004b; A. E. Clark, 1996; A. E. Clark and Oswald, 1994;
Oswald, 1997). However, poorly matched workers who are still employed may
also su￿fer. Therefore, in order to understand the welfare impact of personality
mismatch, I provide evidence to show that a mismatch in terms of Big Five per-
sonality traits between a worker and their job is associated with lower levels of
subjectivewell-being, evenwhen controlling for key determinants of life satisfac-
tion. I also ￿￿nd that a mismatch in Conscientiousness leads to lower earnings.
Well-being is important to economists for the simple reason that, above all
else, all of us want to maximise it.1 Happiness is particularly relevant to the
labourmarket, as there are clear links between unemployment andunhappiness
after controlling for more standard economic variables such as income (A. E.
Clark andOswald, 1994).2 This research supports the view that unemployment
is largely involuntary (Frey and Stutzer, 2002), and therefore it is important to
identify causes of attrition for preventative purposes. Easterlin (2005) explains
that work & personality is one of the three main factors that a￿fect happiness,
alongsidematerial standard of living, and family & health.
Subjective well-being (life satisfaction in particular) has been found to corre-
spondextremelywell to economic choice. Benjamin et al. (2012) ￿￿nd that choices
correspond to theoption that provides higherwell-being 83￿of the time.Whilst
other factors (such asmoney) also contribute to choice, it is clear that anynotion
of a utility function has subjective well-being as its core argument. Hence, any
￿￿nding in relation to well-being levels is highly relevant to economic decision
making.
1 Or experienced utility, as in Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin (1997).
2 The magnitude of the e￿fect is dependent on unemployment duration, among other factors.
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TheBig Five personality factors (e.g.Goldberg, 1990, 1992) arewidely studied
and implemented in personality psychology. Measures based upon the Big Five
are themost prominent to penetrate the economics literature, due to the ability
to easily test for predictive power of particular traits on outcomes. The Big Five
originated through adjective analysis of the English language, the idea being that
if someone has an observed personality characteristic that is consistent across in-
dividuals, then there must be a word to describe it (Allport and Odbert, 1936).
Words were grouped in order to identify common factors. These factors were
reduced over time until the following ￿￿ve were obtained: Agreeableness (A),
Conscientiousness (C), Extraversion (E), Neuroticism (N), and Openness (O).
Whilst these factors are not independent of each other, it is generally accepted
that they cannot be reduced further without loss of information (McCrae and
John, 1992).
Extraversion and Neuroticism are linked to responsiveness to positive and
negative a￿fect, respectively. As such, these two factors have the strongest rela-
tionship with subjective well-being (e.g. DeNeve, 1999; DeNeve and Cooper,
1998; Diener and Lucas, 1999; Diener, Oishi, and Lucas, 2003), with Neuroti-
cism being the most predictive of the Big Five factors. Openness is related to
intellectualism and creativity. Conscientiousness, having roots in self-discipline
and orderliness, is predictive of achievement and success related outcomes (e.g.
Nyhus and Pons, 2005). Agreeableness captures the tendency to be warm, com-
passionate, altruistic, and so on. It has been linked with social-cognitive theory
of mind (Nettle and Liddle, 2008), which has implications for behaviour in
strategic settings.
Many studies have addressed the relationshipbetweenpersonality and labour
market outcomes, thoughwork in this area has been relatively recent. For exam-
ple, Judge, C. A.Higgins, et al. (1999) showusing panel data that Conscientious-
ness has a positive predictive e￿fect on career success, both in subjective satisfac-
tion terms and objective income terms. Neuroticism has a negative e￿fect, but
only in objective terms.HighConscientiousness is linkedwith gainingmore sat-
isfaction from having higher income (Boyce andWood, 2011). However, highly
Conscientious people also su￿fer the largest drop in life satisfaction when they
become unemployed (Boyce, Wood, and Brown, 2010).
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Uysal and Pohlmeier (2011) study the e￿fects of personality on the probabili-
ties of entering and leaving employment. They ￿￿nd inGerman Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP) data that instantaneous employment probability is signi￿￿cantly
a￿fected by Conscientiousness (positively) and Neuroticism (negatively). They
also ￿￿nd that Big Five traits are powerful in explaining unemployment dura-
tion. Bowles, Gintis, andOsborne (2001) stress the importance of noncognitive
abilities in explainingwage determination.Nyhus andPons (2005, 2012) explore
these links empirically to ￿￿nd strong negative e￿fects ofNeuroticismonwages as
well as the fact that adding personality traits to an econometric model explains
11.5￿ of the observed gender wage gap.
The majority of elicitation methods for Big Five factors involve self-report-
ing. Depending on incentives and context, onemight expect an individual to be
biased (or even outright lie) in their responses. However, these e￿fects have little
impact on predictive power (Borghans et al., 2008). Economists may ￿￿nd the
derivation of the Big Five measure through factor analysis to be less appealing
than tests that are speci￿￿cally tailored to predict real-world outcomes (Borghans
et al., 2008). Although both approaches have their merits, this may be part of
the reason economics as a whole has taken longer to recognise the potential of
personality measures.
Personality traits are relatively stable across theworking lifespan, though they
are unsettled in both early age and post-retirement (Lucas andDonnellan, 2011).
Although there are theoristswhowould claim that personality is ‘set like plaster’,
personality is a combination of both genetics and early environment (Almlund
et al., 2011; Polderman et al., 2015). In practical terms, Cobb-Clark and Schurer
(2012) show using Australian HILDA panel data that the Big Five are robust
over time to all but repeated extreme life shocks. Therefore, they are suitable for
use as economic explanatory variables.3 More recently, Boyce,Wood, Daly, et al.
(2015) show that an extended period of unemployment is an extreme enough
shock to change mean levels of Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Open-
ness. However, more work (and better large scale longitudinal personality data)
is required in order to understand when and why personality changes.
3 The data they analysed was only for a 4-year period, however, so it would seem a longer panel is
required to validate this ￿￿nding.
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Whilst generalised theories of mismatch and labour market ￿￿ows have been
explored in economics for many years, assessing the impact of mismatch empir-
ically has been rare. However, there has been considerable interest in business
and management to try to match the right worker to the right job. For exam-
ple, Larson, Rottinghaus, and Borgen (2002) explain that the RIASEC model
(Holland, 1997) has been in existence for around 20 years longer than the Big
Five. Rather than looking at personality characteristics of the individual, the
RIASEC model is focused speci￿￿cally on assigning people to the correct work
category, by way of the ‘Self-Directed Search’ questionnaire.4
Since theRIASECaskswhat peoplewant to do rather thanwhere they ￿￿t, the
model is likely eliciting preferences rather than underlying traits. As Almlund
et al. (2011) explain, preferences and personality are di￿ferent concepts. Person-
ality helps to shape one’s preferences, and likely acts like a set of constraints on
behaviour, or as a functional mapping of genetic traits to preferences and ac-
tions. On a related note, empirical work comparing economic preference mea-
sures (such as attitudes to risk) with personality traits highlights that the two
concepts are complementary, and not substitutes for one another (Becker et al.,
2012).5
De Fruyt and Mervielde (1999) ￿￿nd a clear disparity between Big Five per-
sonality factors and RIASEC, despite some overlap. Whilst RIASEC is more
predictive of employment status, the Big Five tend to be better in ￿￿nding the
best ￿￿t employees. This is intuitive in the following way. Taking on a job that
￿￿ts with preferences may bring short term utility. However, a poor ￿￿t in terms
of personality is likely to cause dissatisfaction and a reduction in e￿￿￿ciency.
The ‘person-￿￿t’ literature in management supports the view that individu-
als who ￿￿t their jobs better are more satis￿￿ed with them, and therefore are less
likely to become voluntarily unemployed.Most notably, Chatman (1991) found
this e￿fect in the public accounting industry by de￿￿ning ‘￿￿t’ in terms of shared
values between individuals and ￿￿rms. However, Judge and Cable (1997) explain
that values aremore similar to preferences thanpersonality traits. Therefore, the
￿￿nding from this line of literature is that choosing a less valued job leads to an
4 The RIASEC categories are: Realistic, Investigative, Artistic, Social, Enterprising and Conven-
tional.
5 It should be emphasised, however, that the economic preferences considered in Becker et al.
(2012) are not the same as the aspirational preferences captured by the RIASEC categories.
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increased likelihood of dissatisfaction and job attrition. This is somewhat tauto-
logical - people choosing a preferred option are, by de￿￿nition, attaining higher
levels of utility. The management literature does not address the e￿fects of per-
sonality matching on job satisfaction, or indeed overall life satisfaction.
Personality seems intuitivelymore likely to be stable than preferences.Whilst
personality does change across the life cycle (Lucas andDonnellan, 2011; Specht,
Eglo￿f, and Schmukle, 2011), most psychologists today accept that individuals
have some form of stable personality (see Almlund et al., 2011, for further ref-
erences and a brief discussion). In contrast, preferences and tastes are strongly
a￿fected by environment and context (e.g. Simonson and Tversky, 1992), and of-
ten develop based on experience. For example, a new drinker may prefer light
beer, but after drinking for some time, may eventually prefer stronger beer (Ho-
e￿￿￿er and Ariely, 1999).
Traits actmore like constraints to preferences thande￿￿ning preferences them-
selves (Almlund et al., 2011). This being the case, ￿￿nding a good ￿￿t in terms of
personality should be much more relevant to longer term well-being. Gardner
et al. (2012) describe that the closeness of personality between an individual and
the modal personality of an organisation is a key ingredient for a good ￿￿t, since
organisations are relatively homogeneous. They ￿￿nd various links between Big
Five trait combinations and goodness of ￿￿t to certain organisational cultures.
For example, less Agreeable people perceive themselves as a better ￿￿t for a mar-
ket culture (Gardner et al., 2012). To the extent that Big Five factors are predic-
tive of ￿￿t, this suggests that personality traits are closer to the root of the labour
market matching problem than self reported values or preferences.
In addition to this, the Big Five measure of personality is more established
and validated than many employer-employee matching indicators, such as the
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (McCrae andCosta, 1989). These studies also seem
to be aimed at speci￿￿c cases or industries, rather than assessing more global ef-
fects on individual well-being. In their meta-analysis of the person-￿￿t literature,
Kristof-Brown,Zimmerman, and Johnson (2005) suggest that a personality trait
approach to matching would be most appropriate:
“Future studies of personality-based ￿￿t are advised to use measures that
are capable of assessing various conceptualizations of ￿￿t at the trait level,
rather than overall personality pro￿￿les.”
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The closest work to the present study appears to be by L. Winkelmann and
R. Winkelmann (2008). They identify mean personality traits for each occupa-
tion from the German SOEP, and relate these to personality traits of workers
in order to ￿￿nd implications for life satisfaction. Whilst they use a much larger
sample size than the present study, they do not have the data to compute per-
sonality mismatch directly. By predicting the job satisfaction for workers, had
they been employed in di￿ferent occupational areas, and linking this to other re-
sults, they conclude that mismatch leads to lower life satisfaction. Their ￿￿nding
matches the overall conclusion of this chapter. However, it may be argued that
the present study shows this relationshipmore directly (at the expense of sample
size). I also analyse the impact of personality mismatch on happiness, and wage.
Neither of these are addressed in L. Winkelmann and R.Winkelmann (2008).
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 presents a simple
framework to explain how a personality trait mismatch can cause a reduction in
well-being. Section 1.3 describes details of survey design and data collection. Sec-
tion 1.4 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 1.5 brie￿￿y describes
the limitations of the ￿￿ndings. Finally, Section 1.6 summarises and concludes.
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I consider a mechanism that directly maps personality mismatch to some wel-
fare or well-being level, holding other factors constant. Building upon an idea
by Brown (2013), suppose that a worker has a vector of K personality traits:
T = {T1, T2, T3, ..., TK}. For convenience, assume each personality trait k has
a value in the trait space t = [t, t¯], so that Tk 2 t. Each worker undertakes a
job, which has its own trait vector J = {J1, J2, J3, ..., JK}. A personality mis-
match occurs when ||T   J|| 6= 0, with ||T   J|| representing the degree of
mismatch.
The signi￿￿cance of matching Tk with Jk is that optimum productive e￿￿￿-
ciency is achieved by the individual for that job. This can bemodelled as follows.
For trait k, the worker has a productive e￿￿￿ciency function P(t).6 P(t) resem-
6 I use the term productive e￿ciency as opposed to just productivity to emphasise the fact that a
better personality match allows an individual to be more productive for a given level of e￿fort.
P(.) can also depend on other parameters, but these are left exogenous.
10 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿
bles a beta density function, and is maximised when t = Tk. However, the
realised e￿￿￿ciency of the worker is P(Jk). This means that the worker is produc-
ing at peak e￿￿￿ciency (in terms of that trait) when the trait value of the job is the
same as the trait value of the worker. If there is a mismatch between a worker’s
trait and that of the job, then P(Tk) > P(Jk), since the worker has to adjust
their behaviour to the requirements of the job. P(Tk)  P(Jk) represents the
productive e￿￿￿ciency that is foregone due to the mismatch.
t tTk
Task trait level t
Jk
Well-being costP
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 1:Diagram showing how apersonality traitmismatch can generate awell-being
cost.
A worker with Tk further from Jk must make a greater compromise to their
natural tendencies in order to successfully complete their work tasks. This is ef-
fortful, and therefore, the worker incurs a psychological adjustment cost. This
can be thought of as an experienced utility cost, or a reduction in well-being.
The cost is represented by the area under P, bounded by Tk and Jk. More for-
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mally, ifM = max{Tk, Jk} andm = min{Tk, Jk}, the well-being cost to the
worker is given by:
Wellbeing cost =
Z M
m
P(t) dt (1)
The cost will, therefore, be larger as M and m are further apart i.e. when
there is greater mismatch. The marginal e￿fect of increased mismatch depends
on the shape of P(t). Since this cost will be incurred over the duration of em-
ployment, one would expect to see this re￿￿ected in lower subjective well-being
scores reported by the individual. A visual representation is shown in Figure 1.
To verify whether this holds empirically, we can test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1.1 Individuals with a larger personality trait mismatch have lower
subjective well-being.
Further support for this hypothesis comes from self-discrepancy theory (E. T.
Higgins, 1987). This theory distinguishes between three di￿ferent domains of
‘self’: the actual self; the ideal self; and the ought self. Furthermore, each of these
selvesmay be recognised di￿ferently by the individual, in comparison to another
person’s evaluation of that individual. According to the theory, the nature of
the repercussions experienced as a result of a discrepancy between di￿ferent ver-
sions of the self depends upon the types of selves being compared.Myde￿￿nition
of mismatch in this chapter compares the perception of an individual’s actual
self to their perception of the ideal self that another person (i.e. their employer)
would want them to be. E. T. Higgins (1987) posits that this type of mismatch
would result in emotions pertaining to dejection, such as shame, as a result of
an expected loss in social esteem. Hence, this should be re￿￿ected in measures of
well-being, particularly those that measure happiness and life satisfaction. Anx-
iety and Neuroticism are related to feelings of agitation, and are less likely to be
a￿fected by this form of mismatch.
An employer can only reward an individual based on observed productivity,
and not on the di￿ference between observed and theoretical e￿￿￿ciency.However,
where there are otherworkers performing the same job, an employermay reward
those in the same position who are relatively more e￿￿￿cient.Whilst some of this
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added e￿￿￿ciencymay be attained through ability and skill level, it is possible that
￿￿rms are also implicitly rewarding workers that have a better personality match
with the job with a higher wage. Therefore, we can test a second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1.2 Individuals with a larger personality trait mismatch receive a
lower wage.
The most similar work in existing empirical literature is on the relationship
between educational mismatch andwages. The generalised ￿￿nding is that those
who are overeducated relative to the requirements of their job earn less than
those with identical levels of education, but working in a job that correctly mat-
ches their education level (e.g. Bauer, 2002; Budría andMoro-Egido, 2008). Bau-
er (2002) also ￿￿nds that includingunobservedheterogeneity can eliminatemuch
of this wage di￿ference. For the present study, this means both that educational
mismatch is likely to have an impact on wage, and that personality mismatch
may account for some of the unobserved heterogeneity that clearly has an im-
pact on wage di￿ferentials.
The theoretical ideas in this section are conceptually similar to those surround-
ing identity (Akerlof andKranton, 2000). In termsof their framework,wemight
think of the trait associated with a job as an identity prescription for worker
behaviour. Unlike their more generalised notion of identity, however, an indi-
vidual cannot choose their personality. Although some aspects of outward be-
haviour canbe adjusted to ￿￿t a given situation, underlying traits are generally sta-
ble. This means that any disparity between the identities of the job and worker
leads to a loss of utility.7
Sackett andWalmsley (2014) make an important distinction between person-
ality as behaviour (I act...) and as identity (I am...). The former ismoremalleable,
and potentially what an employer is most interested in. However, the latter is
more rigid and de￿￿nes how a person sees themselves. The usage of personality
in this chapter is more closely related to this second idea. Whilst an individual
with trait level Tk may be able to compensate their behaviour somewhat in or-
der to ￿￿t better with the job trait level Jk, they cannot change their core sense of
self. It is this friction, I posit, that is likely to result in the individual incurring a
cost to their well-being.
7 This loss is referred to Is in Akerlof and Kranton (2000).
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To test these hypotheses, I designed a survey to be administered online, using
participants recruited fromAmazonMechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is one of
the largest crowdsourcing websites on the internet and is widely used to recruit
online subjects for academic research. The subject pool is much larger andmore
representative than standard undergraduate recruitment systemswithin univer-
sities, and results have a high degree of validity (see Mason and Suri, 2012, for a
detailed discussion).
Bertrand andMullainathan (2001) objectively test the use of subjective survey
questions for validity.Although they ￿￿nd that data tends to be noisy due tomea-
surement error, they conclude that subjective variables are useful in comparing
across individuals (but not within individuals). They also raise concerns about
using subjective questions as dependent variables. Since I compare across indi-
viduals, a subjective survey should be valid. Furthermore, there is a large body
of literature that validates the use of subjectivewell-beingmeasures in economic
research (e.g. Blanch￿￿ower and Oswald, 2004b).
I include a combination of scales to measure various aspects of well-being.
First, I use the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS), which is a widely used mea-
sure of the cognitive aspects of subjective well-being (Diener, Emmons, et al.,
1985). These are separate from shorter-term a￿fective aspects of well-being, such
as mood (Pavot andDiener, 1993). Each individual component question is sum-
med to give a life satisfaction score between 5 and 35.
Second, to measure aspects of well-being speci￿￿cally related to job satisfac-
tion, I include two items from the British Workplace Employment Relations
Study (WERS), found in their survey of employees.8 The ￿￿rst of these breaks
down job satisfaction intomore speci￿￿c components.The secondaskshowone’s
job a￿fects general emotional states. Individuals rate themselves on a ￿￿ve-point
scale for each component, ranging from ‘very dissatis￿￿ed’ to ‘very satis￿￿ed’.
Third, I use two subjectivewell-being items from theUKAnnual Population
Survey (APS). The ￿￿rst asks the participant to rate their happiness yesterday; the
second asks them to rate their overall life satisfaction (both on a scale from 0-
10). The questions have been reframed so that participants rank themselves in
8 Speci￿￿cally, I use items A8 and A9 from the survey.
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relation to 10 other people by clicking on an image which contains a visual rep-
resentation of 10 people in a row. The results are, therefore, still captured on
a 0-10 scale. However, since people ￿￿nd it easier to rank their relative position
than make absolute judgements about their condition (Frey and Stutzer, 2005),
it should make responses more accurate and consistent. To control for any bias
arising from colour, 50￿ of participants received a similar image, but with the
background colours reversed (see Figure 2 for illustration).
(￿)Regular colour scale
(￿)Reversed colour scale
F￿￿￿￿￿ 2: Images used in survey for happiness and life satisfaction relative rank re-
sponses.Clicking on the right endof the scale is equivalent to a score of 10/10.
In order to measure personality mismatch between individuals and jobs, I
used a 50-item Big Five measure from the International Personality Item Pool
(IPIP). This measure is from Goldberg (1992), and has a high degree of correla-
tion with each of the Big Five factors.9 Participants were asked to rate the ac-
curacy of each item on a 1-7 scale for both themselves and for their perception
of an ‘ideal’ worker for their job. This allows us to directly assess the degree of
mismatch, according to the individual’s perception. Whilst this is a less power-
ful measure than the L. Winkelmann and R. Winkelmann (2008) approach of
￿￿nding mean trait scores for various occupations in a large scale dataset, it is
more e￿fective in capturing mismatch at the individual level. Additionally, the
approachused in this study does not assume thatmeanpersonality in anoccupa-
tion represents the ‘ideal’ personality. The order of statements was randomised
on a per-subject basis to eliminate any bias.
9 The weakest is Conscientiousness, with an a score of 0.79.
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The measure of mismatch used in this study is more sophisticated than sub-
jective ￿￿t measures used in job-￿￿t studies, such as Judge and Cable (1997). I mea-
sure mismatch on individual personality factors, rather than solely asking peo-
ple whether they ￿￿t well with their jobs.10 This means that, although individual
ratings are subjective, the framework for computing themismatch (the Big Five)
is more rigorous in terms of eliciting traits than a purely self-reported declara-
tion of ￿￿t.
I also collect standard demographic information, employment information
(such as experience, job title, working hours, and employment status), salary,
and information regarding health and marital status, since these are important
determinants of well-being (e.g. Frey and Stutzer, 2005; Pavot andDiener, 1993).
Artés,Mar Salinas-Jiménez, andSalinas-Jiménez (2013) ￿￿nd that individualsmore
over-quali￿￿ed for a speci￿￿c jobwill su￿fermore in terms of subjectivewell-being,
both in terms of life satisfaction and happiness, after controlling for other fac-
tors. However, they ￿￿nd that within a given job, those that are under-educated
relative to their peers will su￿fer in terms of well-being - the ‘small ￿￿sh in a big
pond’ e￿fect. Due to this result, I include the following question: “What is the
minimum level of education required for someone doing your job?”. This will
allow me to control for the impact of educational mismatch on well-being.
As order e￿fects can have a large impact on survey responses, and since per-
sonality alone is predictive of well-being, the well-being items are placed at the
beginning of the survey. This rules out the possibility of personality questions
priming subjects’ perceptions about their happiness and life satisfaction.
1.4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
1.4.1 Summary Statistics
The survey was administered in 3 batches, two in mid-2014, and one in early
2015.11 282 responses were obtained overall. The ￿￿rst batch consisted of 97 sub-
jects, each of whomwere paid $3 for survey completion. The second batch con-
10 Though I do also ask individuals separately whether they feel they are a good ￿￿t for their job.
11 The gap between the ￿￿rst two and the third is due to additional research funding becoming
available after the 2014 sample was collected.
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sisted of 25 subjects, eachpaid $2.88.The ￿￿nal batch contained 160 subjects, each
paid $4.
I ￿￿rst present some statistics on the data collected to provide the reader with
background information about the sample. 220 of the 282 respondents were in
full time employment at the timeof the survey.Of the remaining 62, only 24had
notbeen in full time employmentwithin theprevious 12monthperiod. Subjects
were employed in awide variety of occupations and industries.Aquestion at the
end of the survey asked respondents how seriously they took the survey, on a
scale from 0 to 10. Only three responses reported a seriousness score of less than
7. These three observations were omitted from subsequent regression analyses.
Mean age is 34.5, with a minimum of 20 and maximum of 68.12 54.3￿ of the
sample are male. 47.5￿ are married or living with a partner. Respondents are
predominantlyU.S. nationals, and 74.8￿ arewhite. They are alsowell educated:
approximately 67.7￿ have at least an undergraduate degree. A breakdown of re-
spondent salaries is shown in Figure 3. The distribution of salaries in the sample
is positively skewed, re￿￿ecting the pattern observed in U.S. household income
distribution data.
Exactly half of the subjects were randomly shown the standard well-being
rank question image, whilst the other half were shown the reversed colour ver-
sion. A t-test comparing mean responses between these two groups for both
the happiness and life satisfaction ranking questions yielded p-values of 0.4069
and 0.1778 respectively. Therefore, no signi￿￿cant di￿ference was found between
people’s subjective well-being ranking when colour was reversed.
Table 1 shows that the threeprimarywell-beingmeasures beingused arehighly
correlated. The weakest correlation is between the SWLS and happiness yester-
day rank. This is likely due to the fact that happiness has a stronger correspon-
dence withmood and a￿fect. Since life satisfaction obtained via the ranking task
had a stronger correlationwith happiness than the SWLS did, it suggests that the
elicitation method was important.
12 One respondent did not provide their age, and so was excluded from the majority of the regres-
sion analyses.
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T￿￿￿￿ 1: Correlations between measures of well-being.
Happy Life Sat SWLS
Happiness yesterday (relative rank) 1
Life satisfaction (relative rank) 0.8667 1
SWLS 0.6898 0.7727 1
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1.4.2 Personality Mismatch and Well-being
1.4.2.1 Measuring Mismatch
To compute Big Five mismatch, I calculate mean trait scores from the 50 items
in the survey for both the individual and their perception of an ‘ideal’ worker in
their position. I create a personality mismatch vector, |Mˆ|, that is the absolute
value of the di￿ference between an individual’s actual trait score (denoted by sub-
script a), and their perceived ideal personality for the job (denoted by subscript
i):
|Mˆ| =
              
0BBBBBBBB@
Aa
Ca
Ea
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1CCCCCCCCA
 
0BBBBBBBB@
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              
(2)
To assess whether the direction of mismatch is relevant for speci￿￿c traits, I also
use the raw di￿ference, Mˆ, for some regressions.
Second, I create a scalarmismatchmeasure, mˆ, that is obtained by computing
the Euclidean distance between actual and ideal personality vectors:
mˆ =
q
(Aa   Ai)2 + ...+ (Oa  Oi)2 (3)
This provides us with a single, holistic measure of personality mismatch.
Figure 4 shows plots of Big Five factors for an individual plotted against the
ideal personality trait value of their job. The 45-degree line represents a trait
mismatch of zero. Visually, one can see that the mismatch is skewed to one di-
rection in the cases of Extraversion and Neuroticism. More people are lacking
in Extraversion than being too Extraverted. Furthermore, more people seem to
be excessively Neurotic for their jobs than those who are less Neurotic than re-
quired.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 4: Personality mismatch: actual personality traits plotted against ‘ideal’ personality traits for
each of the Big Five.
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We can also use these ideal personality traits to form a picture about rela-
tive di￿ferences in trait values. Table 2 shows the mean ideal trait reported by
individuals for each industrial employment sector. Health Care & Social Assis-
tance jobs require a level of 6 in Agreeableness on a 1-7 scale, whereas jobs in
Manufacturing only require 4.67. Jobs inManagement require a 1 point higher
level of Openness than those in Accommodation and Food Services, and just
below 0.9 points higher than jobs in Construction,Manufacturing, Transporta-
tion & Warehousing, and Utilities. Similarly, jobs in Arts, Entertainment, and
Recreation require at least 1 point more Extraversion than jobs in Administra-
tive Support &WasteManagement, Construction, Information, andManufac-
turing. These paint a picture of jobs in various industries that wouldmatch our
intuition somewhat regardingworker stereotypes: the outgoing and charismatic
people required in the leisure industry, versus the relatively reserved bricklayer,
for example.
Table 3 shows ideal traits for job titles containing a speci￿￿c keyword. Even
though the number of observations is too small to make any conclusive asser-
tions about ideal trait values for each job, the results show quite a surprising
amount of precision (evidenced by low standard deviations) given the sample
size. Sales jobs unsurprisingly require over 1 point more Extraversion than jobs
with “admin”or “research” in their title. In contrast, research jobs require around
half a point more Openness than sales jobs. Finally, teaching jobs appear to re-
quire particularly high levels of Agreeableness, with amean requirement of 6.29
out of a possible 7. As with sectoral ideal traits, these seem to correspond well
with intuitions and stereotypes about the traits required for particular occupa-
tions.
L. Winkelmann and R. Winkelmann (2008) also measure mean personality
traits for occupations. Two of their occupations, ‘manager’ and ‘teacher’, corre-
spond to job titles measured in Table 3. Both in their SOEP data, and in Table 3:
teachers are more Open, less Conscientious, less Extraverted, and more Agree-
able. Only the ordering of Neuroticism is di￿ferent between studies. This is en-
couraging, as though the sample in this chapter is much smaller, there appears
to be a degree of agreement in measured personality.
This evidence points to a potential problem in the labour market. As we see
in Table 3, each job appears to require trait values above the midpoint of the
1.4
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T￿￿￿￿ 2: ‘Ideal’ Big Five traits for each employment sector
Ideal Personality Trait for Job
Agreeableness Conscientious Extraversion Neuroticism Openness
Sector n Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd
Accommodation and Food Services 16 5.26 0.97 6.34 0.70 4.74 1.06 2.23 0.81 4.59 0.68
Administrative and Support andWaste Management 6 4.68 1.06 5.88 0.82 4.28 0.26 2.48 1.14 4.78 0.73
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 21 5.79 0.99 6.29 0.67 5.54 0.90 1.91 0.75 5.87 0.88
Construction 5 5.58 0.89 5.88 1.25 4.54 0.74 2.26 1.38 4.72 0.48
Educational Services 23 5.81 1.08 5.95 0.76 4.88 1.23 2.19 0.75 5.27 0.96
Finance and Insurance 22 5.26 0.94 6.05 0.59 4.85 0.93 2.20 0.79 4.95 0.52
Health Care and Social Assistance 27 5.99 0.85 6.30 0.69 5.01 0.91 1.92 0.71 5.14 0.95
Information 28 4.89 0.77 5.56 0.92 4.46 0.99 2.77 0.62 5.11 0.88
Management of Companies and Enterprises 7 5.63 0.82 6.29 0.95 5.10 0.93 2.21 0.98 5.60 1.21
Manufacturing 7 4.67 1.04 5.90 1.24 4.41 1.33 2.67 1.11 4.73 1.26
Other Services (except Public Administration) 26 5.42 1.11 5.85 0.83 4.73 1.07 2.32 0.99 4.87 1.08
Professional, Scienti￿￿c, and Technical 31 5.24 0.88 5.83 0.97 4.83 0.61 2.64 1.14 5.33 0.77
Public Administration 6 5.50 0.86 6.32 0.78 5.22 0.77 2.08 0.58 5.72 0.75
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 2 5.75 1.77 6.60 0.57 5.80 0.71 2.05 0.78 5.80 1.27
Retail Trade 36 5.56 0.92 5.99 0.80 5.45 0.85 2.13 0.80 4.83 1.00
Transportation andWarehousing 12 4.92 1.02 6.48 0.43 4.63 1.02 1.70 0.58 4.73 0.73
Utilities 3 5.00 0.53 5.17 0.93 4.60 0.56 2.90 1.25 4.73 0.93
Wholesale Trade 4 5.13 0.51 6.05 1.07 5.15 0.78 2.53 1.66 5.38 0.40
282 5.34 0.95 6.04 0.83 4.90 0.87 2.29 0.93 5.12 0.86
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scale (the reverse being true for Neuroticism). Whilst this corresponds approxi-
mately tomodal trait values amongst workers in a given population, there is still
a signi￿￿cant proportion of workers who have low trait values for Agreeableness,
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, and Openness (or high Neuroticism). If very
few jobs demand these personalities, then there may be a subset of the working
population that will be perennially unemployed (or at least consistently poorly
matched). I do not explore this issue further. However, this may help to explain
theories that propose the existence of a ‘natural’ rate of unemployment.
T￿￿￿￿ 3: ‘Ideal’ Big Five trait scores for popular job titles in the sample
Ideal Personality Trait Score for Job
A C E N O
Job title contains: n Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd
Sales 21 5.84 0.81 6.27 0.65 5.73 0.92 1.90 0.56 5.08 0.79
Admin 14 5.39 1.08 6.06 0.65 4.65 0.63 2.27 0.91 5.11 0.71
Research 8 5.45 0.63 5.91 0.63 4.68 0.46 2.44 0.53 5.59 0.78
Manage (excl. sales) 31 5.45 0.96 6.18 0.83 5.25 0.74 2.18 0.90 5.25 0.73
Teach 9 6.29 0.34 6.03 0.58 5.01 0.92 2.10 0.65 5.50 0.78
Note: Each personality trait is scored on a scale from 1 to 7. 4 represents a score at the mid-point.
To compare my mismatch measure with the kind of subjective ￿￿t response
used in Judge andCable (1997), I asked respondents to answer the question “Do
you feel you are/were a good ￿￿t for this job?” on a ￿￿ve-point scale. Mismatch
scores for all Big Five traits are negatively correlated with this measure of job
￿￿t (Table 4). In other words, people who consider themselves to be a good ￿￿t
for their job have lower personality trait mismatch. This is in line with what we
would expect.
However, the strongest correlation for subjective job ￿￿t and individual trait
mismatch, is r = -0.39 for Neuroticism. The scalar mismatch measure mˆ is
similarly correlated with subjective job ￿￿t. These correlations are not close to
1 in absolute value. This suggests that self-reported ￿￿t is a broader concept than
personality mismatch, though measurement error in both the personality mis-
match and ￿￿t measures may a￿fect the extent to which this is true. If an indi-
vidual’s perception of ￿￿t includes other latent factors, then measuring Big Five
mismatch allows us to isolate attention to personality e￿fects.
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T￿￿￿￿ 4: Correlations between Big Five mismatch and subjective self-reported job ￿￿t.
SR ￿￿t |MˆA| |MˆC| |MˆE| |MˆN | |MˆO| mˆ
SR job ￿￿t 1
Mismatch in A (|MˆA|) -0.1811 1
Mismatch in C (|MˆC|) -0.2384 0.2904 1
Mismatch in E (|MˆE|) -0.2221 0.2785 0.2280 1
Mismatch in N (|MˆN |) -0.3893 0.3428 0.3103 0.5026 1
Mismatch in O (|MˆO|) -0.3033 0.2602 0.1251 0.1410 0.2499 1
mˆ -0.3991 0.5557 0.4784 0.7956 0.7945 0.4566 1
1.4.2.2 Job Satisfaction
First, I consider the e￿fects of personality mismatch on individual aspects of job
satisfaction, as measured by 8 items from the WERS. If a personality mismatch
betweenworker and job translates to overall well-being, then at least part of this
relationship should act through job satisfaction.
Eight separate ordered logit regressionswere run,with eachWERS satisfaction
measure as the dependent variable. A full set of controls are used. The general
speci￿￿cation is as follows:
JSi = aPi + bWAGEi + gEi + qXi + dYEARi + ei (4)
wherePi represents a vector of rawBig Five, andBig Fivemismatchmeasures;Ei
represents a vector of education and educational mismatch; and Xi represents
other demographic variables, such as gender.YEARi is a dummy variable that
has the value 1 if the survey year was 2015 (i.e. the third batch) and 0 otherwise.
I estimate two versions of this regression. The ￿￿rst has a smaller Xi vector -
it includes only age, gender, and information about wage, employment status,
and working hours. The second can be described as a ‘kitchen sink’ regression.
It includes WERS measures of job a￿fect, as well as both the happiness yester-
day and life satisfaction rank measures, in order to determine whether general
well-being has a reverse e￿fect on job satisfaction. I also include additional demo-
graphic information (such as race) and the general health level of each individual.
Dependent variable descriptions can be found in Table 5.
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T￿￿￿￿ 5: Job satisfaction variables key.
How satis￿￿ed are you with:
WERS 1 The sense of achievement you get from your work?
WERS 2 The scope for using your own initiative?
WERS 3 The amount of in￿￿uence you have over your job?
WERS 4 The training you receive?
WERS 5 The opportunity to develop your skills in your job?
WERS 6 The amount of pay you receive?
WERS 7 Your job security?
WERS 8 The work itself?
Table 6 shows ordered logit estimates for both scalar and vector mismatch
under the two di￿ferent speci￿￿cations (only one measure of mismatch was in-
cluded in each group of regressions).We see that coe￿￿￿cients for scalarmismatch
are all negative, suggesting a higher level of mismatch is associated with reduced
job satisfaction. Furthermore, the estimates are strongly signi￿￿cant, save for the
regressions that measure satisfaction with training (WERS 4) and job security
(WERS 7). This ￿￿nding is the ￿￿rst stage in the validation ofHypothesis 1.1.Of the
remaining control variables, education level and education mismatch had very
strong relationships, more than double themagnitude of personality mismatch
in some of the regressions. Surprisingly, salary generally had an insigni￿￿cant im-
pact on job satisfaction.
All parameter estimates for mismatches in Neuroticism and Openness are
negative (and most are signi￿￿cant), whilst estimates for mismatches in Agree-
ableness, Conscientiousness, and Extraversion have mixed signs. This suggests
that mismatches in Neuroticism and Openness account for most of the scalar
mismatch relationshipwith job satisfaction.Whilst signi￿￿cance drops in the sec-
ond (deliberately over￿￿tted) speci￿￿cation, the signs and many of the estimated
magnitudes do not di￿fer substantially from the ￿￿rst speci￿￿cation. Surprisingly,
point estimates for Neuroticism mismatch are relatively stable between speci￿￿-
cations, even though the second speci￿￿cation includes measures of mood and
a￿fect that are likely to overlap with Neuroticism.
In particular, amismatch inNeuroticism (in both speci￿￿cations) is associated
with signi￿￿cantly lower satisfactionwithpay (WERS6), even after controlling for
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T￿￿￿￿ 6: Job satisfaction is inversely related to personality mismatch.
Dependent variables are measures of job satisfaction (see Table 5 for variable details).
WERS 1 WERS 2 WERS 3 WERS 4 WERS 5 WERS 6 WERS 7 WERS 8
Speci￿cation 1
Regression group 1
mˆ -0.319*** -0.359*** -0.238** -0.171* -0.340*** -0.289*** -0.185* -0.319***
(0.103) (0.0980) (0.0958) (0.0966) (0.1000) (0.0989) (0.0998) (0.101)
Regression group 2
|MˆA| -0.13 -0.0833 0.0632 0.0233 -0.313 -0.138 0.0429 -0.0706
(0.198) (0.193) (0.196) (0.200) (0.191) (0.189) (0.202) (0.192)
|MˆC| 0.021 0.152 0.161 0.114 0.101 0.293 0.145 0.131
(0.228) (0.221) (0.218) (0.211) (0.213) (0.214) (0.215) (0.231)
|MˆE| 0.0156 -0.0253 -0.0397 0.0962 0.166 -0.086 -0.12 -0.0789
(0.156) (0.153) (0.153) (0.150) (0.153) (0.142) (0.148) (0.156)
|MˆN | -0.237 -0.326* -0.292 -0.28 -0.400** -0.469***† -0.223 -0.258
(0.188) (0.181) (0.184) (0.179) (0.184) (0.176) (0.174) (0.188)
|MˆO| -0.444** -0.476***† -0.424** -0.469***† -0.424** -0.168 -0.201 -0.507***†
(0.181) (0.175) (0.172) (0.178) (0.174) (0.166) (0.165) (0.175)
Regression group 3
Job ￿￿t 1.196*** 1.446*** 1.264*** 0.630*** 1.032*** 0.480*** 0.826*** 1.681***
(0.167) (0.170) (0.166) (0.149) (0.158) (0.139) (0.150) (0.186)
Speci￿cation 2 (‘kitchen sink’)
Regression group 4
mˆ -0.235** -0.320*** -0.207** -0.0999 -0.288*** -0.235** -0.0964 -0.263**
(0.108) (0.104) (0.101) (0.101) (0.104) (0.102) (0.103) (0.108)
Regression group 5
|MˆA| -0.151 -0.00272 0.0425 0.0802 -0.263 -0.0816 -0.0265 -0.0169
(0.208) (0.204) (0.205) (0.205) (0.203) (0.200) (0.210) (0.206)
|MˆC| -0.259 -0.0684 -0.032 0.0201 -0.114 0.156 0.00644 -0.0597
(0.249) (0.237) (0.234) (0.233) (0.233) (0.231) (0.235) (0.248)
|MˆE| 0.107 0.00109 0.0356 0.185 0.21 -0.0414 -0.00911 -0.00918
(0.166) (0.164) (0.159) (0.157) (0.161) (0.149) (0.154) (0.167)
|MˆN | -0.118 -0.336* -0.313 -0.297 -0.350* -0.498***† -0.143 -0.327
(0.199) (0.194) (0.192) (0.188) (0.193) (0.187) (0.190) (0.201)
|MˆO| -0.227 -0.340* -0.276 -0.342* -0.326* -0.0298 -0.0914 -0.265
(0.188) (0.182) (0.179) (0.183) (0.181) (0.176) (0.180) (0.187)
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † p<0.05 after Bonferroni correction. n=278.
Notes: These are mismatch estimates from 5 groups of ordered logit regressions. Speci￿￿cation 1 includes
controls for raw personality, age, age-squared, gender, employment status, education, education mismatch,
working hours, and salary. Speci￿￿cation 2 adds further controls for mood, well-being, health, marital status,
and race. Bonferroni corrections are applied to regression groups 2 and 5 to control for multiple hypotheses.
These represent conservative lower bounds for signi￿￿cance.
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actual salary. The coe￿￿￿cient for salary was equally signi￿￿cant, but with magni-
tudes of 0.27 and 0.257 in the ￿￿rst and second speci￿￿cations, respectively. This is
only approximately 55￿ of the estimates for Neuroticismmismatch. Therefore,
satisfactionwith pay ismore strongly associatedwith personality traitmismatch
than with pay itself, by nearly a factor of 2. This suggests that relative incomes,
personal characteristics, or personal expectations about one’s earning potential
(Rutledge et al., 2014), are more important than absolute earnings in determin-
ing satisfaction with pay.
For regression groups 2 and 5 in Table 6, I apply Bonferroni corrections to ad-
just for multiple comparisons. There are ￿￿ve hypotheses corresponding to each
of the Big Five mismatch variables if we are testing for the impact of person-
ality mismatch as a whole on job satisfaction. For joint signi￿￿cance at the a =
0.05 level, we require a corrected p-value that is below 0.01. Therefore, any mis-
match coe￿￿￿cient that is signi￿￿cant at the a = 0.01 level is also jointly signi￿￿cant
at least at the a = 0.05 level. The Bonferroni correction is conservative as a cor-
rection formultiple comparisons. It is likely to be evenmore conservative in this
case, because the ￿￿ve tests are not independent (Abdi, 2007). Therefore, these
tests of joint signi￿￿cance represent ‘worst case’ lower bounds. Despite this, the
strong association between Neuroticism mismatch and satisfaction with pay is
signi￿￿cant in both speci￿￿cations after correcting for multiple hypotheses.
Taking themean of scalarmismatch estimates fromSpeci￿￿cation 1 gives us an
average coe￿￿￿cient for mismatch on job satisfaction of -0.278. All other things
constant, a one point increase in scalar mismatchmeans that the predicted odds
of being ‘very satis￿￿ed’, relative to the set of all four lower satisfaction categories,
changes by a factor of 0.758. In other words, one is only about 76￿ as likely to
report being ‘very satis￿￿ed’ if personality mismatch increases by one point.
Point estimates for personalitymismatch are, in general,much greater inmag-
nitude than those for salary. However, education level and educationmismatch
were much more strongly related to job satisfaction than personality or person-
ality mismatch.
Finally, it should be noted that when self-reported job ￿￿t was substituted for
scalar personality mismatch in speci￿￿cation 1, it dominated all other estimates.
When including both self-reported ￿￿t and scalar mismatch, the coe￿￿￿cients for
personality mismatch were smaller in general, but still signi￿￿cant. Therefore,
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personality mismatch appears to be a key determinant of job satisfaction lev-
els. However, there are other aspects of job ￿￿t that are clearly not personality
related.
1.4.2.3 Subjective Well-being
We have established that a mismatch in personality is related to lower job sat-
isfaction. To answer the main question of this chapter, we need to determine
whether this relationship holds for subjective well-being.
The general speci￿￿cation of the regression to be estimated is given by (5),
withW representing a well-being measure. Again, P represents raw personality
and personality mismatch, E represents education and educational mismatch,
and X captures a series of additional controls. This equation captures the three
main channels that determine happiness and well-being, as observed by Easter-
lin (2005) - personality, health, and standard of living (represented by wage).
Wi =b0 + b1Pi + b2HEALTHi + b3WAGEi + gEi + dYEARi
+ qXi + ei
(5)
Whilst Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is often used to estimate well-being
equations, coe￿￿￿cient estimates will be inconsistent since one cannot assume
that the distances between response categories are perceived as being the same.
In the present case, one would expect this to be more of a problem when using
the SWLS thanwith the rank-basedmeasures, which are designed tomake it easy
for an individual to rank themselves on an evenly-spaced scale. To estimate the
regression equations, therefore, I used both ordered logit andOLS approaches.13
However, since both approaches gave very similar results, I report only the es-
timates from OLS in order to allow for more intuitive interpretation. Regular
OLS standard errors were computed for all regressions, as Breusch-Pagan and
Cook-Weisberg tests did not ￿￿nd evidence of heteroskedasticity.
13 An ordered probit model gives qualitatively very similar results, and is often preferred in eco-
nomics research. However, there is no theoretical reason for us to prefer a probit speci￿￿cation
i.e. we would not expect well-being a priori to be dependent on a latent normally distributed
random variable.
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T￿￿￿￿ 7:Relationship between Big Five mismatch and subjective well-being, with no controls.
Dependent variable:
Happiness Life Satis SWLS Happiness Life Satis SWLS Happiness Life Satis SWLS
mˆ -0.556*** -0.619*** -2.443*** - - - - - -
|MˆA| - - - 0.0681 0.11 0.155 - - -
|MˆC| - - - -0.179 -0.251 -1.533** - - -
|MˆE| - - - -0.0815 -0.168 -0.968** - - -
|MˆN | - - - -0.813*** -0.836*** -2.374*** - - -
|MˆO| - - - -0.0774 0.102 -0.471 - - -
MˆA - - - - - - 0.135 -0.0528 0.435
MˆC - - - - - - -0.135 0.185 0.727
MˆE - - - - - - -0.0154 0.138 0.817**
MˆN - - - - - - -0.792*** -0.733*** -2.025***
MˆO - - - - - - -0.144 -0.152 -1.207***
Constant 7.442*** 7.399*** 28.09*** 7.151*** 6.972*** 27.07*** 6.605*** 6.655*** 24.88***
Observations 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279
R2 0.139 0.152 0.235 0.191 0.192 0.253 0.213 0.211 0.248
Standard errors omitted for brevity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7 shows the raw relationship between personality mismatch and three
di￿ferentmeasures of subjectivewell-being.Without including control variables,
we see that an increase in scalar mismatch by one point corresponds with just
over a half-point reduction in life satisfaction and happiness yesterday rankings.
Whenwe separatemismatch for each Big Five factor, onlymismatch inNeuroti-
cism has a consistently signi￿￿cant relationship with all three measures of well-
being. Mismatches in Extraversion and Conscientiousness are only signi￿￿cant
in the SWLS regression, but they have consistently negative associations with all
three well-beingmeasures. The SWLSmeasure containsmore items than the sin-
gle life satisfaction ranking task, and so it may be that this measure is able to
capture a wider gamut of life satisfaction determinants. The negative relation-
ship between personality mismatch and life satisfaction supports the ￿￿nding
obtained by L. Winkelmann and R.Winkelmann (2008).
The third group of regressions uses the Mˆ measures of mismatch (i.e. with-
out taking the absolute value). These show that being too Extraverted for your
job is associated with signi￿￿cantly higher life satisfaction.14 The same relation-
ship holds for being too Conscientious, however estimates were not statistically
signi￿￿cant in this case. Being tooNeurotic or tooOpen is associated with lower
levels of all well-being measures.
Adding control variables, Table 8 shows the results of the regressions with
each of the three measures of well-being as dependent variables. The strongest
covariate with happiness yesterday and both life satisfactionmeasures is the self-
assessed health level of the individual. Healthier people, unsurprisingly, report
higher subjective well-being. Neither salary, gender, race, education, nor em-
ployment status are strongly associated with well-being. This seems to support
the theory (and previous evidence) that suggests relative income is a stronger de-
terminant of well-being than absolute income (e.g. Blanch￿￿ower and Oswald,
2004b).15 We can also see that a U-shape in life satisfaction is evident over the
life cycle, in accordance with a number of studies.
14 This is somewhat surprising, considering the theoretical discussion in Section 1.2 suggests that
being mismatched in either direction should result in a well-being loss.
15 Results from the ordered logit versions of these regressions give largely the same conclusion,
though OLS may have underestimated the positive e￿fects of marriage/cohabitation on happi-
ness.
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T￿￿￿￿ 8:The relationship between Big Five mismatch and subjective well-being, with full set of controls.
Dependent Variable
Happiness Life Satis SWLS Happiness Life Satis SWLS Happiness Life Satis SWLS
mˆ -0.152 -0.218* -1.131*** - - - - - -
|MˆA| - - - -0.0423 -0.0134 0.112 - - -
|MˆC | - - - -0.0444 0.191 -1.132 - - -
|MˆE| - - - -0.0872 -0.184 -0.777 - - -
|MˆN | - - - -0.109 -0.277 -0.616 - - -
|MˆO| - - - -0.0878 0.0733 -0.186 - - -
MˆA - - - - - - 0.196 -0.0718 0.267
MˆC - - - - - - -0.0279 -0.0311 0.928
MˆE - - - - - - -0.204 0.0695 0.58
MˆN - - - - - - -0.336 -0.477* -0.307
MˆO - - - - - - -0.221 -0.125 -1.109*
Agreeableness 0.235* 0.0541 0.206 0.233 0.0896 0.354 0.0732 0.131 0.0958
Conscientiousness -0.0605 0.202 0.46 -0.0498 0.358* 0.166 0.0361 0.317 0.0148
Extraversion -0.0148 0.0095 0.0646 -0.0106 -0.0211 0.0773 0.202 0.0166 0.0665
Neuroticism -0.599*** -0.550*** -1.499*** -0.580*** -0.460*** -1.472*** -0.387* -0.238 -1.638**
Openness 0.0217 -0.0849 -0.449 0.016 -0.128 -0.587 0.143 -0.0185 0.191
Health level 0.742*** 0.766*** 1.764*** 0.747*** 0.769*** 1.741*** 0.743*** 0.770*** 1.716***
Salary -0.00965 0.0522 0.400* -0.00719 0.0673 0.415* -0.00527 0.0758 0.461**
Age 0.00193 -0.0921 -0.690*** -0.000858 -0.103 -0.730*** -0.0132 -0.117 -0.713***
Age2 -0.000229 0.000719 0.00618** -0.000197 0.000856 0.00666** -2.85e-05 0.00102 0.00645**
Male 0.11 -0.221 -0.117 0.101 -0.191 0.00721 0.0636 -0.219 0.13
Married/cohabiting 0.511 0.422 2.698*** 0.504 0.421 2.940*** 0.53* 0.457 2.854***
Have children? -0.729** -0.194 1.523 -0.727** -0.234 1.374 -0.849** -0.296 1.1
White -0.0519 -0.0812 1.218 -0.05 -0.0358 1.222 0.039 0.0516 1.468
Is religious? 0.378 0.12 0.00156 0.385 0.12 0.0135 0.331 0.133 0.0799
Education level -0.119 -0.106 1.072 -0.122 -0.0872 1.158* -0.167 -0.158 0.972
Education mismatch 0.0996 0.255 -0.457 0.104 0.187 -0.635 0.204 0.347 -0.275
Work hours /wk -0.11 -0.0438 -0.0935 -0.109 -0.0325 -0.0575 -0.114 -0.0466 -0.101
Is in FTE? 0.106 -0.0292 0.612 0.111 -0.0865 0.323 0.171 -0.0672 0.542
Year Dummy -0.231 -0.281 -1.01 -0.235 -0.285 -1.076 -0.238 -0.314 -1.427*
Constant 5.770*** 6.878*** 30.57*** 5.676** 5.714** 32.15*** 3.997* 4.849* 29.97***
Observations 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 278
R2 0.378 0.342 0.46 0.378 0.344 0.46 0.388 0.349 0.453
Standard errors omitted for brevity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Now that raw personality trait scores have been controlled for, we see that
the strongly signi￿￿cant coe￿￿￿cient for amismatch inNeuroticism inTable 7was
likely picking up the fact that more Neurotic people in general rate themselves
lower on all three well-being measures. This is consistent with the ￿￿nding that
personality traits themselves can explain a large portion of the variance in sub-
jective well-being (Steel, Schmidt, and Shultz, 2008). These results also support
previous research that identi￿￿esNeuroticism as the strongest personality predic-
tor for life satisfaction and happiness, as well as Conscientiousness having the
strongest positive correlation with life satisfaction (DeNeve and Cooper, 1998).
Extraversion and Neuroticism are the two Big Five factors for which the largest
body of underlying theory exists. Extraversion is closely related to the tendency
to experience positive a￿fect, and Neuroticism to negative a￿fect (e.g. McCrae
and John, 1992). The ￿￿nding that rawNeuroticism is related to lowerwell-being
is therefore not surprising, and mirrors early ￿￿ndings from Costa and McCrae
(1980). However, according to this research, we would also expect raw Extraver-
sion to be positively related with well-being, which is not consistently the case
in the present analysis.
Scalar personality mismatch is signi￿￿cantly related to well-being, but more
so with life satisfaction than happiness. The coe￿￿￿cient is now smaller in magni-
tude, owing to variance being captured by Neuroticism and health level. How-
ever, a one-point mismatch is still associated with a 0.15 position reduction in
happiness ranking, and a 0.22 position reduction in life satisfaction ranking. To
put this into perspective, the mean scalar mismatch score in the sample is 2.58.
For an individual with this mean level of mismatch, they would rate themselves
0.56 of a ranking position lower on life satisfaction than someone with no mis-
match.
When the trait-separatedmeasures ofmismatch areused,we see that although
Neuroticism mismatch has the strongest relationship across all three measures
of well-being of the ￿￿ve factors, coe￿￿￿cient estimates are of low statistical signi￿￿-
cance. Using the non-absolutemismatchmeasures does suggest that individuals
su￿fer from almost half a position reduction in life satisfaction for each excess
point in Neuroticism. Furthermore, there is weak evidence suggesting that, as
we saw with the raw correlations in Table 7, excess Extraversion may be bene￿￿-
cial for life satisfaction, but the opposite is true for excess Openness.
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Sincewe established that personalitymismatch is related to job satisfaction in
Section 1.4.2.2, I now test whether it can explain any portion of the variance in
well-being through a channel other than job satisfaction. Intuitively, a person-
ality mismatch at work may have implications for general physical and mental
well-being, which are not realised exclusively in the workplace.
Table 9 shows that job satisfaction is indeed important for general well-being.
In particular, one’s sense of achievement from work, and skill development op-
portunities are strongly related to higher well-being. However, there is still a
signi￿￿cant coe￿￿￿cient for scalar mismatch on life satisfaction. For the SWLS re-
gression, adding job satisfaction variables has only lowered the mismatch coe￿￿￿-
cient by 0.264 in absolute terms, and still p<0.01. This suggests that personality
mismatch has negative implications for well-being outside the workplace.
Finally, Table 10 repeats the regressions from Tables 8 and 9, but using self-
reported job-￿￿t instead of personality mismatch. For the regressions exclusive
of job satisfaction variables, job-￿￿t has a smaller relationship (in absolute terms)
with both measures of life satisfaction. Furthermore, the coe￿￿￿cients for job-￿￿t
in the life satisfaction regressions are not strongly signi￿￿cant. However, the ab-
solute relationship between happiness and job-￿￿t is nearly twice as strong as
that of happiness and scalar personality mismatch. A similar conclusion can be
drawn when job satisfaction variables are included.
This ￿￿nding suggests that although self-reported ￿￿t is more useful than per-
sonality mismatch in accounting for an individual’s level of job satisfaction, it
is less useful in accounting for general life satisfaction. This again implies that a
personality mismatch at work may have more long-term implications for well-
being.
1.4.3 Personality Mismatch and Wage
Section 1.2 describes how a worker who has a larger personality mismatch is
likely to be less productive. Although the employer may not realise this at the
time of employment, over a longer period, we might expect the wage of these
mismatched individuals to be lower than those better matched to their jobs.
Classical earnings regression speci￿￿cations, such as Mincer (1974), measure
earnings by taking into account the e￿fects of schooling and work experience. I
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T￿￿￿￿ 9: Personality mismatch is related to life satisfaction not only through job satisfaction.
Dependent variable:
Happiness Life Satis SWLS Happiness Life Satis SWLS
mˆ -0.124 -0.182 -0.867*** - - -
|MˆA| - - - -0.00435 0.0505 0.426
|MˆC | - - - -0.0496 0.171 -1.247*
|MˆE| - - - -0.106 -0.224 -0.896*
|MˆN | - - - -0.0689 -0.202 -0.181
|MˆO| - - - -0.08 0.0877 -0.0291
Agreeableness 0.203 0.00181 -0.0295 0.215 0.0546 0.2
Conscientiousness -0.0722 0.191 0.489 -0.068 0.328* 0.0723
Extraversion -0.0299 -0.0192 0.0652 -0.0439 -0.0792 -0.0585
Neuroticism -0.580*** -0.553*** -1.494*** -0.574*** -0.482*** -1.592***
Openness 0.0666 -0.021 -0.42 0.0582 -0.0709 -0.588
Health level 0.771*** 0.831*** 1.659*** 0.769*** 0.821*** 1.557***
Salary -0.0298 0.026 0.259 -0.0285 0.0424 0.258
Age 0.0161 -0.0795 -0.641** 0.0125 -0.0917 -0.680**
Age2 -0.000341 0.000643 0.00568* -0.0003 0.000799 0.00615**
Male 0.0306 -0.408 -0.641 0.0344 -0.351 -0.401
Married/cohabiting 0.438 0.281 2.139** 0.437 0.289 2.421**
Have children? -0.723** -0.119 1.509 -0.724** -0.158 1.345
White 0.00234 0.0669 1.27 8.03e-05 0.0993 1.22
Is religious? 0.411 0.206 -0.000801 0.409 0.194 -0.0834
Education level -0.146 -0.128 0.791 -0.143 -0.115 0.888
Education mismatch 0.102 0.217 -0.104 0.101 0.153 -0.296
Working hours per wk -0.111 -0.0441 -0.171 -0.109 -0.033 -0.14
Is in FTE? 0.153 0.0521 1.499 0.145 -0.0239 1.113
Year Dummy -0.194 -0.249 -0.891 -0.204 -0.262 -1.013
WERS 1 0.398* 0.495** 1.398** 0.404* 0.523** 1.421**
WERS 2 -0.163 -0.362* -0.579 -0.158 -0.341 -0.493
WERS 3 -0.0231 0.102 0.299 -0.0275 0.0909 0.291
WERS 4 0.0559 0.114 -0.787 0.052 0.127 -0.804
WERS 5 0.0976 0.339* 1.303** 0.103 0.352* 1.435***
WERS 6 0.104 0.177 0.904** 0.105 0.167 0.938**
WERS 7 0.147 0.189 0.366 0.148 0.179 0.386
WERS 8 -0.362* -0.718*** -1.325** -0.370* -0.719*** -1.340**
Constant 4.575** 5.452** 26.70*** 4.621** 4.477* 29.24***
Observations 278 278 278 278 278 278
R2 0.401 0.404 0.508 0.401 0.407 0.514
Standard errors omitted for brevity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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T￿￿￿￿ 10: Job-￿￿t is less signi￿￿cantly related to life satisfaction than personality mismatch
Dependent Variable:
Happiness Life Satis SWLS Happiness Life Satis SWLS
Self reported job-￿￿t 0.319** 0.207 0.801* 0.468** 0.347* 0.328
Agreeableness 0.229 0.0451 0.158 0.217 0.00235 -0.103
Conscientiousness -0.0939 0.191 0.446 -0.105 0.173 0.52
Extraversion 0.0577 0.115 0.614* 0.0353 0.0712 0.476
Neuroticism -0.586*** -0.583*** -1.723*** -0.576*** -0.575*** -1.706***
Openness -0.0443 -0.167 -0.862* 0.00114 -0.0975 -0.709
Health level 0.721*** 0.765*** 1.790*** 0.760*** 0.826*** 1.678***
Salary -0.0094 0.0583 0.438** -0.033 0.0268 0.284
Age -0.00551 -0.101 -0.733*** 0.00376 -0.0904 -0.666***
Age2 -0.000154 0.000813 0.00665** -0.000206 0.000764 0.00596*
Male 0.157 -0.17 0.127 0.0606 -0.373 -0.505
Married/cohabiting 0.543* 0.466 2.927*** 0.48 0.32 2.240**
Have children? -0.760** -0.218 1.418 -0.760** -0.145 1.49
White -0.108 -0.104 1.161 -0.0325 0.0475 1.301
Is religious? 0.32 0.114 0.0502 0.363 0.191 0.142
Education level -0.131 -0.107 1.084 -0.106 -0.101 0.796
Education mismatch 0.159 0.288 -0.342 0.124 0.24 -0.0328
Working hours per wk -0.108 -0.0372 -0.0544 -0.11 -0.0412 -0.15
Is in FTE? 0.156 0.0142 0.806 0.229 0.13 1.74
Year Dummy -0.28 -0.344 -1.324 -0.244 -0.306 -1.099
WERS 1 - - - 0.413** 0.511** 1.450**
WERS 2 - - - -0.226 -0.393* -0.488
WERS 3 - - - -0.0505 0.0772 0.24
WERS 4 - - - 0.0524 0.111 -0.794
WERS 5 - - - 0.0823 0.340* 1.403***
WERS 6 - - - 0.132 0.205 0.984**
WERS 7 - - - 0.109 0.161 0.344
WERS 8 - - - -0.513** -0.824*** -1.385**
Constant 4.579** 5.783** 25.54*** 3.652* 4.438* 23.19***
Observations 278 278 278 278 278 278
R2 0.383 0.336 0.441 0.411 0.404 0.495
Standard errors omitted for brevity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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use this as a starting point from which to add additional explanatory variables.
Since data on total years of work experience were only collected in the ￿￿nal sam-
ple, duration of employment at current/most recent job is used as a suitable
alternative to capture the variation in wage accounted for by experience. This
allows for the full sample to be used.16
As is often the case in earnings regressions, ability is unobservable and there
is no true measure available to us to control for this. Heckman, Lochner, and
Todd (2003) explain that the importance of ability bias is still a point of con-
tention in economics. The Big Five factor Openness is closely tied to intellect
and creativity, and so its inclusion may account for at least some of the individ-
ual di￿ference in ability.
Table 11 shows the results of the wage regressions, estimated using ordered
logit.17 In regressions (1) and (2), only a minimal set of control variables is in-
cluded. Additional controls are added for regressions (3) and (4).
There are a number of interesting ￿￿ndings fromTable 11. First,we see that raw
personality traits are related to wages, as we might expect from previous work
by Nyhus and Pons (2005). I ￿￿nd, as they do, that Neuroticism is negatively
associated with earnings. However, in contrast to their ￿￿ndings, Conscientious-
ness appears to be associated with a lower wage. The reason for this is not clear,
however, it is likely to be a feature of the speci￿￿c sample obtained for this study.
Second, a mismatch in Conscientiousness is signi￿￿cantly negatively related
to wage in regressions (2) and (4). The odds of being in a higher salary band are
signi￿￿cantly reduced with a one-point increase in Conscientiousness mismatch.
This reduction outweighs the positive impact on wages that on-the-job experi-
ence brings bymore than a factor of two.AnOLS estimate of this coe￿￿￿cient tells
us that a one point increase in Conscientiousness mismatch reduces an individ-
ual’s salary by over a third of a band (each band being approximately $10,000).18
Finally, education has the strongest observable relationship with earnings,
as we would expect. However, an educational mismatch is also very strongly
related with earnings. In the sample, only 1.43￿ are undereducated for their
16 It was found that duration of employment at the most recent job was more relevant in deter-
mining current wage than work experience. These results are available upon request.
17 The reason for using ordered logit in this case is that the top salary band (over $100,000) is
disproportionate in size in comparison to the other bands, which have a ￿￿xedwidth of $10,000.
18 The direction of Conscientiousnessmismatchwas not important (data available upon request).
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T￿￿￿￿ 11: Big Five mismatch and its relation to wages (ordered logit).
Dependent Variable: Gross annual salary level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mˆ -0.152 - -0.105 -
|MˆA| - -0.0952 - -0.0983
|MˆC| - -0.574*** - -0.488**
|MˆE| - -0.0115 - 0.108
|MˆN | - 0.21 - 0.0537
|MˆO| - -0.175 - -0.0268
Agreeableness -0.0652 -0.12 -0.0344 -0.0819
Conscientiousness -0.107 -0.380** -0.152 -0.387**
Extraversion 0.0878 0.177 0.046 0.163
Neuroticism -0.313*** -0.464*** -0.286*** -0.347**
Openness 0.19 0.216 0.269* 0.286*
Health Level - - 0.0886 0.104
Age 0.106 0.114 0.0227 0.0207
Age2 -0.00145 -0.00157* -0.000372 -0.000362
Male 0.405* 0.379 0.204 0.161
Married/cohabiting - - 0.46 0.49
Have children? - - -0.0666 -0.0907
White -0.00226 -0.0447 0.0449 0.035
Is religious? - - -0.897*** -0.858***
Education level 0.650*** 0.675*** 1.176*** 1.184***
Education mismatch - - -0.955*** -0.932***
Working hours per wk - - 0.221*** 0.212***
Is in FTE? - - 0.973*** 0.944**
Time in job 0.194*** 0.201*** 0.200*** 0.209***
Year Dummy 0.332 0.302 0.429* 0.454*
Industry Dummies? No No Yes Yes
Observations 278 278 278 278
Cut constants and standard errors are omitted for brevity.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1.5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 37
job, as opposed to 37.63￿who are overeducated. Whilst this is an issue outside
the scope of this chapter, we may be concerned by this result, as it suggests ei-
ther a shortage of jobs for high-skilled people, or simply that workers are over-
investing in education.
In regressions (1) and (3), (where scalar mismatch was included, rather than
trait-level mismatch) although mismatch had a negative relationship with earn-
ings, themagnitudes of this relationshipwere not large. Examining the traitmis-
match estimates in (2) and (4), we see that this is due to a positive association be-
tween Neuroticismmismatch and earnings. Since higher Neuroticism is linked
to lower earnings, we might suspect that this mismatch e￿fect is because most
people in the sample are less Neurotic than a job requires (and this could be
somewhat desirable). However, Figure 4 shows that we observe the opposite in
the raw data.More people have excess levels of Neuroticism than those who are
less Neurotic than required. Although the coe￿￿￿cient was not signi￿￿cant, this is
a somewhat puzzling ￿￿nding.
1.5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Whilst limitations of individual ￿￿ndings are discussed in previous sections, here
I brie￿￿y summarise some of the general limitations with this study. First, al-
though every e￿fort has been made to include confounding factors, the chain
of causality is di￿￿￿cult to establish. An instrumental variables approach is dif-
￿￿cult to apply to the Big Five. In theory, the Big Five factors are supposed to
represent primitive aspects of human personality. To ￿￿nd reasonable correlates
for each factor, as well as having these uncorrelated to the dependent variable, is
therefore di￿￿￿cult to achieve.
Due to the novel measures of personality mismatch used, the sample size is
relatively small and cross-sectional. A longitudinal and representative version of
these data would be ideal in theory in order to obtain clearer causality, although
one would have to be careful of attrition and other endogeneity issues. Lon-
gitudinal data would also allow us to control for personality change, if future
research suggests personality traits are less stable than currently appears to be
the case.
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1.6 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Themain ￿￿ndings of this chapter can be summarised as follows. First, personal-
ity mismatch between a worker and their job has a strong negative relationship
with their level of job satisfaction. When traits are separated out, mismatches
in Neuroticism andOpenness have the strongest relationships with job satisfac-
tion. In particular, personality mismatch is more strongly related to satisfaction
with pay than actual salary.
Second, personalitymismatchhas a signi￿￿cantly negative associationwith life
satisfaction. This relationship holds even when controlling for job satisfaction,
suggesting that amismatch inpersonalitymaybeharming aworker evenoutside
thework environment.An individualwith amean level of personalitymismatch
places approximately 0.5 lower on a 0-10 scale for life satisfaction. In addition,
there is some weaker evidence that suggests being too Open or Neurotic lowers
life satisfaction, but being too Extraverted may actually prove to be bene￿￿cial.
Self-reported job ￿￿t is not as strongly related to life satisfaction as personality
mismatch. Therefore, personality mismatch appears to provide us with a more
holistic metric for measuring long-term well-being implications of job ￿￿t.
Third, a mismatch in Conscientiousness has a negative relationship with an-
nual earnings. The magnitude of this relationship is more than double the im-
pact of the time an individual had been working at their job. This suggests that
personality trait mismatch can completely o￿fset the positive e￿fect that work
experience has on salary. Hence, individuals with a higher level of personality
mismatch are also likely to be less well-o￿f.
This study highlights the need for further attention to be given to personal-
ity factors and optimal personality matching in the labour market. More gen-
erally, it stresses the importance of psychological measures, relative to classical
observed variables used commonly in labour economics. Previous research has
highlighted the severe impact that unemployment has on well-being. The ￿￿nd-
ings in this chapter suggest that personality mismatch has a severe impact on
well-being even for those in employment.19
19 There is also a distinct possibility that mismatched individuals are more likely to become unem-
ployed. If this is found to be true, then addressing the problem of personality mismatch may
help to mitigate against job attrition. This is left for future work.
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Even though poor job ￿￿t has been shown to be related to lower job satisfac-
tion, ￿t does not correlate with job choice (Judge and Cable, 1997). Therefore, a
simple and potent policy would be to educate younger individuals about the
value of personality matching when deciding upon a career path. This is likely
to reduce the cost incurred as a result of investing time and e￿fort in a pursuit
thatmay leave them less satis￿￿edwith their lives overall, as well as reducing their
lifetime income.

2
THE DETERMINANTS OF WELL - B E ING
PR IOR IT I SAT ION OVER THE L I F E CYCLE
Recently, a novel attempt has been made to estimate priorities for the
di￿ferent aspects of subjective well-being, in order to understand where
resourcesmight best be allocated.However, the determinants of, and life
cycle trends for prioritisation have yet to be studied. This chapter - the
￿￿rst to study these issues - ￿￿nds no consistent (cross-sectional) evidence
of variation in priorities over the life cycle, unlike the ‘mid-life crisis’ ob-
served for levels. Life satisfaction is the most valued aspect of well-being
throughout life.However, people overestimate the valueplacedbyothers
on happiness. Well-being priorities are strongly in￿￿uenced by well-being
levels, and individual ￿￿xed e￿fects such as personality, health level, and
smoking frequency. The separation of aspects into cognitive and a￿fec-
tive factors may provide additional insight into how individuals generate
priorities, and hence inform the optimal targeting of policy.
2.1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
After decades of focus by economists on improving incomes and production,
more recentworkhas highlighted that increasing incomepast a certain level does
not necessarily translate to any marked improvement in an individual’s level of
subjective well-being (though this ￿￿nding is still subject to debate, e.g. Steven-
son andWolfers, 2008, 2013).When examining time series data,mean happiness
remains unchanged even when income increases (e.g. Easterlin, 2005). Subse-
quent research has uncovered important determinants of subjective well-being,
such as relative comparison (A. E. Clark and Oswald, 1996; Ferrer-i-Carbonell,
2005); unemployment (A. E.Clark andOswald, 1994); andother non-pecuniary
factors (Blanch￿￿ower and Oswald, 2004b).
As a result of earlier research, theUKO￿￿￿ce forNational Statistics (ONS) now
measures four aspects of subjective well-being. These are: happiness yesterday;
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satisfactionwith life; worthwhileness of life; and anxiety yesterday. It is clear that
the collection of these data is designed to help inform policymakers of the fac-
tors that improve an individual’s overall quality of life. However, limited work
has been done to establish which of these well-being measures is considered im-
portant to individuals.Ultimately, if economies are to shift their attention to im-
proving societal welfare, it is important to understand the relative signi￿￿cance
of each aspect of well-being in order to allow for informed policy decisions.
O’Donnell and Oswald (2015) appear to be the ￿￿rst to obtain weightings for
the four aspects of well-being, in order to estimate the linear approximation
of a ‘change in well-being’ function. The weights they collect correspond to
fh, fs, fw, and fa in the following expression:
DW ⇠= K[ fh(h  h0) + fs(s  s0) + fw(w w0)  fa(a  a0)] (6)
where h, s,w and a refer to happiness, life satisfaction,worthwhileness, and anx-
iety, respectively. Of the four samples they collect, three give the highest weight-
ing to life satisfaction ( fs).
These data represent a ￿￿rst attempt at estimation. As such, these three sam-
ples were taken from economics students, business students, and professional
economists. They are therefore likely to be unrepresentative of the wider pop-
ulation. Since the focus of the study was to estimate weights alone, no attempt
wasmade to uncover how theseweightsmight be determined, andwhether they
are di￿ferent for di￿ferent individuals.
Given that previous research on the determinants and life cycle trends ofwell-
being has been plentiful (see Dolan, Peasgood, and White, 2008, for a review
of the economic literature on well-being), a natural extension would be to link
these ideas to the determination of well-being priorities. This chapter appears
to be the ￿￿rst study of its kind to address these issues.
This study has twomain aims. First, it extends the ￿￿ndings inO’Donnell and
Oswald (2015) by uncoveringwhichwell-being aspects are given highest priority
over the life cycle. Second, it provides an initial attempt to understand what de-
termines the rank ordering of well-being aspects. Neither of these issues has pre-
viously been explored in the literature. I ￿￿nd that the non-linear ‘mid-life crisis’
dip observed in well-being levels does not reliably translate to a corresponding
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relationship forwell-being prioritisation.However, themiddle-aged focusmore
on their own level of well-being in their determination of happiness and anxi-
ety. Individual characteristics have a strong in￿￿uence on which aspect is given
highest priority.
The trends and determinants of subjective well-being have been studied for a
number of years, in both economics and psychology. A large number of general
￿￿ndings have emerged as a result of this research. Relative comparisons based
on income have strong e￿fects on well-being levels (e.g. A. E. Clark and Oswald,
1996; Dolan, Peasgood, and White, 2008; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005), suggesting
that the traditional economic focus on increasing income per capita (past some
threshold) may have little impact in terms of increasing per capita well-being.
A wealth of economic studies have shown the negative impact of unemploy-
ment and poor labour market outcomes on well-being (e.g. Frey and Stutzer,
2002; Oswald, 1997; L. Winkelmann and R. Winkelmann, 2008). These seem
to be linked less with a loss of income than a psychological loss. The same can
be said for a reduction in levels of health. Other personal circumstances and
lifestyle choices alsohave a signi￿￿cant in￿￿uence on levels of subjectivewell-being.
Most notably, this includes marriage (Blanch￿￿ower and Oswald, 2004a), exer-
cise (Ferrer-i-Carbonell andGowdy, 2007), and diet (Mujcic andOswald, 2016).
In addition to these situational factors, personal characteristics also a￿fectwell-
being.TheBigFivepersonality factors Extraversion andNeuroticismare strongly
linked to well-being levels; the former positively and the latter negatively (Di-
ener and Lucas, 1999). Subsequent research has shown that ￿￿ner-grained mea-
sures may have more explanatory power (Dolan, Peasgood, and White, 2008).
Still, it is clear that individual characteristics shape well-being.
One of the most prominent and consistent ￿￿ndings is that there is a U-shape
inwell-being over the life cycle in cross-sectional data, andwhilst controlling for
factors such as health and income (e.g. Blanch￿￿ower andOswald, 2004a; Ferrer-
i-Carbonell and Gowdy, 2007). This pattern is consistent with the theory of a
‘mid-life crisis’ in psychology (e.g. Brim, 1976), andmay be generated partly as a
result of forecasting error (Schwandt, 2016). TheU-shape for happiness and life
satisfaction has been shown to hold across a number of di￿ferent countries, and
when taking into account cohort e￿fects (Blanch￿￿ower andOswald, 2008). This
rules out the explanation that the observed mid-life dip in well-being is being
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caused by generational di￿ferences in the trajectory of happiness over the life cy-
cle. The U-shape holds longitudinally within individuals (Cheng, Powdthavee,
and Oswald, 2015). Evidence of a mid-life crisis has also been found in primates
(Weiss et al., 2012). Some recent studies (e.g. Frijters and Beatton, 2012; Kassen-
boehmer and Haisken-DeNew, 2012) have highlighted issues with this pattern
due to unobserved heterogeneity (such as interviewer e￿fects), reverse causality,
and ￿￿xed e￿fects. Despite this, the majority of evidence points towards the pres-
ence of a U-shape over the life cycle.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 uses data
from the UK APS to analyse life cycle patterns for well-being levels, in order to
form expectations for prioritisation behaviour. It then discusses how prioritisa-
tion may be determined by well-being levels. Section 2.3 presents evidence ob-
tained from the online survey data collected for O’Donnell and Oswald (2015).
Section 2.4 presents evidence obtained from a new online survey designed to
address shortcomings of the data from Section 2.3, and estimates themodel pro-
posed in Section 2.2. Section 2.5 provides a discussion of the results, and how
the di￿ference between cognitive and a￿fective measures of well-being may help
to explain them. Finally, Section 2.6 summarises the ￿￿ndings of the chapter, and
concludes.
2.2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
2.2.1 Well-being levels across the life cycle
It is important to highlight at this stage that throughout this chapter, I attempt
to identify patterns over the life cycle from cross-sectional data. This has the
inherent problem that a comparison is made across birth cohorts, and so we
may be uncovering generational di￿ferences rather than true age e￿fects. How-
ever, as discussed brie￿￿y in Section 2.1, whilst non-linearities in well-being levels
were initially shown using cross-sectional data, subsequent work has con￿￿rmed
the relationships when controlling for cohort di￿ferences (Blanch￿￿ower andOs-
wald, 2008). Whilst this does not mean that any life cycle patterns found in the
present work can be generalised to hold within the same birth cohort, it does
suggest that ￿￿ndings from this study have the potential for wider applicability.
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To understand how we might expect individuals to prioritise well-being a
priori, and to determine whether the U-shaped pattern for levels of well-being
holds in more recent data, I look at the life cycle patterns of well-being levels
using data from the 2013-14 UKAnnual Population survey (O￿￿￿ce for National
Statistics. Social Survey Division, 2014). The four well-being questions asked to
respondents are as follows (each is scored on a scale from 0-10):
1. “Overall, how happy did you feel yesterday?”
2. “Overall, how satis￿￿ed are you with your life nowadays?”
3. “Overall, to what extent do you feel the things you do in your life
are worthwhile?”
4. “Overall, how anxious did you feel yesterday?”
Figure 5 plots ￿￿tted third-order polynomial curves in age to reported levels of
happiness yesterday, life satisfaction, worthwhileness of life, and anxiety.We see
that happiness and life satisfaction exhibit a U-shape across the life cycle, and
anxiety is hump-shaped. No additional controls were used - this is a pattern
found in raw data.1 According to these data, it does seem that the middle-aged
are, in fact, su￿fering from lower levels of well-being than the young and old.
The pattern for worthwhileness is somewhat more ambiguous. The overall
life cycle pattern could be described as a ‘late wave’. However, when separating
for gender, we see that males seem to experience an increasing level of worth-
whileness with age, whilst females su￿fer a sharp decline in later life. Further in-
vestigation reveals that this pattern disappears (i.e. the female curve looks more
similar to the male curve) when looking only at those with good or very good
levels of general health. From this, it appears as though femalesmay be factoring
health more highly in their evaluation of worthwhileness than males.2
When controls are added (Table 12), we see that the U-shape is still present.
Worthwhileness becomesU-shaped, in a similar fashion tohappiness and life sat-
isfaction. The estimates in Table 12 are obtained using both OLS (i.e. assuming
cardinality of well-being responses) and ordered logit (i.e. assuming ordinality
1 This is in contrast to Easterlin (2006), who claims that the U-shape only arises when control
variables are included in a quadratic regression of well-being on age.
2 This could be due to evolutionary reasons, such as fertility, and ability to nurture o￿fspring.
46 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
only). Both estimation methods o￿fer similar interpretations in terms of direc-
tion, which is consistent with Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004).
Gender di￿ferences over the life cycle are minimal for levels of life satisfaction
and worthwhileness. They are signi￿￿cantly di￿ferent for happiness and anxiety,
though gender di￿ferences in anxiety are more pronounced. Anxiety levels drop
o￿f much more rapidly for males after middle age, whereas they peak closer to
the age of 60 for females. All four of the life cycle relationships in Table 12 point
to a middle-aged dip in subjective well-being (i.e. a U-shaped pattern for levels
of happiness, life satisfaction, and worthwhileness; and a hump-shaped pattern
for levels of anxiety).
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 5: 3rd order polynomial age curves for levels of well-being, fromUKAPS, 2013-14. Solid black
line = raw data; dashed red line = females; dotted blue line = males. n=165,122.
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T￿￿￿￿ 12:The quadratic life cycle relationship of well-being levels, APS 2013-14
OLS Ordered Logit
Happiness Life Satisfaction Worthwhileness Anxiety Happiness Life Satisfaction Worthwhileness Anxiety
Age -0.0551*** -0.0818*** -0.0428*** 0.0409*** -0.0591*** -0.103*** -0.0618*** 0.0318***
Age2 0.000659*** 0.000896*** 0.000530*** -0.000412*** 0.000713*** 0.00115*** 0.000769*** -0.000338***
Male 0.165 -0.0476 -0.185 -1.011*** 0.218 0.0224 -0.283* -0.695***
Age * Male -0.0140* -0.00267 -0.00607 0.0449*** -0.0167** -0.00868 -0.00592 0.0318***
Age2 * Male 0.000186** 4.63e-05 9.76e-05 -0.000586*** 0.000202** 0.000115 9.47e-05 -0.000402***
General health (reverse) -0.538*** -0.510*** -0.382*** 0.634*** -0.474*** -0.612*** -0.467*** 0.413***
Net pay 9.70e-07 1.71e-06*** 1.57e-06*** 1.42e-06 3.98e-07 2.57e-06*** 2.00e-06*** 1.44e-06**
Married, living with spouse 0.340*** 0.452*** 0.347*** -0.108*** 0.314*** 0.570*** 0.436*** -0.0717***
Married, separated -0.0996** -0.254*** 0.0405 0.0497 -0.0395 -0.251*** 0.0765** 0.0095
Divorced -0.00705 -0.0598** 0.0401* 0.0295 0.0273 -0.0385 0.0941*** -0.00675
Widowed -0.246*** -0.364*** -0.0552 0.014 -0.168*** -0.371*** -0.00151 0.00714
Were/still in civil partnership 0.0548 0.482*** 0.191** 0.285 0.172 0.612*** 0.240** 0.133
Mixed -0.112 -0.209*** -0.0216 0.195 -0.0955 -0.260*** 3.19e-05 0.112
Indian 0.197*** -0.0823* -0.0159 0.112 0.190*** -0.0946* -0.0172 0.0607
Pakistani -0.133 -0.232*** -0.0077 0.347*** -0.00897 -0.189** 0.0555 0.166**
Bangladeshi 0.316** -0.168 0.0963 0.125 0.353*** -0.0832 0.275** 0.0127
Chinese -0.0249 -0.283*** -0.381*** -0.0691 -0.113 -0.409*** -0.530*** 0.0264
Other Asian 0.381*** 0.142* 0.115 0.220* 0.357*** 0.164* 0.168* 0.134
Black -0.0777 -0.458*** -0.0468 0.247*** 3.08e-05 -0.534*** -0.0157 0.114**
Other ethnicity -0.082 -0.127** -0.0929 0.312*** -0.0145 -0.120* -0.0709 0.191***
Constant 9.261*** 10.07*** 9.242*** 1.017*** - - - -
Observations 67324 67324 67324 67324 67324 67324 67324 67324
R2 0.052 0.098 0.061 0.036 - - - -
Standard errors and ordered logit cut constants omitted for brevity. Robust s.e. used for OLS. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.2.2 Determining well-being prioritisation
Given that individuals in general do not have large amounts of empirical data
about well-being in society, it seems natural to believe that theywill utilise infor-
mation about their own levels of well-being in determining how to prioritise a
given well-being aspect. On its own, this suggests that well-being priorities may
exhibit a U-shape or hump-shape similar to that shown in Figure 5. However,
own well-being is likely to be combined with personal beliefs about what con-
stitutes optimal policy when determining social priorities. These beliefs will be
in￿￿uenced by (limited) knowledge about the well-being levels of others, as well
as by individual ￿￿xed e￿fects.
Let PAi represent the well-being priority for aspect A, given an individual i.
3
The priority given to a particular aspect of well-being depends upon a function
of one’s own well-being level Li, and a function of the expected level of others’
well-being L¬i. Hence, priority can be represented in the following way:
PAi = ai f (L
A
i ) + big(Ei[L
A¬i]) (7)
where ai and bi are constants.
One’s level ofwell-being at any given point in life is in￿￿uenced by factors such
as regret from forecasting error, and optimism (Schwandt, 2016). These factors
contribute to the underlying U-shape of happiness and life satisfaction over the
life cycle. This life cycle trend is implicitly contained within Li. Li also captures
much of what constitutes preferences in terms of choice utility.Whilst there are
some exceptions, what people choose in a decision scenario largely corresponds
to what provides themwith the highest level of subjective well-being (Benjamin
et al., 2012).
We can estimate a general form of this relationship, given that we have data
on levels and beliefs about others’ levels. I assume there is some commonality in
3 In practice, this priority can either represent a weighting, or a simple ordinal ranking.
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howpriorities are formed, which allows us to take parameters across individuals
as constant:
PAi = b0 + b1(L
A
i )
b2 + b3(Ei[LA¬i])b4 + ei (8)
One hypothesis about the values of b1 and b2 can be formed by consider-
ing the possibility that themarginal impact of an extra unit of well-being a￿fects
overall priority. For example, ifwewere to assume a standard concave value func-
tion (i.e. displaying diminishing marginal returns), the value of an additional
unit of well-being would diminish as well-being level increases. This would sug-
gest that individuals with a low level of well-being for a given aspect would
prioritise that aspect more highly than someone with a higher level.4 In other
words, thiswould imply f (LAi ) is decreasing in L
A
i , suggesting that b2 2 (0, 1).
Given this supposition, I hypothesise that priority will be allocated to those
well-being aspects for which the corresponding level is lower (i.e. b1 < 0).
Therefore, if well-being prioritywas determined by own levels alone, then based
on the APS data in Section 2.2, we would expect that the middle-aged place
higher priority on the increase of happiness and life satisfaction; and reduction
of anxiety. We may expect the opposite for worthwhileness, given the nature of
the relationship for worthwhileness levels in Figure 5.
However, one expects that individuals would account for others’ needs, in
addition to their own.Given the arguments above about one’s own level of well-
being, we might expect that the same inverse relationship would hold between
beliefs about others’ level of well-being, and one’s priority for a given aspect.
Thus, b2 and b4 are likely to be similar, with b3 < 0. It is not clear whether
individuals would place more weight on their own well-being, or their expec-
tations about others’ well-being. However, given own levels are more available
and salient, a sensible hypothesis would be that |b1| > |b3|. That is, I expect
own levels of well-being to be more important in determining well-being prior-
ity for a given aspect than others’ levels of well-being.
4 For example, we might expect that an increase in happiness by one point on a 0-10 scale would
be more desirable to someone with a happiness level of 4 than someone with a happiness level
of 8.
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It is important to note the implicit assumption that all priorities are inde-
pendent. However, if we ask individuals to form a rank ordering, or to provide
weights that add up to a ￿￿xed sum, the priority of one of the four aspects will be
determinedby the other three. Therefore, it is possible that estimated parameter
values for one of the four aspects will be largely di￿ferent from the rest.
There aremany variables representing individual di￿ferences and ￿￿xed e￿fects
that are subsumed into the error term. Easily observable determinants of well-
being (such as income, employment status, and marital status) can be collected
in order to eliminate at least some of the omitted variable bias that may other-
wise arise from estimation of (8). These variables may also in￿￿uence priorities
aside from their in￿￿uence on levels. The greater the impact these variables have
on prioritisation, the less likely we are to see the ‘mid-life crisis’ pattern of well-
being levels re￿￿ected in priorities.
In particular, two of the Big Five personality factors - Extraversion and Neu-
roticism - are strongly linked to subjective well-being levels (Diener and Lucas,
1999). The most clear link is between Neuroticism and anxiety. Since Neuroti-
cism captures sensitivity to negative a￿fect (McCrae and John, 1992), more Neu-
rotic people will su￿fer the most from high anxiety levels. Therefore, individu-
als with higher Neuroticism would see greater value in addressing factors that
would reduce anxiety levels (i.e. giving higher priority to anxiety). Extraversion
is linked to responsiveness to positive outcomes, such as rewards. Hence, one
would expect those high in Extraversion to prioritise happiness more than oth-
ers.
2.3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1
To provide a ￿￿rst indication of the pattern of well-being priorities across the
life cycle, I use data from a short online survey. The survey was administered in
mid-2014, using participants recruited fromMTurk. This sample was one of the
four used in O’Donnell and Oswald (2015). Individuals were asked to prioritise
the four standardised aspects of well-being by allocating points to each aspect,
where the sumof points was constrained to 100. The exact text of thewell-being
weighting task is provided in the Appendix.
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In addition, a limited set of demographic data was obtained. Demographic
questions were asked at the end of the survey, in order to avoid any potential
priming e￿fects (although such e￿fects would be unlikely in this case). 306 re-
sponses were collected in total. Each respondent was paid $1, and mean survey
completion timewas 7.4minutes. Themean age of the samplewas 32. 60￿were
male. 79￿ of respondents were U.S. nationals.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 6:Mean weighting given to each of the four aspects of subjective well-being in
survey 1. n=306.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 7:The rank ordering of well-being priorities in survey 1 is largely the same
across age bands.
Figure 6 shows the mean weighting given to each aspect of well-being. Hap-
piness is valued the highest, followed by life satisfaction, worthwhileness, and
anxiety (in that order). The rank ordering of well-being aspects in this survey is
preserved across all but the ￿￿nal age band (Figure 7). Worthwhileness is given
much higher priority by those aged 60 or above, but data at this end of the
age range is sparse.5 Mean relative weightings, however, do not remain constant
across bands.
Figure 8 shows a third-order polynomial ￿￿t to the weighting for each aspect
of well-being over the life cycle. A cubic polynomial is used to account for non-
linearity,without constraining the shape tobe a parabola.Weights for happiness
and anxiety follow a hump shape across the life cycle. In contrast, weights for
life satisfaction and worthwhileness follow a U-shape across the life cycle. This
implies that middle-aged individuals care relatively more about policies that in-
crease happiness and reduce anxiety than the young or the elderly. The 95￿ con-
￿￿dence intervals displayed on the curves show that the trend is noisier towards
5 For example, only 6 responses are obtained from those aged 60 or above.
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the upper end of the age range. This is due to the shortage of data from older
individuals.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 8: 3rd order polynomial age curves ￿￿tted to well-being weightings, with 95￿ con￿￿dence in-
tervals. n=306.
In order to ascertain the strength of these parabolic relationships, I estimate
a quadratic relationship in age, using OLS with robust standard errors. Speci￿￿-
cation 1 in Table 13 shows the raw quadratic relationship between age and well-
being weightings. The quadratic term is not statistically signi￿￿cant for happi-
ness, but is signi￿￿cant for life satisfaction, worthwhileness, and anxiety.
Speci￿￿cation 2 in Table 13 adds gender interaction terms to separate the re-
lationship for males and females. Men place higher weight on happiness and
life satisfaction, and therefore, less weight on worthwhileness and anxiety than
women. The results for males in this sample suggest a ￿￿atter life cycle weighting
pro￿￿le than for females. This is particularly true for both happiness and worth-
whileness,where the curvature is being drivenprimarily by females.Despite this,
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the polarity of the quadratic relationships remains the same, even when separat-
ing for gender.
The signi￿￿cance of the gender di￿ference in worthwhileness weightings may
be re￿￿ecting the unusual pattern observed in the APS data in Figure 5. Recall
that the level of worthwhileness for females was somewhat hump-shaped over
the life cycle, in contrast to aU-shape formales. The hypothesis that individuals
are prioritising aspects that they are de￿￿cient in is consistent with a stronger
U-shape for females in terms of the importance they place on worthwhileness
around middle age.
2.3.1 Limitations of survey 1
There are a number of limitationswith the ￿￿ndings from this simple ￿￿rst survey.
First, andmost importantly, the sample does not stratify for age. This results in
highly noisy data at the upper end of the age range. 80￿ of respondents were
below the age of 39, whichmeans that the patterns observed aftermiddle age are
likely to be inaccurate.Whilst data acquired fromMTurk have been shown to be
reliable (Mason and Suri, 2012), a more age-representative sample is required to
drawmeaningful conclusions about life cycle patterns. Due to the novel nature
of the question posed, large randomised datasets with data on well-being pri-
orities currently do not exist. However, strati￿￿cation in a smaller-scale survey is
feasible.
Second, no randomisation was used in the order of well-being statements.
This may result in bias due to order e￿fects. The overall mean ordering of well-
being priorities from the MTurk sample di￿fers from the other samples used in
O’Donnell and Oswald (2015), even though the same ordering of aspects was
shown to each sample in that paper. In these other samples, the mean happi-
ness weighting drops to third in the rank ordering, after life satisfaction, and
worthwhileness. Whilst this may suggest that order e￿fects are unlikely to have
had a substantive impact on the results, it is important to note that these other
samples came from students andprofessional economists. It is possible that they
are less susceptible to order e￿fects than those responding quickly to an online
survey.
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T￿￿￿￿ 13:The relationship between age and well-being weights. Weightings for the importance of happiness yesterday and anxiety are hump-
shaped across the life cycle, whilst weightings for life satisfaction and worthwhileness of life are U-shaped.
Speci￿￿cation 1 Speci￿￿cation 2
Happy Satisfaction Worthwhile Anxiety Happy Satisfaction Worthwhile Anxiety
Age 0.577 -0.621** -0.928** 0.972** 1.249* -0.369 -1.695*** 0.815
(0.420) (0.305) (0.379) (0.391) (0.654) (0.459) (0.521) (0.666)
Age2 -0.00701 0.00744** 0.0124** -0.0129*** -0.0149* 0.00504 0.0220*** -0.0121
(0.00541) (0.00370) (0.00488) (0.00478) (0.00811) (0.00533) (0.00651) (0.00785)
Male - - - - 21.68 9.312 -26.00* -4.995
(15.57) (11.76) (13.44) (15.59)
Age * Male - - - - -1.16 -0.355 1.433* 0.0823
(0.844) (0.636) (0.729) (0.836)
Age2 * Male - - - - 0.0138 0.00324 -0.0185** 0.00144
(0.0106) (0.00779) (0.00928) (0.0102)
Constant 23.18*** 38.43*** 39.59*** -1.206 10.41 32.05*** 53.97*** 3.566
(7.563) (5.668) (6.880) (7.214) (12.34) (8.744) (9.792) (12.75)
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 306
R2 0.006 0.013 0.022 0.017 0.012 0.023 0.034 0.023
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Finally, these data do not allow us to understand how priorities are formed,
due to the absence of individual ￿￿xed e￿fects andwell-being levels. Although the
results from survey 1 resemble thenon-linear life cycle patterns forwell-being lev-
els from the APS data in Section 2.2, we do not know the extent to which levels
are contributing to the prioritisation process. Collecting data on well-being lev-
els would allow us to assess how much the observed weightings depended on
individuals’ own subjective well-being. In addition, individual ￿￿xed e￿fects in-
￿￿uence subjective well-being (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). Therefore,
their inclusion is likely to explain further variation in priorities.
2.4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2
2.4.1 Design
To address the limitations of the ￿￿rst survey, and allow for estimation of the
model proposed in Section 2.2.2, a second online survey was designed. In order
to resolve some of the noise around the extremes of the age range, the sample
was strati￿￿ed equally amongst seven age bands (see Table 14).6
T￿￿￿￿ 14:The di￿ference in age distribution between survey 1 and survey 2.
Num of observations
Survey 1 Survey 2
24 or under 73 40
25-31 105 40
32-38 68 40
39-45 23 40
46-52 18 41
53-59 13 40
60 or over 6 40
306 281
6 Although the survey was designed so that 40 observations were collected in each age band, one
age band received 41 responses. Rather than discarding data, I include this extra observation in
the analysis.
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Themain task asked individuals to rank the four well-being aspects ordinally,
rather than assigningweighting points.Whilst this has the disadvantage that we
do not obtain information about the relative strength of a priority, it simpli￿￿es
the task and prevents arbitrary weights from being assigned. To compensate for
the lack of a numerical measure of weighting for each aspect, I asked respon-
dents how sure they were of each rank position they decided upon. Certainty
was recorded on a three-point scale: not at all sure; somewhat sure; and very
sure.
The starting order of the four aspects was randomised for each respondent,
which eliminates the problem of potential order e￿fects. The ranking task re-
quires that individuals drag the aspects in the ordering they desire, with a mech-
anism to prevent skipping ahead without moving any item.
In order to estimate a form of expression (8), participants were asked about
their levels of well-being, and their beliefs about others’ well-being levels and
priorities. Themeasures used for levels are identical to those used in the APS. In-
formation on individual ￿￿xed e￿fectswas captured by collecting data onbasic de-
mographic information; as well as employment status, marital status, children,
health, education, income, and Big Five personality factors using the 20 item
mini IPIP personality inventory (Goldberg et al., 2006). All of these variables
are included as they have been found to be associated with levels of well-being.
Statements from the mini-IPIP measure of personality were presented in a ran-
dom order to each participant.
Time preference has been shown to vary across the life cycle. Empirically, the
discount factor appears to be positively correlated with age and income (Green
et al., 1996). Since income peaks aroundmiddle-age, the evidence would suggest
that the discount factor should be relatively high at this point in the life cycle.7
Hence, di￿ferences in time preference over the life cycle may in￿￿uence pri-
oritisation. I use the smaller-sooner vs larger-later task developed by Coller and
Williams (1999) in order to elicit timepreferences. Since I donot use task-speci￿￿c
incentives, this measure is likely to be biased towards patience (i.e. a lower dis-
count rate, and therefore higher discount factor). Therefore, an item on smok-
7 Themajority of evidence for increasing discount factors comes from experiments that deal with
monetary gains. The same e￿fects do not hold for the discounting of emotional experiences
(Löckenho￿f and Rutt, 2015).
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ing frequency was also included. Reimers et al. (2009) ￿￿nd that smoking be-
haviour is strongly related to time preference. Smokers prefer smaller-sooner
monetary payo￿fs over larger-later ones, suggesting that the propensity to smoke
would make a good proxy for impatience.
2.4.2 Results
Responses to the survey were collected inMay 2016, again using participants re-
cruited fromMTurk. Themean survey completion time was 6.04minutes. Each
respondent was paid $2.50. Approximately 40￿ of respondents were male (112
of the 281). All but 5 respondents were U.S. nationals.
There are key di￿ferences in the results from survey 2 when compared to the
those from survey 1. First, the mean rank ordering of the well-being aspects has
changed. Figure 9 shows that happiness is now the lowest ranked aspect of well-
being on average.8 The relative rankings of the other three aspects remain un-
changed, so that life satisfaction now receives the highest priority, followed by
worthwhileness, and anxiety. Figure 10 shows that this relative ranking is pre-
served across age bands. The fact that life satisfaction is the highest priority well-
being aspect is consistent with all of the non-MTurk samples in O’Donnell and
Oswald (2015). However, in those samples, happiness is given higher priority
than anxiety, which is not the case in the present data.
8 Whilst the survey had individuals rank the aspects from top to bottom, so that 1 represented the
highest ranking, labelling in the analysis has been reversed to show 4 as the highest ranking.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 10:Happiness falls to the bottom of well-being priorities for all age groups in
survey 2.
Figure 9 also plots beliefs about how others would rank the four aspects. The
overallmean ordering of beliefs is consistentwith the order generated fromown
mean ranking. However, t-tests of the di￿ference between mean rankings for
each aspect show that, on average, people overestimate the ranking others give
to happiness. This is compensated by underestimates in the beliefs about others’
worthwhileness and anxiety rankings.
Second, the non-linearity ofwell-being priorities across the life cycle found in
survey 1 is not replicated by the data from survey 2. The third-order polynomial
age curves in Figure 11 show little evidence of non-linearity. Table 15 con￿￿rms
this ￿￿nding by ￿￿tting a quadratic in age, with identical speci￿￿cations to those in
Table 13 for survey 1. An ordered logit model is used instead of OLS, since survey
2 asks for ordinal rankings, and it is not clear whether the distance between the
rankings is perceived as being the same. There are no signi￿￿cant age trends for
any of the well-being aspects.
2.4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2 61
1
2
3
4
H
ap
pi
ne
ss
 R
an
k
20 40 60 80
Age
1
2
3
4
Li
fe 
Sa
tis
fa
cti
on
 R
an
k
20 40 60 80
Age
1
2
3
4
W
or
th
w
hi
len
es
s R
an
k
20 40 60 80
Age
1
2
3
4
An
xie
ty
 R
an
k
20 40 60 80
Age
F￿￿￿￿￿ 11: 3rd order polynomial age curves ￿￿tted to well-being ranks from survey 2, with 95￿ con￿￿-
dence intervals. n=281. Rankings appear to be constant over the life cycle.
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T￿￿￿￿ 15:The relationship between age and well-being rankings from survey 2 (ordered logit). Rankings are consistent across the life cycle.
Speci￿￿cation 1 Speci￿￿cation 2
Happy Rank Satis Rank Worth Rank Anxiety Rank Happy Rank Satis Rank Worth Rank Anxiety Rank
Age -0.0331 0.00534 0.00989 -0.0166 -0.0973 0.045 0.0834 -0.0901
(0.0600) (0.0547) (0.0525) (0.0507) (0.0824) (0.0737) (0.0752) (0.0683)
Age2 0.000306 -5.39e-05 -7.35e-05 0.000181 0.000945 -0.000443 -0.000831 0.000933
(0.000696) (0.000630) (0.000605) (0.000581) (0.000941) (0.000831) (0.000857) (0.000770)
Male - - - - -2.925 1.759 3.131 -3.028
(2.421) (2.254) (2.155) (2.082)
Age * Male - - - - 0.145 -0.0713 -0.143 0.119
(0.121) (0.112) (0.107) (0.103)
Age2 * Male - - - - -0.00138 0.000712 0.00146 -0.00131
(0.00141) (0.00130) (0.00123) (0.00119)
Constant 1 0.153 -3.706*** -2.840*** -1.625 -1.141 -2.723* -1.212 -3.525**
(1.195) (1.168) (1.088) (1.032) (1.680) (1.584) (1.561) (1.437)
Constant 2 1.899 -1.969* -0.795 0.494 0.624 -0.983 0.845 -1.354
(1.209) (1.111) (1.059) (1.024) (1.687) (1.544) (1.550) (1.421)
Constant 3 3.456*** -0.293 1.356 1.546 2.19 0.696 3.009* -0.283
(1.286) (1.101) (1.062) (1.029) (1.743) (1.540) (1.560) (1.417)
Observations 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 12 plots the gender-separated ￿￿tted quadratic curves from the second
speci￿￿cation in Table 15. Whilst gender di￿ferences were not statistically signif-
icant in the regression, the graphs do indicate a di￿ference in ranking patterns
over the life cycle betweenmales and females. The dotted blue and red curves in
Figure 12 represent ￿￿tted curves for all rankings that respondents rated at least
somewhat sure, in order to exclude uncertain responses. Doing this appears to
suggest that the priority given to worthwhileness increases over the life cycle. It
also shifts the priority for anxiety upwards. For females, we see that happiness
ranking decreases over the life cycle. This suggests that a more naive or uncer-
tain individual might undervalue anxiety andworthwhileness, in favour of hap-
piness.9
2.4.3 Model Fitting
Inorder to investigate howpriorities are formed, I estimate a versionof equation
(8), as discussed in Section 2.2.2. Since the dependent variables will be ordinal
rankings for each of the four well-being aspects, I use an ordered logit frame-
work for estimation. First, as we do not know the nature of the functions f (.)
and g(.) from equation (7), I compare a non-linear speci￿￿cation to a linear spec-
i￿￿cation to establish which is a better ￿￿t for the data.
The non-linear speci￿￿cation is based on equation (8):
RankAi = b1(L
A
i )
b2 + b3(Ei[LA¬i])b4 (9)
The linear speci￿￿cation takes b2 = 1 and b4 = 1, i.e:
RankAi = b1(L
A
i ) + b3(Ei[L
A¬i]) (10)
9 It also suggests that beliefs of these uncertain individualsmay be driving the di￿ferences between
own and others’ ranking in Figure 9.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 12:Quadratic age curves to show gender di￿ferences in well-being rank (survey 2). Solid blue
and red curves are for males and females, respectively. Dashed blue and red curves are for
those males and females that were at least somewhat sure of their ranking.
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These speci￿￿cations are used in the following ordered logistic log-likelihood
function for maximum likelihood estimation (for a given aspect of well-being,
A):
lnLA =
281
Â
i=1
4
Â
j=1
mij ln[F(kj   RankAi )  F(kj 1   RankAi )] (11)
where k0 =  • and k4 = •; mij = 1 if the observed value of RankAi = j
and 0 otherwise; and F(.) is the c.d.f. of the logistic function:
F(x) =
1
1+ e x (12)
Table 16 showsmaximum likelihood estimates for this model, using both lin-
ear and non-linear speci￿￿cations. In order to determine which model is more
appropriate, I make use of the Likelihood Ratio (LR), and the Bayesian Infor-
mationCriterion (BIC).10 The LR test is suitable for testing the validity of nested
models. It can be used here, since (10) is a restricted version of (9). The BIC is
more general, allowing for comparison of non-nested models. Both tests use
information about the maximised likelihood function from which to draw in-
ferences. I use both for greater clarity.
The LR test statistic is given by:
D = 2(ln Lnonlinear   ln Llinear) ⇠ c2(2) (13)
The BIC test statistic is given by:
BIC = k ln(281)  2 ln L (14)
where k is the number of parameters estimated, and the log-likelihoods are the
maximised values after estimation.
A lower BIC score indicates a bettermodel,with anydi￿ference greater than ap-
proximately 6 indicating a strong preference for the speci￿￿cationwith the lower
score. In Table 16, we see from the BIC score di￿ferences that the non-linear spec-
i￿￿cation is only close to the linear speci￿￿cation for anxiety ranking. Rankings
10 A discussion of the BIC method can be found in Burnham and Anderson (2004).
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for the other three aspects are better explained by the linear speci￿￿cation. Even
for anxiety, the BIC score for the linear speci￿￿cation is lower, suggesting that we
should prefer this speci￿￿cation.
The LR statistic is only su￿￿￿ciently high for anxiety ranking, since
c20.05(2) = 5.991 (15)
This leads to the rejectionof the null hypothesis that b2, b4 = 1. Thenull is not
rejected for each of the other three aspects, suggesting the linear speci￿￿cation is
at least as valid as the non-linear speci￿￿cation for these.
2.4
￿￿￿￿￿￿
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T￿￿￿￿ 16:Maximum likelihood estimates of linear and non-linear ordered logit speci￿￿cations for well-being rank.
Linear speci￿￿cation (b2, b4 = 1) Non-linear speci￿￿cation
Happy Rank Satis Rank Worth Rank Anx Rank Happy Rank Satis Rank Worth Rank Anx Rank
bˆ1 0.152 0.128 0.028 0.221 -9.714 0.152 0.612 1.204
bˆ2 - - - - -13.449 0.920 0.005 0.306
bˆ3 -0.054 0.102 -0.080 -0.119 -10.500 0.002 -0.415 -0.049
bˆ4 - - - - -6.961 2.892 0.424 1.466
Constant 1 1.627 -2.520 -3.427 -1.220 0.892 -2.715 -3.408 -0.498
Constant 2 3.391 -0.765 -1.380 1.063 2.645 -0.964 -1.358 1.871
Constant 3 4.944 0.959 0.784 2.185 4.203 0.766 0.807 2.995
Observations 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281
BIC 459.766 557.555 679.205 702.384 471.115 567.191 690.089 703.025
BIC linear - BIC nonlinear -11.349 -9.636 -10.884 -0.641 - - - -
LR statistic -0.0724 1.641 0.392689 10.635 - - - -
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The estimates for b1 are all positivewhenusing the linear speci￿￿cation,which
rejects the hypothesis in Section 2.2.2 that posits peoplewill prioritisewell-being
aspects inwhich they arepersonally de￿￿cient. Instead,we see that having ahigher
level of well-being in a given aspect increases the priority given to that aspect.
This relationship is weakest for worthwhileness, and strongest for anxiety.With
the exception of the model ￿￿tted for life satisfaction ranking, the estimates for
b3 are negative. Therefore, for these aspects, it appears that whilst priority is
increasing in own levels, it is decreasing in the beliefs about others’ levels.
With the exceptionof themodel ￿￿tted forworthwhileness ranking, I ￿￿nd that
|bˆ1| > |bˆ3|. This suggests that an individual’s priorities are more dependent
on their own levels than their beliefs about others. This is consistent with the
hypothesis put forward in Section 2.2.2. For the non-linear speci￿￿cations, this
also holds for three aspects, though this time the exception is happiness (for
which the non-linear model is particularly weak, relative to the linear model).
As the linear speci￿￿cation provides a better ￿￿t, I estimate thismodel with sep-
arate regressions for each age band. Table 17 shows the estimates for b1 and b3
from these regressions.These estimates are plotted in Figure 13.Whenwe look at
the relationship between well-being levels and rankings, we see that happiness
and anxiety exhibit stronger positive associations around middle age. In con-
trast, life satisfaction levels have the strongest in￿￿uence on life satisfaction rank
for the young and old. The trend for worthwhileness rank is less clear. These
estimates suggest that there may be a common underlying factor that links how
individuals think about happiness and anxiety. This corresponds to the same
link observed from the priority weighting patterns in survey 1 (see Figure 8). I
discuss this link further in Section 2.5.
Finally, Table 18 shows estimates from ordered logit regressions, with the in-
clusion of individual characteristics. As before, we see no substantial evidence
of a non-linear life cycle trend in priorities. There is relatively little di￿ference in
the estimates for the in￿￿uence of own and others’ levels of well-being between
this regression and the estimates from Table 16. Again, own levels are positively
related with priorities for all aspects, save for worthwhileness. Worthwhileness
level has no signi￿￿cant in￿￿uence on worthwhileness rank.
Individuals with higher Neuroticism, as expected, give a higher priority to
anxiety, at the expense of happiness in particular. The sizes of these estimates
2.4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2 69
T￿￿￿￿ 17:Ordered logit models for well-being rank, with linear speci￿￿cation estimated
for each age band.
Age Band n Happiness Rank Life Sat Rank Worthwhile Rank Anxiety Rank
 24 40 bˆ1 0.0487 0.311* 0.0331 0.266**
bˆ3 0.0131 -0.0509 -0.143 -0.247
25 - 31 40 bˆ1 0.146 0.00895 -0.0369 0.165
bˆ3 -0.249 -0.0314 0.108 -0.0117
32 - 38 40 bˆ1 0.0699 0.170* 0.0169 0.330***
bˆ3 -0.203 0.222 -0.368** -0.208
39 - 45 40 bˆ1 0.197 0.138 0.0563 0.321**
bˆ3 0.0408 0.379 -0.245 -0.335
46 - 52 41 bˆ1 0.515** -0.0847 0.102 0.289**
bˆ3 0.942** 0.196 -0.0961 -0.295*
53 - 59 40 bˆ1 0.433 0.0588 0.0496 0.146
bˆ3 -0.155 0.0219 -0.0238 0.0142
  60 40 bˆ1 0.0831 0.367*** -0.00327 0.172
bˆ3 -0.0210 0.0287 -0.00742 0.0558
Standard errors and constants omitted for brevity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
are large. For example, the reduction in odds of a high happiness ranking caused
by a point increase in Neuroticism is almost three times the magnitude of the
increase in odds due to a point increase in happiness level. Surprisingly, how-
ever,we donot observe the converse for Extraversion.Themost noteworthy per-
sonality trait in￿￿uence, aside fromNeuroticism, is that of Agreeableness. More
Agreeable people place a higher priority on worthwhileness. It is not immedi-
ately clear why this would be the case.
Healthier people also place a higher priority on worthwhileness, relative to
the other aspects. This is somewhat intuitive. Worthwhileness of life is a long
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 13: Plot of ordered logit estimates for b1 (solid black lines) and b3 (dotted blue lines) by age
band, using data from Table 17.
term evaluation of life quality and value. One would expect that this is only
considered of primary importance for those individuals who are free of more
primitive concerns like insu￿￿￿cient income or ill health. This is corroborated by
the ￿￿nding that those with a higher level of income also attach a higher priority
to worthwhileness, though the magnitude of this relationship is much weaker
than that of health level.
Males, those with children, and individuals with a higher level of education
place higher priority on happiness and life satisfaction, and lower priority on
worthwhileness and anxiety. The preference given to happiness and life satis-
faction by males is consistent with evidence from survey 1 (see Table 13). Those
who aremarried or livingwith a partner place a higher priority on happiness, rel-
ative to the other aspects. The unemployed place higher priority on happiness
and anxiety. This may be due to the fact that these are shorter term hedonic
considerations. As argued for health level and income, longer term evaluations
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are likely to be considered less important than an immediate improvement in
situation for someone who is unemployed.
Perhaps themost surprising results are for smoking frequency. Recall that in-
dividuals who smokemore frequently are found to bemore impulsive (Reimers
et al., 2009), in that they prefer smaller-sooner payo￿fs over larger-later ones.
Those who smoke more frequently place a higher priority on happiness and
worthwhileness than they do on life satisfaction and anxiety. The result for hap-
piness is again intuitive - those who are more impatient are likely to place a
higher value on hedonism. However, it is not clear why smokers give a higher
priority to worthwhileness, and a signi￿￿cantly lower priority to anxiety.11
2.5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
The non-linear life cycle pattern for well-being priorities obtained from survey 1
does notmatch the ￿￿at pro￿￿le found in survey 2when ￿￿tting a basic polynomial
in age to the data. Yet, there is some indication from the additional results in
survey 2 that there may be some general themes underlying the prioritisation
process.
Survey 1 shows thatmiddle-aged individuals give a higherweight to happiness
and anxiety, and lower weights to life satisfaction and worthwhileness. Despite
not ￿￿nding direct con￿￿rmation for these patterns in survey 2, Figure 12 shows
that a similar (though not statistically signi￿￿cant) grouping of aspects emerges
after separating for gender. The age-band separated models in Table 17 show
evidence of a greater correspondence between happiness and anxiety levels, and
their respective ranking around middle age.
The reason why this grouping may be occurring was alluded to in Section
2.4.3.The4 aspects ofwell-being canbe groupedby those thatmeasureA￿fective
Well-being (AWB), and those thatmeasure CognitiveWell-being (CWB). The for-
mer is related to shorter term mood; the latter to a more holistic evaluation of
life (Luhmann et al., 2012). The distinction between these forms ofwell-being is
11 Whilst a direct measure of discounting was also collected, the data were noisy, with two respon-
dents exhibiting multiple switching points in the task. Inclusion of this variable did not add
any meaningful information, and so these additional regressions are omitted from the chapter.
They are available upon request.
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T￿￿￿￿ 18:Ordered logit regressions for the determinants of well-being rank, inclusive
of full set of control variables.
Happy Rank Satis Rank Worth Rank Anx Rank
Age -0.026 0.0219 0.00698 -0.0238
Age2 0.000161 -0.000226 -2.62E-05 0.00035
Happiness Level 0.117 - - -
Happiness Other -0.0621 - - -
Life Satisfaction Level - 0.182*** - -
Life Satisfaction Other - 0.109 - -
Worthwhileness Level - - -0.0928 -
Worthwhileness Other - - -0.0951 -
Anxiety Level - - - 0.181***
Anxiety Other - - - -0.101
Agreeableness -0.207 -0.0319 0.187* -0.0638
Conscientiousness -0.149 -0.132 0.0105 0.133
Extraversion -0.0301 0.052 -0.0255 0.0614
Neuroticism -0.348** -0.0675 -0.0764 0.199*
Openness -0.0503 -0.135 0.0612 0.108
Married/Cohabiting? 0.126 -0.0721 -0.0473 -0.0756
Has children? 0.0917 0.225 -0.0446 -0.385
Employed? -0.295 0.169 0.209 -0.0276
Male 0.334 0.323 -0.0517 -0.598**
Health Level -0.11 -0.245 0.462*** -0.214
Income Band -0.0415 -0.0461 0.0498 0.018
Freq of Smoking 0.197** -0.0749 0.131* -0.170**
Education Level 0.0559 0.0351 -0.122 -0.0757
Constant 1 -2.856 -4.203** -1.217 -1.452
Constant 2 -0.995 -2.441 0.893 0.938
Constant 3 0.596 -0.674 3.173* 2.103
Observations 281 281 281 281
Standard errors omitted for brevity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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important, as the determinants of each form di￿fer. The key di￿ference between
the two is the role that hedonic adaptation (Brickman and Campbell, 1971; Di-
ener, Lucas, and Scollon, 2006) plays in AWB. It is widely accepted in psychol-
ogy thatmost positive or negative shocks to happiness are transitory.12 However,
when it comes to CWB measures such as life satisfaction, factors such as income
and signi￿￿cant life events can have a permanent impact, despite having a lower
short-term variance (Luhmann et al., 2012).
Anxiety and happiness can both be thought of as a￿fective states, and hence
forms of AWB. These are feelings and emotions that take place in the short-run,
i.e. in response to a particular stimulus or situation. In economic parlance, one
might call these ‘￿￿ow’ measures of well-being. In contrast, life satisfaction and
worthwhileness of life are wider in their scope of consideration. They require
the respondent to take into account their entire life history (or at least a signif-
icant portion of it). We may therefore consider them to be ‘stock’ measures of
well-being. It should be noted, however, that happiness cannot be considered
exactly equivalent to ￿￿ow utility (Kimball and R. Willis, 2006). Instead, Kim-
ball andR.Willis (2006) split a￿fect into baseline mood (i.e. long-run happiness),
and elation (i.e. short-run happiness).
Analysis of the APS well-being data, along with the data from survey 2, con-
￿￿rms this grouping. Table 19 shows the results of a factor analysis on the levels of
the four well-being aspects, using the principal factors method with an oblique
promax rotation of power four.13 A rule of thumb states that loadings above
0.32 are signi￿￿cant at the 1￿ level for sample sizes above 300 (Yong and Pearce,
2013). For the very large APS sample, this threshold is likely to be lower.
The factor loadings for both sets of data support an underlying relationship
between life satisfaction andworthwhileness of life, and between happiness and
anxiety.Happiness has a signi￿￿cant loading on both factors, which suggests that
the measure of happiness in generalised studies captures a more holistic assess-
ment of well-being than short term transitory changes alone. This supports the
claim of Kimball and R. Willis (2006).
12 Though Easterlin (2005) explains that the data rule out a ‘setpoint’ of happiness, in the sense
that there does not appear to be complete adaptation.
13 An oblique rotation was used as opposed to an orthogonal rotation, since we would not ex-
pect cognitive and a￿fective forms of well-being to be completely independent from each other.
Applying a varimax rotation does not yield qualitatively di￿ferent results.
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Figure 14 plots loadings over the life cycle when we perform factor analysis
separately on each age band. There are more age bands in the APS data, due to
a higher upper age limit. We see that the loadings on each factor are relatively
stable over the life cycle for each aspect of well-being for the APS data.
There are two notable exceptions to this. First, the loading of happiness on
the factor representingCWB is increasingover the life cycle in theAPSdata.Whilst
the loadings from survey 2 exhibit more noise, we can see some indication of
the same trend. If we relate this to the framework proposed by Kimball and R.
Willis (2006), then the baseline mood component of happiness appears to be
dominating the elation component as one ages. Despite not ￿￿nding evidence of
prioritisation di￿ferences across the life cycle, if happiness is perceived as being
closer to life satisfaction for those that are older, then there may be an implicit
increasing preference for CWB over the life cycle.
According to Socioemotional SelectivityTheory (Carstensen, 2006), the you-
ng pursue goals that optimise the future. Close proximity to the end of life for
older individuals leads them to pursue shorter term goals (Löckenho￿f, 2011).
This means that even though their discount factors may be lower (Green et al.,
1996), the young appear to have longer time horizons than the middle-aged. In
light of this, one might expect an increasing preference for AWB policies with
age. However, it is also the case that older adults tend to focus further into the
past and less into the future than younger adults (Löckenho￿f and Rutt, 2015).
It is possible that this backward looking evaluation of life may be contributing
to an increasing emphasis on CWB with age.
Second, the loadings of happiness and anxiety on the factor representingAWB
switch polarity for those aged 74 and above (the survey 2 loadings in Figure
14 (D) are extremely noisy, though one might argue a similar pattern may be
present). In other words, happiness begins to correspond to negative a￿fect, and
anxiety begins to correspond to positive a￿fect. This is somewhat puzzling. It is
unclear whether this can be related to research on older individuals, or whether
it ismerely an anomaly in the data. The latter seems unlikely, given that the total
number of observations from individuals 74 and above in the APS data is 19,308.
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T￿￿￿￿ 19: Factor analysis ofwell-being levels fromAPS 2013-14 (n=165,122) and survey 2
(n=281), showing the rotated loadings on cognitive and a￿fective well-being.
APS 2013-14 Survey 2
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2
“Cognitive” “A￿fective” “Cognitive” “A￿fective”
Happiness yesterday 0.3460 0.4550 0.4181 0.4833
Life satisfaction 0.6763 0.1379 0.8048 0.1243
Worthwhileness of life 0.7236 0.0042 0.8218 0.0082
Anxiety yesterday -0.0156 -0.5365 -0.0346 -0.5277
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 14:Graphs showing factor loadings for each well-being aspect over the life cycle. Data for (A)
and (C) is from APS 2013-14. The minimum number of observations for an age band in
the APS data was 7,638 for those over 80. Data for (B) and (D) is from survey 2.
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In summary, this study ￿￿nds the following. First, there is no consistent evidence
that supports changing well-being priorities over the life cycle (based on cross-
sectional data containing a mixture of birth cohorts). Despite this, older indi-
viduals may implicitly be exhibiting a preference for cognitive well-being over
a￿fective well-being, due to an increasing factor loading of happiness on cogni-
tive well-being with age.
Second,when an age-strati￿￿ed sample is used, themean rank ordering ofwell-
being aspects (from highest to lowest rank) is: life satisfaction, worthwhileness
of life, anxiety, and happiness yesterday. The ranking is stable across age groups.
On average, individuals overestimate the rank they believe others will give to
happiness, and underestimate the rank they believe others will give to worth-
whileness and anxiety.
Third, an individual with a higher level of happiness, life satisfaction, or anxi-
ety, is more likely to give a higher priority ranking to that respective aspect. This
relationship is strongest during middle age for happiness and anxiety. Beliefs
about others’ levels of well-being generally have less of an impact on prioritisa-
tion than own levels of well-being. The fact that life cycle levels of well-being
show a mid-life dip, but priorities do not, suggests that levels are being moder-
ated by other factors that also determine prioritisation.
Fourth, individuals with the following characteristics show a clear prioriti-
sation preference for one aspect over the other three: more Agreeable people
(worthwhileness); more Neurotic people (anxiety); those married or cohabit-
ing (happiness); healthier people (worthwhileness). In addition, more frequent
smokers (a proxy for impatience) prefer happiness and worthwhileness to life
satisfaction and anxiety.
The literature on well-being prioritisation is still in its infancy, but its overall
goal is of prime importance: to informoptimal resource allocationwhen seeking
to improve society. As the focus of the developed world shifts from increasing
raw incomes to improving the general well-being of its inhabitants, this line of
enquiry promises to become increasingly pertinent for public policy. It is im-
portant that we understand which aspects people value, how they value them,
and why they form these valuations. The ￿￿ndings from this study contribute
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to this understanding by providing a ￿￿rst attempt to identify determinants of
prioritisation over the life cycle.

Part II
NEW BEHAV IOURAL IDEAS FOR
ECONOMIC SETT INGS

3
DO PEOPLE AD JUST FOR EXTREME REV I EW SCORE
B IA S ?
An important implication of the internet onmodern economic life is the
increasing reliance on online reviews to inform consumption decisions.
Yet, extremely positive or negative reviewsmaybe subject to a large degree
of bias, as well as con￿￿icts of interest. I introduce a model that proposes
individuals weight extreme review scores to adjust for this potential bias.
A randomised experiment on 501 individuals ￿￿nds insu￿￿￿cient evidence
that extreme review scores are being weighted when evaluating the qual-
ity of a good. Hence, individuals are susceptible to being in￿￿uenced by
deliberately falsi￿￿ed extreme reviews, which is likely to reduce consumer
surplus. I also ￿￿nd that personality traits have no signi￿￿cant moderating
e￿fect on product quality evaluation.
3.1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
The importance of customer reviews for products and services has increased,
due to the increasing proportion of transactions we make online. In the U.S.,
after adjustment for seasonal variation, the proportion of total retail sales ac-
counted for by e-commercehasmore thandoubled, to 7.5￿, in less than adecade
(Figure 15).1
Word-of-mouth recommendations have existed since the dawn of communi-
cation. In modern times, o￿￿￿cially accredited ratings have been in use for some
time (e.g. in the ￿￿nancial industry). Independent product reviews and consumer
advice have long been dispensed through the media. However, the internet has
resulted in the standardisation (and abundance) ofword-of-mouth.Online pur-
chasing has placed an emphasis on peer reviews from consumers themselves.De-
tailed ratings and reviews by other customer can be found next to the vastmajor-
1 These data can be found at census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec_current.pdf
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ity of goods available for purchase. As a result, in a market environment where
physical access to a product is not always possible, a purchasing decision is likely
to be highly in￿￿uenced by reviews (e.g. Luca, 2011).
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 15: E-commerce sales in theU.S. have steadily increased as a proportion of total
retail sales. Source: U.S. Census, via Department of Commerce. The dotted
‘adjusted’ trend removes seasonal ￿￿uctuations, likely due to increased con-
sumer activity during the holiday period.
The reliance on review scoresmeans that the set of strategies for sellers is now
vastly di￿ferent than it was prior to internet shopping. In particular, some ￿￿rms
have taken to writing anonymous glowing reviews of their own products, and
even buying the services of ‘fake’ reviewers.2 Though less publicised, it has also
been shown that falsi￿￿ednegative reviews are left for competing goods (Mayzlin,
Dover, and Chevalier, 2014). This has led to legal action being taken by online
marketplacewebsites thatwish to keep reviews on their platform free of bias.3 In
developed countries, such as the UK and Australia, the legal system allows for
action to be taken if deliberate attempts to mislead are detected (Hunt, 2015).
Whilst automated methods of detection have been proposed (e.g. Lim et al.,
2 One ￿￿rm, Taser, has even defended its practice of allowing sta￿f to write reviews without disclos-
ing a￿￿￿liation (arstechnica.com/the-multiverse/2015/12/bad-reviews-for-taser-documentary-on-
amazon-itunes-seem-to-come-from-taser-employees/)
3 For example, the online retailer Amazon sued over 1000 professional ‘fake reviewers’ in 2015
(nbcnews.com/tech/internet/amazon-￿￿les-suit-against-1-000-people-fake-reviews-n447101)
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2010; Mukherjee, B. Liu, and Glance, 2012) as a result of sentiment analysis and
opinionmining in computer science (seeB.Liu andL.Zhang, 2012, for a review),
it remains extremely di￿￿￿cult to identify and remove reviews posted by every
individual that has a con￿￿ict of interest.
Therefore, consumers must take the potential for bias into account when
valuing a good based on review scores. However, researchers do not yet know
how consumers use review scores to value a good in terms of its quality, nor
in monetary terms. Hence, this chapter seeks to determine whether individuals
implicitly place a weight on extreme review scores, in order to adjust for this
potential bias.
I focus on extreme scores (those at the top and bottom end of the scoring
range), since these are the most likely to be falsi￿￿ed, given the aim is to alter
the perception of a good in the most dramatic way possible. I also investigate
whether individual di￿ferences (in the form of personality traits) mediate be-
haviour in this setting. It is possible that more sophisticated forms of falsi￿￿ca-
tion may involve leaving a number of non-extreme reviews. Given the general
J-shaped distribution of review scores in practice (discussed later), however, this
is unlikely tohavemuchof an impact for themajority of goodswith a reasonable
number of reviews.
In order to test this hypothesis, I ￿￿rst develop aweighted-meanmodel that ap-
plies weights to review scores at the top and bottom ends of the scoring range.
I then perform a simple randomised experiment, using real goods taken from
the websites Amazon.co.uk and TripAdvisor.co.uk, in order to test whether in-
dividuals exhibit this weighting pattern in practice.
At a high level, the experiment involves treatment conditions where the re-
view scores for various goods are manipulated. Reviews at the extremes of the
range were either partially or entirely removed from the review score distribu-
tion shown to individuals (in a manner similar to the judging process used in
￿￿gure skating competitions). If individuals are applying a weight to extreme re-
view scores in the way speci￿￿ed by the model, the quality of a good should be
perceived (in most cases) as being higher in one of the treatments than in the
control condition.
Thedata obtained fromthe experiment shows that theweighted-meanmodel
is better than themean review score, and amodel based on range-frequency the-
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ory, at predicting the e￿fects of review score manipulation on perceived good
quality. However, the overall predictive power of this model is still relatively
poor. This suggests that consumers are not fully adjusting for extreme review
bias. They may therefore be vulnerable to being manipulated into the purchase
ofpotentially lowqualityproducts, thusharmingwelfare.This is especially likely
to be the case for individuals low in the personality factorAgreeableness, or high
in the personality factor Neuroticism.
3.1.1 Literature
The economic potential of computers to make product evaluations cheap and
ubiquitous was recognised by Avery, Resnick, and Zeckhauser (1999). Reviews
can be thought of as public goods, as they are non-rivalrous and are (usually)
non-excludable. Since it is costly to purchase a good and evaluate it early rather
than waiting for more reviews, this generates an opportunity cost. Therefore,
the market will not produce reviews e￿￿￿ciently by itself. Avery, Resnick, and
Zeckhauser (1999)propose apricingmechanism to resolve this ine￿￿￿ciency.How-
ever, this requires a benevolent broker and two of three possible conditions to
be satis￿￿ed. In practice, online product reviews are not centrally organised in
this way. Hence, we are likely to be in a state of the world where the number
of individuals reviewing, and the information disseminated, is sub-optimal. An-
other strand of theoretical literature focuses ondeveloping optimalmechanisms
that exploit cascades and herding to maximise welfare by withholding a subset
of the available information from certain individuals (Kremer, Mansour, and
Perry, 2014).
Hu, Pavlou, and Jennifer Zhang (2006) show that the only way review scores
signal true quality is if all consumers leave a review score, or that those con-
sumers that do review are equally likely to ‘moan’ about a bad product as they
are to ‘brag’ about a good one.However, there is endogeneity in terms of which
individuals choose to leave reviews, leading to under-reporting (Koh, Hu, and
Clemons, 2010). Hence, it is likely that neither of the requisite conditions for an
unbiased signal will be satis￿￿ed. This is corroborated by the fact that experimen-
tal review score distributions are unimodal (Hu, Jie Zhang, and Pavlou, 2009).
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Amore applied analysis of product reviews has predominantly been con￿￿ned
to the business andmanagement literatures. In one notable exception,Mayzlin,
Dover, and Chevalier (2014) infer, using a di￿ference-in-di￿ferences approach,
that more fake positive and negative reviews can be found for hotels on TripAd-
visor than for the same hotels on Expedia. This is due to the fact that Expedia
requires reviewers to have booked into the hotel through their website, whereas
TripAdvisor does not.
The type of good under consideration has been found to be important in de-
termining the usefulness of extreme reviews. Mudambi and Schu￿f (2010) ￿￿nd
that extreme review scores for experience goods (goods thatmust be experienced
before they can be reasonably valued, e.g. music) are rated as being less helpful
than moderate reviews by customers on Amazon.com. However, the opposite
e￿fect was found for books. Mudambi and Schu￿f (2010) suggest that the dif-
ference may be explained by the prior attitude of the consumer towards the
product. This implies that personality traits and other individual characteristics
might account for some of the variation in review score perception.
In this chapter, I do not consider information about written reviews or re-
viewer reputation.However, these factorsmay be important in determining the
value of a particular review in any individual’s belief updating process (e.g. Hu,
L. Liu, and J. J. Zhang, 2008). Mudambi and Schu￿f (2010) ￿￿nd that longer re-
views for search goods (goods that can be compared easily using objective at-
tributes e.g. cameras) are considered more helpful. This e￿fect is smaller for ex-
perience goods, potentially due to the stronger misalignment between text re-
views and review scores (Mudambi, Schu￿f, and Z. Zhang, 2014). Other work
has focused on disclosure of reviewer identity being positively related to the per-
ceived helpfulness of a review, and also quantity of sales (Forman, Ghose, and
Wiesenfeld, 2008). Hu, L. Liu, and J. J. Zhang (2008) show that the impact that
a product review has on sales diminishes the longer the product has been on the
market.
Literature in computer science has focused on developing algorithms that at-
tempt to elicit the ‘useful’ information component from review score data. This
problem has proved challenging to solve, since the precise proportion of fake
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reviews is unknown.4 Using a behavioural program designed to identify and re-
move spam reviewersmakes a larger impact on overall review scores thanmerely
discarding reviews ￿￿agged as unhelpful (Lim et al., 2010).However, it is not clear
how this a￿fects a consumer’s valuation of a good.
The distribution of review scores is likely to play a factor in how a product is
evaluated. In their classic economic theory paper, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)
explain that if two randomvariables have the samemean, the onewith the larger
variance may be preferred by some risk averse individuals. Therefore, it is not
clear whether a larger spread of review scores is more or less helpful for a con-
sumer’s valuation of a product.
Park and Sabourian (2011) show that in ￿￿nancial markets, herding should
only take place in theory if private information follows a U-shaped distribution
(i.e. one that emphasises extreme outcomes are more likely). Contrarianism (i.e.
behaving in a manner that is against the crowd) occurs only when private infor-
mation follows a hump-shaped distribution.
These results suggest that people may be prone to following the crowd in re-
viewing products when their prior signal is that a product can either be ‘good’
or ‘bad’. Hu, Pavlou, and Jennifer Zhang (2006) ￿￿nd that review score distri-
butions for around half of the products on Amazon.com are bimodal. Further-
more, extremely high ratings are more common than extremely low ratings, cre-
ating a J-shaped distribution (Hu, Jie Zhang, and Pavlou, 2009). As the num-
ber of reviews increases, there will not necessarily be convergence towards a true
score for the product. Both of these ￿￿ndings point towards U-shaped signals
facilitating herding behaviour towards the extremes.
The aforementioned literature does not attempt to elicit perceptions of the
value or quality of a good, based on review scores.However, the psychology liter-
ature has produced substantial work that has built uponRange Frequency The-
ory (Parducci, 1965). This posits that people take information about the rank
position of a good within a distribution, and the range of the distribution, in
order to form a valuation for that good. The valuation is determined by taking
a linear combination of the range and rank e￿fects.
4 Hu, Bose, et al. (2012) estimate that 10.3￿ of products on Amazon.com are subject to manipu-
lated reviews.
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Subsequentwork has con￿￿rmed predictions of the theory hold in experimen-
tal data. Parducci (1968) found that the average moral judgement on an act of
‘bad behaviour’ is harsher when other acts in the set of scenarios are milder. In
other words, when a set of scenarios has a positively skewed distribution (i.e. a
lower frequency of extreme scenarios), then a particular scenario which is near
the upper end of that distribution will be given a higher (harsher) judgement
valuation than when that same scenario is part of a negatively skewed set.
Parducci (1968) also found thatwhen subjectswere given a sequenceofmoney
payo￿fs from distributions with the same expected value, they were more sat-
is￿￿ed when the values were drawn from a negatively skewed distribution (i.e.
when the mean is to the right of centre) than a positively skewed one. Range
frequency e￿fects have been shown to hold in various contexts, such as in the
perception of drink sweetness (Riskey, Parducci, and Beauchamp, 1979).5
Range FrequencyTheory suggests that the skewness of the review score distri-
bution is likely to in￿￿uence an individual’s valuation for that good. A key di￿fer-
ence between the present study and the experiments on range frequency is that
the distributions of review scores are explicitly observable to consumers. One
would therefore expect an even stronger e￿fect of distribution on valuation.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 introduces
the weighted-meanmodel, and describes amodel based uponRange Frequency
Theory. Section 3.3 outlines the experimental design, and provides predictions
for the experimentusing themodels described inSection 3.2. Section 3.4presents
and discusses the results of the experiment. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿
The central questionof interest in this study is: given that there is somedegree of
prior public knowledge that online reviews for goods may be fake or biased, are
consumers taking this information into account in their evaluation of a prod-
uct’s quality? There are many possible approaches that one might take in or-
der answer this question. In this chapter, I consider one particular approach –
namely that consumers adjust extremely high and extremely low review scores
5 See Tripp and Brown (2016) for a summary of the ￿￿ndings in this area.
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by applying a weight to them. This weight binds more strongly when the total
number of extreme reviews is low.
Onemight questionwhy it is assumed that reviews at the extreme ends of the
scale are those most likely to be fake or biased. The logic behind this assump-
tion is as follows. Upon seeing a review score distribution and a mean review
score, perhaps the simplest and most naive evaluation for the quality of that
goodwould be themean score.Onemight think of this as a ‘level-0’ approach in
the context of level-k reasoning (Stahl andWilson, 1994), where no adjustment
is made. If an individual or ￿￿rm wanted to positively (negatively) in￿￿uence per-
ception of a good’s quality, then their best response to a level-0 consumerwould
be to give the highest (lowest) possible rating to the good. Amore sophisticated
consumer, knowing this best response, would therefore apply a weight in the
￿￿rst instance to review scores at the highest and lowest ends of the review scale.
Of course, it is possible that levels of sophistication go even further than this.
However in this study, I aim to test whether or not consumers are applying this
￿￿rst-order ‘level-1’ response.
An implicit assumption that arises from the former discussion is that indi-
viduals will apply the sameweighting approach to any review score distribution
they see. Given that most online product review distributions follow the same
‘J-shape’ (see the discussion in Section 3.1.1), it is plausible that individuals learn
to form one strategy over time, which would then be applied upon exposure to
more unusual (e.g. ‘U-shaped’) review score distributions.6
Suppose that a product can be given an integer review score r, where r 2
{1, 2, 3, ...,R}.7 The mean review score for a product is given by:
µ =
1
N
R
Â
r=1
rnr (16)
where nr represents the number of reviews with score r, and N =
R
Â
r=1
nr (i.e.
the total number of reviews for that product).
6 The casewhendi￿ferentmodels are useddependingon the shape of the review score distribution
is left for future research.
7 Ideally, R is odd, so that there is a clear middle score.
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I propose aweighted versionof themean score fromwhich toobtain aquality
evaluation for a good:
µw =
1
N
R
Â
r=1
w(.)rnr (17)
There are two processes that generate the weighting functionw(.). First, be-
cause I assume ‘extreme reviews’ (i.e. reviews with scores of either 1 or R) are
most likely to be biased or fabricated, reviews with those scores are weighted.
In particular, reviews with a score of R will be given a negative weight, whilst
reviews with a score of 1 will be given a positive weight (with a weight larger
than 1). This is because if an extremely high review was not genuine (and one
was aware of this), onewould expect a consumer to reduce their valuation of the
good, relative to the value suggested by the rawmean review score. In contrast, if
an extremely low reviewwas not genuine, then a consumer would increase their
valuation of the good, relative to the value suggested by the raw mean review
score.
Second, this weighting should only bind for su￿￿￿ciently small numbers of
reviews with a particular score. As nr increases, r is increasingly likely to be a
true re￿￿ection of the quality of a good.8 Based on these two processes, we can
explicitly de￿￿ne the weighting function as follows:
w(r, k, a, b) = 1+ g(r) f (nr, a, b, T) (18)
The function g(r) represents the ￿￿rst process. The simplest way to model
this is to use a piecewise function, where scores of 1 are positively weighted,
scores of R are negatively weighted, and all other scores receive a weighting of 1
(i.e. they are unweighted). I take the positive weight for r = 1 to be R+12 , which
is the midpoint of the review scale. This essentially has the e￿fect of ‘cancelling
out’ reviews with score 1, by pushing them towards a neutral, middle value. I
take the negative weight for r = R to be 1. This is the simplest integer weight
8 An astute consumermay realise that if the frequency of r scores is su￿￿￿ciently high, that it could
also be the result of herding. In this case we could add the possibility of the review score weight-
ings being ‘reactivated’ after a certain frequency is reached. I leave this as a future extension.
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that reduces the overall weighted mean in the presence of suspicious reviews at
the uppermost end of the review scale. The functional form for g(.) is therefore:
g(r) =
8>>>><>>>>:
R+1
2 if r = 1
 1 if r = R
1 otherwise
(19)
The function f (nr, a, b, T) represents the second process. This generates
what may be thought of as an ‘unreliability’ score, bounded by 0 and 1. For a
high enough number of reviews nr, f (.) = 0 so that w(.) = 1. I use T to
denote the threshold, such that for nr > T, f (.) = 0.9 On the other hand, as
nr ! 0, we have that f (.) ! 1. In other words, the fewer the number of re-
views at a given score, the less reliable that score is deemed to be as an estimate of
the true quality of the good. The beta density function allows us to model this,
whilst providing the ￿￿exibility to easily change the shape of f (.) by changing
the parameters a and b. The general form of f (.) can be derived as:
f (nr, a, b, T) = c
⇣nr
T
⌘a 1 ⇣
1  nr
T
⌘b 1
(20)
where c is a normalising constant, given by:
c =
1⇣
n⇤r
T
⌘a 1 ⇣
1  n⇤rT
⌘b 1 (21)
and n⇤r is the maximiser of the beta density function:
n⇤r =
T
b 1
a 1 + 1
(22)
In order to compare valuations generated by the weighted-meanmodel with
a metric more sophisticated than the mean, I use a model based on the Range-
9 Note that if nr is large enough for all r, we have µ = µw.
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Frequency model (RF). Riskey, Parducci, and Beauchamp (1979) describe the
category rating of a stimulus as being of the general form:
RF(w) = wRe + (1  w)Fe (23)
where Re represents the range e￿fect (the position of a draw in the range of the
distribution), and Fe represents the frequency e￿fect (the percentile rank of the
draw).10 The relative weighting placed on each of these e￿fects isw 2 [0, 1].
There are two issues with using this model directly. First, the model evalu-
ates a draw (stimulus) from a distribution. Whilst consumers viewing a review
score distribution do not draw a stimulus from that distribution per se, it seems
reasonable to take the mean rating as being the stimulus, since this is the most
accessible information signalled to them. Second, the model assumes individu-
als receive stimuli from the domain of the distribution, which is generally dis-
crete.However, using themean score as the stimuluswillmean that the stimulus
lies within the continuous interval [1,R]. I make the discrete distribution con-
tinuous by assuming a straight line connects nr for each r (in a construct that
resembles an upper envelope). See Figure 16 for illustration.
Hence, in the context of the current study, the range e￿fect is given by:
Re =
µ  1
R  1 (24)
and the frequency e￿fect is given by:
Fe =
nbµc + h
N
(25)
where h is a measure of the change in the density of the distribution, given a
change in the domain from bµc to µ:
h = (µ  bµc)(ndµe   nbµc) (26)
An assumption Imake in applying bothmodels is that individuals all behave
according to one model, with one set of parameters. It is a simplifying assump-
10 I have used di￿ferent notation to Riskey, Parducci, and Beauchamp (1979), so as to avoid confu-
sion with parameters in the weighted-mean model.
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tion, in order to assess the relative performance of themodels as general descrip-
tors of behaviour. However, it is of course quite likely that parameters vary be-
tween individuals. It is also possible that there are di￿ferent ‘types’ of individuals,
that behave according to di￿ferent models.Whilst the latter point is partially ad-
dressed later in the chapter by testing hypotheses concerning two personality
factors, the broad issue of heterogeneity is left as an extension.
 0
 25
 50
 75
 100
r
µ
dµebµc
n µ 
n µ 
h
n µ  + h
1 R
F￿￿￿￿￿ 16:An illustration of the parameters used to calculate the range (Re) and fre-
quency (Fe) e￿fects, given a review score distribution.
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I have argued that, due to the presence of fake reviews and the increased likeli-
hood that an extreme review score is subject to large amounts of bias, individuals
may be implicitly applying weights to reviews with these scores. Therefore, the
central hypothesis to be tested is the following:
Hypothesis 3.1 Individuals implicitly overweight 1-star reviews, and negatively
weight 5-star reviews.
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Two sub-hypotheses can be drawn from the central hypothesis above, since
it may be the case that individuals are only applying weights to one of the two
extremes of the review score range:
Hypothesis 3.2 Individuals implicitly overweight 1-star reviews (but do not weight
5-star reviews).
Hypothesis 3.3 Individuals implicitly apply a negative weight to 5-star reviews
(but do not weight 1-star reviews).
If the weighted-mean model outperforms predictions generated by the raw
mean and range-frequency approaches, this would support the central hypoth-
esis. Therefore, the experimental design is based on a need to di￿ferentiate the
predictions generated by each model.
3.3.1 Experimental Design
Review score distributions found online are, more often than not, negatively
skewed. If valuations are judged by individuals as being dependent on themean
review score, then a mean-preserving removal of extreme scores to make the
distribution less negatively skewed should have no e￿fect on subjective evalua-
tions for that good. However, if individuals are suspicious of the abundance of
high review scores because they suspect them as false or biased, theymay actually
value the good more highly in themanipulated distribution.
The design of the experiment is based upon these manipulations of review
score distributions for di￿ferent types of good. Individuals are asked to rate a
good in terms of its quality. I also ask for their maximum Willingness to Pay
(WTP) for each good (though these data are likely to be noisier, given that they
will be in￿￿uenced by income andpersonal preferences). Tomaintain external va-
lidity, real goods (and their review scores) are obtained from the websites Ama-
zon.co.uk and TripAdvisor.co.uk.11 Each product or service on these websites
can be reviewed on a 1-5 scale by registered users (i.e. R = 5). Since anyone with
an account can review any product, review falsi￿￿cation and bias is possible.
11 Amazon is the largest online retailer in the UK. TripAdvisor is the largest travel-oriented review
website.
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10 goods were selected: 5 search goods, and 5 experience goods. For each type,
goods were chosen to cover the following criteria: highly rated with high N;
poorly rated with high N; highly rated with low N; poorly rated with low N;
and middle rated with a roughly even split of bottom and top reviews (i.e. a U-
shaped score distribution). Highly (poorly) rated in this context refers to mean
scores that are above (below) the mid-point of the review scale.
For each good, a brief descriptionof the good is shown, alongwith one or two
images. Branding is stripped from the images in order to minimise the e￿fects
of prior good knowledge (or preferences towards certain brands) on valuation.
Along with each good, the review score distribution is shown, along with mean
review score. The mean review score is the only summary statistic that is explic-
itly available to participants.12 This information is presented in a format which
is in keeping with the style of the original website. See Figure 17 for an example.
Participants report the quality of each good on a 0-100 point scale. Their WTP
can be any non-negative dollar amount.
12 Amazon shows the mean numerically, and also visually. TripAdvisor only shows the mean visu-
ally. I preserve this di￿ference in the experiment to maximise external validity.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 17: Example of the information and questions shown to a participant for a
good. Shown is the original review condition for good 1.
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An individual will see one of three possible conditions for each good. The
control condition (o) shows all the information as described above, with the
original review scoredistribution.Twomanipulations are applied to review scores
in order to generate two di￿ferent treatment conditions. The ￿￿rst treatment, re-
ferred to asmean-preserving (m), removes some 1-star and 5-star scores from the
distribution, whilst keeping the mean identical. Where more than one mean
preserving option is available, the most aggressive transformation is used. If in-
dividuals are only looking at the mean score to base quality judgements upon,
there should be no di￿ference between reported quality in this treatment and
the control group. However, if they weight extreme scores, then the removal of
these scores would result in a more positive perception of quality.
The second treatment, referred to as extreme (e), removes all 1-star and 5-star
reviews.13 This necessarily changes the mean. The direction of movement de-
pends on the shape of the distribution of review scores. For example, goodswith
a negatively skewed review score distribution will have a lower mean in the ex-
treme treatment, relative to the control. If individuals only consider the mean,
then they will have a lower valuation. However, if they weight extreme reviews
according to the weighted-meanmodel, then the removal of these scores should
increase their valuation. A summary of the goods used, and the review distribu-
tions for each treatment can be found in Table 20.
Each individual is shown all 10 goods, one by one, in a randomised order.
For each good, a subject is randomly shown either the control review scores,
the mean-preserving treated review scores, or the extreme treated review scores.
Therefore, every subject sees a variety of treatments across goods, but only one
treatment per good. Approximately a third of subjects sees one condition for
each good. We can therefore compare the mean quality and willingness to pay
for each good individually, between the three conditions.
The reason this design is preferred over themore simple assignment of one in-
dividual per condition for all goods, is tominimise changes of behaviour arising
in the extreme condition. If individuals were to see 10 consecutive goods with
no 1-star or 5-star reviews, theymay have changed their usual strategy to evaluate
13 The removal of lowest and highest scores is similar to the process used by judging in ￿￿gure skat-
ing competitions, used to avoid bias caused by disproportionately extreme opinions.
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T￿￿￿￿ 20: Summary of the 10 goods used in the experiment, with original and treated review score distributions.
Number of reviews for each star rating (1*, 2*, 3*, 4*, 5*)
Good Description Type of good Original mean score Original distribution Mean-preserving condition Extreme condition
1 Smartwatch Search 2.73 (48, 7, 10, 14, 30) (31, 7, 10, 14, 17) (0, 7, 10, 14, 0)
2 Smartphone Search 4.36 (23, 32, 38, 94, 370) (5, 32, 38, 94, 276) (0, 32, 38, 94, 0)
3 Headphones Search 2.50 (9, 6, 2, 2, 5) (4, 6, 2, 2, 2) (0, 6, 2, 2, 0)
4 LCD TV Search 4.50 (2, 2, 3, 6, 39) (1, 2, 3, 6, 32) (0, 2, 3, 6, 0)
5 Laptop Search 3.16 (86, 23, 29, 35, 102) (17, 23, 29, 35, 21) (0, 23, 29, 35, 0)
6 3* Hotel Experience 2.19 (485, 184, 248, 129, 64) (346, 184, 248, 129, 5) (0, 184, 248, 129, 0)
7 4* Hotel Experience 4.06 (18, 30, 59, 230, 206) (5, 30, 59, 230, 164) (0, 30, 59, 230, 0)
8 Programming Book Experience 2.50 (14, 2, 4, 5, 5) (9, 2, 4, 5, 2) (0, 2, 4, 5, 0)
9 Parenting Book Experience 4.33 (3, 3, 3, 5, 34) (1, 3, 3, 5, 24) (0, 3, 3, 5, 0)
10 Restaurant Experience 2.93 (48, 24, 21, 23, 43) (18, 24, 21, 23, 15) (0, 24, 21, 23, 0)
Notes: The review score distributions are given in the format (a, b, c, d, e), where a represents the number of 1* reviews, b represents the number
of 2* reviews, and so on. The mean-preserving treatment has reduced numbers of 1* and 5* reviews, whilst keeping the mean identical to the original
distribution. The extreme treatment removes all 1* and 5* reviews from the original distribution.
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products. This would have created an additional confounding factor, reducing
the validity and comparability of the results.
In order to assess whether individual di￿ferences in personality have mediat-
ing e￿fects on good valuation, I ask participants to complete the 20 item mini-
IPIP personality inventory (Goldberg et al., 2006), based upon the Big Five fac-
tors. This measure is short enough to prevent survey fatigue, whilst still provid-
ing a high degree of reliability. The order of personality items was randomised
for each subject.
3.3.2 Predictions
In order to generate predictions from the models discussed in Section 3.2, we
need to determine plausible parameter values. With each model, and for each
good,we canpredict a rankordering of the three experimental conditions, based
upon how highly the good will be valued in each condition. This can then be
compared to the experimental data. In particular, by assessing the accuracy of
the weighted-mean model predictions, relative to the valuation implied by the
mean review score, we can determine whether the main hypothesis holds.
To generate valuations from the weighted-meanmodel, I let a = 1 and b =
4. The a and b parameters are chosen so that the the shape of function f (.) is
decreasing in the number of reviews with a given score, nr.
Four di￿ferent variants of the weighted-mean model are computed. The ￿￿rst
(referred to as ‘µw’) takes the threshold T = N. This means that the weight-
ing will always be di￿ferent from 1 for extreme reviews. The weighting will be
stronger when nr represents a larger proportion of N.
The second (referred to as ‘µw threshold’) utilises a ￿￿xed threshold value for
T, depending on the type and source of the good. In a dataset by JulianMcAuley
(see McAuley, Pandey, and Leskovec, 2015; McAuley, Targett, et al., 2015), the
95th percentile of total number of reviews for 7,824,482 electronics products
on Amazon, from May 1996 to July 2014, is 55. For books, the 95th percentile
of 22,507,155 goods is 32. Hence, I use T = 55 for the ￿￿rst ￿￿ve goods in the
experiment, and T = 32 for goods 8 and 9. These represent sensible upper
thresholds. For TripAdvisor, based on a sample of 1850 hotels, the mean num-
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ber of reviews for each hotel is 58.86 (Wang, Lu, and Zhai, 2010). There is no
information provided from which to infer percentiles. However, if we assume
a similar distribution for number of reviews per product on Amazon and per
hotel on TripAdvisor, then the 95th percentile would be 3.34 times the mean.
Based on this approximation, I use a threshold of T = 197 for the three goods
from TripAdvisor.
The third (referred to as ‘µw 1-star’) takes T = N, as in the ￿￿rst variant. It
truncates the shape of g(.), so that the only 1-star reviews are weighted (pos-
itively). The weight applied to r = 5 is ￿￿xed at 1 (i.e. 5-star reviews remain
unweighted).
The fourth (referred to as ‘µw 5-star’) is the converse of the previous case.
Only 5-star reviews are weighted (negatively). The weight applied to r = 1 is
￿￿xed at 1 (i.e. 1-star reviews remain unweighted).
Finally, I compute valuations using the range-frequency based model, as dis-
cussed in Section 3.2. The weighting parameterw has been found to be close to
0.5 in experimental data (Parducci andWedell, 1986). Therefore, I takew = 0.5,
placing an equal weight on the range and the frequency e￿fects.14
Scores from eachmodel are computed for each good and condition. An ordi-
nal ranking of valuations by treatment is formed for each good.Model scores are
rounded to 1 decimal place. If scores for a good are the same for two treatments
at this level of precision, they are taken to be valued equally.
A summary of the ordinal rank predictions for each treatment, using each
model, is given inTable 21.With few exceptions, theweighted-meanmodel gives
higher value to a good which has had its scores treated according to the extreme
condition. This is no surprise for poorly rated goods, since the treatment will
increase the mean review score. However, a highly rated good which is valued
most highly in the extreme condition would suggest that individuals are implic-
itly correcting for extreme review bias. It is these highly rated goods, with nega-
tively skewed review score distributions, that re￿￿ect themajority of goods found
on online reviewwebsites.Hence, these goods (2, 4, 7, and 9) are particularly im-
portant in testing the main hypothesis.
14 Parducci and Wedell (1986) ￿￿nd that w can be greater when end points are ￿￿xed, and there is
more limited scope for spacing. However, without any reliable justi￿￿cation, a value of 0.5 seems
more sensible as a prior assumption.
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Computed valuations from the four variants of the weighted-mean model
are plotted in Figure 18, alongside the raw means. The range-frequency model
is excluded, since it produces scores on a [0,1] interval, which would be too sub-
tle to see in comparison. Each symbol in Figure 18 represents a di￿ferent model.
The absolute weighted-mean values are not important, but the relative order-
ing of valuations between treatments is. This allows us to see how di￿ferent the
orderings generated by the weighted-mean models are to those implied by the
raw mean review score.
For example, let us look at panel A of Figure 18. The solid black dots plot
the raw mean scores for good 1 (a smartwatch) in the original case, in the mean-
preserving treatment case, and in the extreme treatment case. The hollow blue
circles plot the weighted mean generated by the weighted-mean model in each
of the three conditions. The red triangles plot the weighted mean generated by
the weighted-meanmodel with a ￿￿xed threshold, and so on.We can see that the
raw mean suggests we should value the smartwatch equally in the original and
mean-preserving conditions. However, all but one of the weighted-mean mod-
els predict that we would value the smartwatch more in the mean-preserving
condition. Of these, the µw and µw 5-star models value the smartwatch high-
est in the extreme condition. Table 21 represents this prediction for these two
models (in the top row) with the abbreviated notation e>m>o.
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T￿￿￿￿ 21: Predictions for the ordering of perceived quality over treatments from each
model.
Ordering of conditions based on predicted values (highest to lowest)
Good Mean score µw µw threshold µw 1-star µw 5-star RF
1 e>o=m e>m>o e>o=m m>o>e e>m>o e>o=m
2 o=m>e o>m>e o=m>e m>o>e o=m>e o=m>e
3 e>o=m e>m>o e>m>o o=m>e e>m>o e>o=m
4 o=m>e o=m>e e>o>m o=m>e o=m>e o=m>e
5 o=m>e e>m>o e>o=m m>o>e e>m>o m=e>o
6 e>o=m e>m>o e>m>o e>o>m e>m>o e>m>o
7 o=m>e o>m>e o=m>e o>m>e o>m>e o=m=e
8 e>o=m e>m>o e>m>o e>o=m e>m>o e>m>o
9 o=m>e o=m>e e>o=m m>o>e o=m>e o=m>e
10 e>o=m e>m>o e>m>o o=m>e e>m>o e>o=m
Notes: o = original condition, m = mean-preserving treatment, e = extreme treat-
ment, RF = range-frequency model.
The predictions are shown with the most highly valued treatment on the left. For
example, “e>o=m”means the good will be valued most highly when an individual
is shown the extreme treatment, followed by both of the other treatments, which
are valued equally.
The goods evaluation task requires individuals to react to information in
front of them, as well as think about what each review score actually represents
(and potentially, how it was generated). Therefore, individual di￿ferences in per-
sonality may in￿￿uence valuations. Gill and Prowse (2014) ￿￿nd that more Agree-
able and less Neurotic individuals earn more in a p-beauty contest game, since
they choose numbers closer to equilibrium and operate on a higher level within
the context of a level-k learningmodel. Their results are consistentwith research
byNettle andLiddle (2008) andDeYoung et al. (2010) that suggests higherAgree-
ableness is linked with a having a better ‘theory of mind’, which allows these
individuals to perform better in situations where they have to predict and inter-
pret the actions of others.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 18: Predicted ordering for the valuation of goods in each treatment, according to the raw mean, and the four variants of the weighted-
mean model. See text for a detailed description.
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Hypothesis 3.4 Individuals who are more Agreeable will evaluate a good based
on a more complex metric than the mean review score (i.e. either the weighted-
mean or range-frequency models).
Because they perceive the possibility of bias, one might expect that individuals
with a better theory of mind would be more likely to apply weights to a review
score.
MoreNeurotic individuals respondmore strongly to negative a￿fect (McCrae
and John, 1992).Gill andProwse (2014) ￿￿nd thathigherAgreeableness and lower
Neuroticism load onto one common factor in their strategic setting. In this con-
text, it is not clear whether those lower in Neuroticism would behave similarly
to those higher in Agreeableness.
However, moreNeurotic individuals would likely paymore attention to neg-
ative signals than lessNeurotic individuals.HigherNeuroticismhas been linked
with greater activation of the right insula in the brain (Paulus et al., 2003). This
region provides emotional responses that signal aversion, in order to minimise
harm. Further studies have con￿￿rmed links between higher Neuroticism and
greater aversion to risk and loss (e.g. Bibby and Ferguson, 2011). Based on this
research, we might expect that highly Neurotic individuals negatively weight 5-
star reviews, but do not adjust for deliberately biased 1-star reviews.
Hypothesis 3.5 Individuals who are highly Neurotic will value goods in closer
correspondence to the predictions of ‘µw 5-star’ than those who are low in Neu-
roticism.
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The experiment was conducted online, using participants from MTurk. 501 ob-
servations were collected speci￿￿cally for this experiment. For each good, treat-
ment conditions were randomised, so that approximately the same number of
individuals saw each condition for each good.15 Mean time for overall comple-
tion was 12.76 minutes. Participants were paid $1.50 for successful completion
of the experiment. No task dependent incentive was given. The mean age of
15 They were not exactly equal due to the procedure used.
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participants was 37.7, and 51.7￿were male. 69.5￿ had at least an undergraduate
degree. Almost all participants were U.S. nationals.
3.4.1 Results for Quality Evaluation
Table 22 shows the observed ordering of treatments for each good.The ordering
of experimental conditions for a particular good is based on the mean reported
quality for that good. In each of the subsequent columns, a ‘Yes’ is shownwhen-
ever the actual ordering in column 2 matches the corresponding model predic-
tion fromTable 21.Thesemodel predictions (apart from those for theRFmodel)
can be seen visually in Figure 18. In the analysis to follow, each of the predicted
orderings implied by the weighted-mean model can be contrasted with the ac-
tual observed ordering by comparing each graph from Figure 18 with the corre-
sponding graph in Figure 19.
We see that no model prediction matches the actual ordering for every good.
The weighted-mean model with ￿￿xed threshold (µw threshold) predicts cor-
rectly most often. It is more successful than both the raw mean (3rd column),
and the range-frequency approach (rightmost column), since the goodspredicted
correctly by µw threshold form the union of the goods predicted correctly by
the mean and RF. Three of the four goods that µw threshold correctly predicts
the ordering for are experience goods, suggesting that more weighting may be
occurring for these goods than search goods.
However, even the µw threshold model is only correct for 4 of 10 goods (5th
column in Table 22), so none of the models tested are excellent predictors of
behaviour. Furthermore, only one of these 4 correct predictions (good 7) corre-
sponds to a negatively skewed review distribution. Since most product reviews
are distributed in this fashion, the weighted-mean model is, overall, not very
successful in predicting behaviour.
Despite this, the mean quality for the mean-preserving treatment is signif-
icantly di￿ferent to the mean quality in the control condition (i.e. where the
mean quality for themean-preserving condition lies outside the 95￿ con￿￿dence
interval of the original condition) for 7 of 10 goods.16 Therefore, individuals are
16 This can be seen in the 2nd column of Table 22, for all goods where the ‘o’ and ‘m’ conditions
are not denoted as being equal to each other.
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not basing their evaluation purely on the raw mean review score. In addition,
3 out of 5 experience goods have higher quality ratings for the mean-preserving
treatmentwhen compared to the control, though this is only for the goodswith
a poor overall review score and the good with a U-shaped review distribution.
The µw 1-star and µw 5-star versions were also unsuccessful as predictors of
quality evaluation. The µw 1-star model’s predicted ordering did not match the
actual ordering for any of the goods. The µw 5-star model’s predicted ordering
only matched the actual ordering for two goods. Hence, two things appear to
be true. First, if individuals are taking extreme review bias into account, they
are doing so at both ends of the review score scale. Second, individuals seem to
be more likely to (negatively) weight 5-star reviews than (positively) weight 1-
star reviews. This may re￿￿ect the J-shaped review score distribution observed in
practice formost goods online.The fact thatmanymore 5-star reviews are placed
than 1-star means that individuals are more likely to have devised an implicit
mechanism to deal with this abundance.
T￿￿￿￿ 22: Summary of results for mean quality, and accuracy of model predictions. The pre-
dicted order for each model can be found in Table 21.
Result Did model prediction match result?
Good Actual order (quality) Mean µw µw threshold µw 1-star µw 5-star RF
1 e>o=m Yes No Yes No No Yes
2 o>m>e No Yes No No No No
3 o=m=e No No No No No No
4 o>m>e No No No No No No
5 m>o=e No No No No No No
6 e>m>o No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
7 o=m>e Yes No Yes No No No
8 e>m>o No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
9 o>m>e No No No No No No
10 m=e>o No No No No No No
Key:
= - the means of two treatments are not signi￿￿cantly di￿ferent at the 5￿ level.
o - original review scores; m - mean preserving treatment; e - extreme treatment, RF = range-
frequency model.
The results are shown with the highest valued treatment on the left. For example, “e>o=m”
means the good had signi￿￿cantly higher mean quality in the extreme treatment than the other
two treatments (which are not valued signi￿￿cantly di￿ferently).
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Mean quality for each good and treatment, along with 95￿ con￿￿dence inter-
vals, is plotted in Figure 19. Ifwe compare these plots to themodel predictions in
Figure 18, the weighted-mean models appear to do worse for goods which have
mixed reviews, and for goods that have a lowoverall number of reviews (goods 3-
5 and 8-10). Nomodel does well at predicting the results for the two goods with
mixed reviews (5 and 10), though if we compare panels E and J in Figure 18 with
the corresponding panels in Figure 19, µw 1-star appears qualitatively closest.
Although 7 of 10 goods have statistically signi￿￿cant di￿ferences in quality for
the control and mean-preserving conditions, the relative di￿ference in quality
rating in these cases is small. This is unsurprising, given that for many goods,
mean-preserving transformations did not substantially alter the overall shape of
the review distribution. In general, there is little di￿ference in quality ordering
for search goods and experience goods with similar original review score distri-
butions. This is in contrast to the ￿￿nding by Mudambi and Schu￿f (2010) that
reviews with moderate scores are rated by consumers as being more helpful in
the case of experience goods. A more detailed discussion of the results for spe-
ci￿￿c goods follows.
The largest di￿ference between the mean-preserving and original treatment
can be seen for goods 5 (the laptop) and 10 (the restaurant). These goods both
had aU-shaped review scoredistributionoriginally. In themean-preserving treat-
ment, reductionof 1-star and 5-star reviews turned these distributions intohump
shapes. The fact that quality was perceived as being higher when review scores
were distributed with a hump shape appears to support the case for weightings
on extreme scores. However, the fact that the extreme treatment does not share
the same preference suggests that the mean review score is still important.17
Goods 1, 2, 6, and 7 were selected to represent products with low and high
mean review scores, given a relatively high N. For goods 1 and 6, which were
rated poorly, reported quality was signi￿￿cantly greater in the extreme treatment
(panels A and F in Figure 19). This is as we would expect, given that the mean
score is also increased as a result of this treatment. However, this was not the
case for goods 2 and 7, which were highly rated. The extreme treatment in these
cases was ranked signi￿￿cantly lower than the original (panels B andG in Figure
17 The extreme treatment was preferred to the original for good 10 (where the mean score was
increased), but was not preferred for good 5 (where the mean score was decreased).
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19), likely due to the fact that the extreme transformation resulted in a reduc-
tion of the mean score. For these goods, there is minimal reason to believe that
individuals are rating search goods and experience goods di￿ferently.
For goods 2 and 7, themean-preserving treatment was ranked lower than the
original (though only signi￿￿cantly for good 2). For good 6, themean-preserving
treatment was ranked signi￿￿cantly higher than the original (column 2 in Table
22).These results imply that,whenmean scores are equal, individuals seem tobe
focusing on the number of 5-star reviews, possibly in relation to the number of
1-star reviews. Contrary to the weighted-mean models, this result suggests that
individuals may be placing positive emphasis (i.e. applying a weight greater than
1) on 5-star review scores, relative to moderate scores.
Goods 3, 4, 8, and 9 were selected to represent products with low and high
mean review scores, given a low N. Apart from good 3, we see that the overall
number of reviews does not have an e￿fect on the quality ordering of goods be-
tween treatments. The highly rated goods with low N (4 and 9) have the same
ordering as the corresponding highly rated goods with high N (2 and 7): the
good in the control condition is rated as being of higher quality than in the
mean-preserving treatment, and the good is valued lowest in the extreme treat-
ment (panels D and I in Figure 19). Similarly, the poorly rated, low N good 8
shares the same ordering as the poorly rated, high N good 6.
The only anomaly among these goods is good 3 (headphones), where there
was no signi￿￿cant di￿ference between quality ratings in any of the three con-
ditions (panel C in Figure 19). Though the overall number of reviews for the
original product was low (24), this was also the case for the corresponding expe-
rience good, good 8 (book), which originally had 30 reviews (panelH in Figure
19). One possible reason is that the number of reviews with the middle three
star ratings (i.e. 2, 3, or 4 stars) for good 3 was positively skewed, whereas it was
negatively skewed for good 8. Given that the range frequency model pays con-
siderable attention to the skewness of a distribution, it is surprising that it did
not predict the ordering for good 3 accurately, given that it correctly predicted
the ordering for good 8 (see the ￿￿nal column of Table 22).
In sum, there is some (but limited) support for Hypothesis 3.1, particularly
for experience goods. The weighted-meanmodel with a ￿￿xed frequency thresh-
old outperforms the predictions generated by the raw mean score and range-
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 19:Mean reported quality for each good and treatment (original, mean-preserving, extreme), with 95￿ con￿￿dence intervals. The 5 goods
on the top row are search goods, the 5 on the bottom row are experience goods.
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frequency approach. There is no support for Hypotheses 3.2 and 3.3. In other
words, if individuals are implicitly weighting extreme reviews, overall they are
doing so for both extremely positive and extremely negative ones.
3.4.2 Results for Personality
We have two hypotheses to test for personality e￿fects in this context. Hypoth-
esis 3.4 states that more Agreeable individuals should follow the predictions of
either the weighted-mean or range-frequencymodels more closely than the pre-
diction of the raw mean score. Hypothesis 3.5 states that more Neurotic indi-
viduals will speci￿￿cally follow the predictions of µw 5-star more closely than the
raw mean score.
In order to test these hypotheses, I split the sample into quantiles by personal-
ity trait. Individuals are classi￿￿ed into low,medium, and high levels of a factor in
the following way. Those with a trait score in the bottom quartile of the sample
(25th percentile or lower) are classi￿￿ed as having a low score. Those with a trait
score in the second or third quartiles (between the 75th and 25th percentiles) are
classi￿￿ed as having a medium score. Those with a trait score in the top quartile
(75th percentile or higher) are classi￿￿ed as having a high score.
Figure 20 plots the mean reported quality for individuals with low, medium,
and high levels of Agreeableness. At ￿￿rst glance, there do no appear to be large
di￿ferences in quality evaluation for the majority of goods, given di￿ferent levels
of Agreeableness.
By listing the observed treatment ordering for those with high and low levels
ofAgreeableness, we can testHypothesis 3.4more explicitly. Table 23 lists the ac-
tual ordering for quality evaluation, separating for high and low Agreeableness.
Neither the best performing weighted-mean model (µw threshold), nor the RF
model predicts ordering for highly Agreeable individuals well. The RF model is
successful more often than the raw mean or weighted-mean, but this still only
amounts to prediction success in 4 of the 10 goods.
However, even though these more sophisticated models are not good predic-
tors, it is still true that individuals low in Agreeableness are much closer to the
predictions given by the rawmean than individuals high in Agreeableness. This
suggests that there may be a theory of mind e￿fect present: individuals high in
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 20:Mean reported quality for each good and treatment (original, mean-preserving, extreme), separated by Agreeableness. Blue circles
are quality evaluations for individuals in the bottom quartile for Agreeableness, black triangles are for individuals in the middle two
quartiles, red squares are for individuals in the top quartile.
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Agreeableness appear to be doing something more sophisticated than looking
atmean score alone. It so happens that neither of themodels tested in this study
does a good job in capturing their actual process.
There is evidence that for search goods with a low number of overall reviews
(goods 3 and 4), those who are low in Agreeableness perceive the good to be of
lower quality in the original and mean-preserving conditions than those with
medium or high Agreeableness. This appears to be consistent with Evans and
Revelle (2008), who ￿￿nd that Agreeableness leads to trust in situations where
there is greater uncertainty. However, this relationship does not hold for low
frequency experience goods.
T￿￿￿￿ 23:Highly Agreeable individuals’ quality evaluation is not well captured by the
weighted-mean model, or the range-frequency model.
Results Did model prediction match result?
Actual order (quality) Rawmean µw threshold RF
Good Low A High A Low A High A Low A High A Low A High A
1 e>o=m e>o=m Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 o=m>e o>m>e Yes No Yes No Yes No
3 o=m=e o=m=e No No No No No No
4 o=m>e o=m>e Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
5 m>o=e m>o=e No No No No No No
6 e>o=m e>m>o Yes No No Yes No Yes
7 o=m>e o=m=e Yes No Yes No No Yes
8 e>o=m e>o=m Yes Yes No No No No
9 o=m>e o>m>e Yes No No No Yes No
10 m=e>o m=e>o No No No No No No
Key:
= - the means of two treatments are not signi￿￿cantly di￿ferent at the 5￿ level.
o - original review scores; m - mean preserving treatment; e - extreme treatment.
The results are shown with the highest valued treatment on the left. For example, “e>o=m”
means the goodhad signi￿￿cantly highermeanquality in the extreme treatment than theother
two treatments (which are not valued signi￿￿cantly di￿ferently).
Figure 21 plots mean quality graphs for individuals with low, medium, and
high Neuroticism. As with the graphs plotted for Agreeableness, there are few
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 21:Mean reported quality for each good and treatment (original, mean-preserving, extreme), separated by Neuroticism. Blue circles
are quality evaluations for individuals in the bottom quartile for Neuroticism, black triangles are for individuals in the middle two
quartiles, red squares are for individuals in the top quartile.
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goods that exhibit large di￿ferences in quality evaluation between di￿ferent levels
of Neuroticism.
For good 3 (headphones), individuals with a low level of Neuroticism show
no signi￿￿cant di￿ference inquality ratings for eachof the three conditions.Those
with a medium level of Neuroticism show a preference for the good under the
original review distribution condition over the mean-preserving (signi￿￿cant at
the 5￿ level) and the extreme (not signi￿￿cant at the 5￿ level) treatments. Those
with a high level of Neuroticism, on the other hand, show a signi￿￿cant prefer-
ence for themean-preserving treatment over the others. Inparticular, thosewith
high Neuroticism also exhibit a reduced preference for the good in the original
distribution.
For good 5 (laptop), those with relatively low or mediumNeuroticism value
the good most highly in the mean-preserving treatment. Those high in Neu-
roticism do not show a signi￿￿cant di￿ference between the original and mean-
preserving conditions.
I summarise the di￿ferences in ordering between individuals with low and
high levels of Neuroticism in Table 24. As discussed previously, the di￿ferences
in quality evaluation for goods 3 and 5 are the most prominent. Nevertheless,
7 of the 10 goods exhibit di￿ferent orderings at the 5￿ level when comparing
individualswith lowNeuroticism to thosewithhighNeuroticism (all but goods
1, 2, and 10).
Hypothesis 3.5 states that those with highNeuroticismwill correspondmore
closely to the predictions of the µw 5-star model than those with low Neuroti-
cism. Table 24 con￿￿rms this. First, we see that the µw 5-starmodel predicts qual-
ity ordering correctly for only 2 of 10 goods when looking at individuals with
low Neuroticism; whilst it predicts ordering correctly for 5 of 10 goods when
looking at individuals with high Neuroticism. Whilst a 50￿ success rate is still
no better than a coin ￿￿ip on average, it is still clear that the model performs bet-
ter on highly Neurotic individuals.
Second, for highly Neurotic individuals, the µw 5-star model predicts order-
ing correctly more often than the µw threshold model (which is the best per-
formingmodel overall). This provides support to the argument that individuals
high in Neuroticism are more likely not to adjust for deliberately biased 1-star
reviews.
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T￿￿￿￿ 24:HighlyNeurotic individuals are better captured by theµw 5-starmodel than
those low in Neuroticism.
Results Did model prediction match result?
Actual order (quality) µw 5-star µw threshold
Good Low N High N Low N High N Low N High N
1 e>o=m e>o=m No No Yes Yes
2 o=m>e o=m>e Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 o=m=e m>o=e No No No No
4 o>m>e o=m>e No Yes No No
5 m>o=e o=m=e No No No No
6 e>o=m e>m>o No Yes No Yes
7 o=m>e o>m>e No Yes Yes No
8 e>m>o e>o=m Yes No Yes No
9 o>m>e o=m>e No Yes No No
10 m=e>o m=e>o No No No No
Key:
= - the means of two treatments are not signi￿￿cantly di￿ferent at the 5￿
level.
o - original review scores;m -meanpreserving treatment; e - extreme treat-
ment.
The results are shown with the highest valued treatment on the left. For
example, “e>o=m”means the goodhad signi￿￿cantly highermeanquality
in the extreme treatment than the other two treatments (which are not
valued signi￿￿cantly di￿ferently).
In sum, di￿ferences in mean quality across treatments for di￿ferent levels of
Agreeableness and Neuroticism are neither large nor consistent enough to con-
clude that these personality factors have a signi￿￿cant in￿￿uence on the evaluation
of a good. However, there are di￿ferences in ordering between individuals with
low and high levels of a trait that provide some support for Hypotheses 3.4 and
3.5.
Whilst it appears that highly Agreeable people are using amore complexmet-
ric than the mean review score, none of the models tested in this study are able
to adequately explain their method. Highly Neurotic individuals appear more
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susceptible to falsi￿￿ed 1-star reviews, since they do not appear to weight these in
the same way as they weight scores for 5-star reviews.
It is apparent from the graphs in Figures 20 and 21 that there is a larger level of
disparity in quality evaluation for di￿ferent personality levels when the overall
number of reviews is lower, or when goods have a U-shaped review score distri-
bution with a mean score close to the midpoint of the scale. Furthermore, any
di￿ferences appear to be greater for search goods than experience goods.
3.4.3 Results for Willingness to Pay
As one might expect, the data on WTP for each good was considerably noisy,
relative to the data on quality. At the end of the rating task, individuals were
provided with a free text entry box in which to explain the reasoning behind
their decisions.18 From some of the comments, it is apparent that individuals (at
least, in part) chose their WTP based upon their preferences towards a particular
good, wealth constraints, and other inferences about the good which were not
directly based upon the information presented in front of them. This was not
the case for quality, where individuals refer more to the review data provided.
For example, one respondent explains:
“I don’t wear watches so, I didn’t want to spend too much on watches.
I’m not fond of touch screen smart phones either, so even though the
reviews might be quite favorable, I know I might be o￿fering way less
than what it’s worth. Same thing with the Windows laptop, 14 inch is
myminimum requirement, so I might’ve o￿fered way less than it’s worth.
I roughly estimated 4 stars equals about 80 percent, although i might be
o￿f here and there on certain goods (and I take into consideration if there
were some really poor rating too).”
However, Figure A1 shows that there is still a general correspondence to the
ordering and patterns observed in the quality data. Therefore, despite the lack
of reliability, the conclusions that can be drawn fromquality andWTP are quali-
tatively similar. ForWTP, the range-frequencymodel predicts ordering correctly
for 4 of the 10 goods, which is the same as the standard µw model. Nevertheless,
18 Completion of this was optional, though everyone in the sample provided a response.
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the raw mean review score is the best overall predictor of rank ordering (see Ta-
ble A1). This supports the case againstHypothesis 3.1: individuals do not appear
to be weighting extreme reviews.
3.5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Due to the increase in e-commerce, online reviews have become increasingly im-
portant to the valuation of goods.This has openedup the possibility of exploita-
tion through the generation of fake reviews. This study has hypothesised that to
compensate for this possibility, consumers may be applying weights to reviews
which are scored at the extreme ends of a scale.
Overall, I ￿￿nd that quality evaluations for goods correspond more closely to
the weighted-mean model developed in this chapter than the raw mean review
score, or a model based on range-frequency theory. Nevertheless, the predictive
power of theweighted-meanmodel devised in this chapter is still relatively poor.
Treatment ordering based on quality is predicted correctly (at best) for only 4
of 10 goods, and treatment ordering based on WTP was also predicted correctly
(at best) for only 4 of 10 goods. If all individuals were consistently adjusting for
extreme reviews by overweighting 1-star reviews and negatively weighting 5-star
reviews, one would have expected predicted orderings to be correct for most
goods. Hence, individuals appear not to be fully adjusting review scores to take
into account the possibility of deliberately biased reviews.
In addition to this, the study ￿￿nds that personality di￿ferences have some in-
￿￿uence onhow individuals evaluate the quality of goods. Personality di￿ferences
havemore in￿￿uence on the evaluation of goodqualitywhen a product has fewer
overall reviews, or when a product has mixed review scores.
Whilst individuals low in Agreeableness appear to evaluate quality predom-
inantly using the mean review score, those high in Agreeableness do not. This
supports research on highlyAgreeable individuals having better theory ofmind,
since they appear to be doing something more sophisticated than merely look-
ing at the mean score. However, none of the models tested in this study can
explain the evaluation behaviour of highly Agreeable individuals satisfactorily.
HighlyNeurotic individuals are better predicted by an asymmetric version of
the model that only applies a weight to 5-star reviews. This suggests that those
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high in Neuroticism are more susceptible to reduce their valuation of a good
following exposure to reviews at the bottom end of the scoring range. There-
fore, they may be more prone to exploitation by ￿￿rms who seek to harm the
reputation of competing products by leaving false bad reviews.
Personality di￿ferences, however, are only one aspect of individual hetero-
geneity. Since the results are based on averages across individuals, it is also pos-
sible that some individuals are weighting review scores, but that others are not.
Alternatively, individuals may be weighting review scores, but with di￿fering pa-
rameter values. Accounting for explicit heterogeneity in the model is left as an
extension for future work.
There is some evidence (as discussed in Section 3.3, in the comparison be-
tween quality evaluation in themean-preserving condition and the control con-
dition) that suggests individuals may be placing more emphasis on extreme re-
views than middling reviews in their evaluation of a good’s quality. One possi-
ble interpretation of these results is that consumers see a product as being either
‘good’ or ‘bad’. This would imply that middling review scores have relatively
little value in signalling product quality.
Due to the potential utility loss from overvaluing a low quality good, or un-
dervaluing a high quality good, it seems unlikely to be rational to form incorrect
valuations. Therefore, if it is true that individuals are aware of potential review
bias but are not weighting extreme reviews, then it may point to the presence of
a cognitive bias.
Another possibility, whilst less likely, is that some individuals are simply un-
aware of the possibility of falsi￿￿ed reviews. This may be true for individuals
with low Agreeableness, for whom the mean review score is a good predictor
of quality evaluation. It may be possible to distinguish between these two ex-
planations by performing an additional experiment inwhich another treatment
primes 50￿ of the samplewith information andnews articles about fake reviews.
If individuals in this primed group were to evaluate goods in a way that better
matched the predictions of the weighted-mean model, this would provide sup-
port for the idea that awareness of the possibility of deliberately biased reviews
is lacking.
In both of these cases, consumer surplus is likely to be reduced. The explicit
measurement of this welfare loss would depend on the cost attached to goods
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that consumers bought because of unfairly in￿￿ated reviews, but then returned
orwereunhappywith, combinedwith the cost of goods forgone that consumers
never bought due to unfairly de￿￿ated reviews. This would be di￿￿￿cult to calcu-
late, given thatmost of these ￿￿gures are unobservable. It is left as an open avenue
for future research.
4
BEHAV IOURAL FOUNDAT IONS OF INDUSTR IAL
COMPOS IT ION : AN EXPLORATORY ANALYS I S
Traditionally, the industrial sectors in which a country specialises have
been thought of as being determined largely by resource endowments.
However, characteristics ofworkerswithin an economy are likely to in￿￿u-
ence its composition. Using data from theUK andGermany, I show that
BigFive personality factors are predictive of future industry change - by as
much as 16 percentage points for Agreeableness. Di￿ferences in traits may
help to explain di￿ferences in industrial composition between countries,
but further work needs to be done to verify this. This work highlights
the relevance of personality data to the analysis of traditional economic
issues.
4.1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
The industrial output of a country is largely determined by its endowment of
resources, and its relation to global demand. However, is it also possible that
the individual characteristics of workers can help to determine industry com-
position? I hypothesise that personality trait di￿ferences in labour across coun-
tries may be an important, yet previously unconsidered, component of indus-
trial di￿ferences. Though there is a well-established literature on comparative ad-
vantage (e.g. Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson, 1977; Leamer, 1995; Ricardo,
1821;Roy, 1951), and aburgeoningoneon the economics of personality (e.g.Alm-
lund et al., 2011; Borghans et al., 2008; Boyce andWood, 2011; Boyce,Wood, and
Brown, 2010; Nyhus and Pons, 2005, 2012; Uysal and Pohlmeier, 2011), this ap-
pears to be the ￿￿rst attempt to combine the two ideas.
The aim of this chapter is to provide an initial exploration of the relation-
ship between personality and industrial composition. The results suggest that
workerpersonality is related to industrial composition through schooling choice.
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There is also an early indication that di￿ferences in worker personality, and dif-
ferences in industrial composition between countries may be related.
The Big Five is themostwidely studiedmeasure of personality.1 Nevertheless,
relatively little work has analysed cross-country or cross-cultural Big Five data.2
Costa, Terracciano, and McCrae (2001) look at cross-country data to show gen-
der di￿ferences in personality are more pronounced in the Western world. Mc-
Crae and Terracciano (2005) compare the Big Five across countries and ￿￿nd in-
ternal validity across all countries tested, apart from Botswana. Big Five items
from theNEO-PI-Rmeasure (Costa andMcCrae, 1992) identify the same traits
across countries; even where the language and culture di￿fers from the US. The
Big Five, therefore, appear tomeasure something inherently human, as opposed
to merely an artefact of Western culture.
Terracciano et al. (2005) ￿￿nd that national character stereotypes (such as the
Germans being highly Conscientious and Canadians being highly Agreeable)
do not represent the individual personality traits of the people in those coun-
tries. Instead, they appear to be separate social constructs that represent a cul-
ture but that do not appear to determine the type of people within it. Na et
al. (2010) draw a similar conclusion. This is an important result, because it lends
strength to the argument that personality traits are robust to one’s environment.
In determining an empirical strategy, this suggests that the industrial culture of
a country is not likely to impact the personalities of the workers within it.
Comparative advantage and specialisation has been explained most promi-
nently byHeckscher and Ohlin (see Leamer, 1995) on a cross-country level, and
by Roy (1951) on an individual level. The Heckscher-Ohlin approach operates
under the premise that whilst factors of production are relatively immobile be-
tween countries, goods can be freely traded.3 Therefore, di￿ferences in produc-
tion advantagebetween countrieswould lead themtoproducemoreof the good
that they were most e￿￿￿cient at producing (by allocating factors accordingly).
Trading these goods leads to greater combined output than a single country try-
ing to produce all goods themselves. Markets reach equilibrium through the
1 A more thorough review of Big Five research in economics can be found in Chapter 1.
2 This is, at least in part, explained by the limited availability of personality data from representa-
tive surveys in general.
3 Many would challenge this notion today.
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relative prices of ￿￿nal goods translating into wage and rent changes for labour
and capital respectively.
The Heckscher-Ohlin approach is more macro-oriented, and does not ad-
dress the important role of individual characteristics. The original theoretical
ideas on self-selection in occupational choice byRoy (1951) have been developed
by others to allow for more rigour and clarity in hypothesis testing (notably
Almlund et al., 2011; Borjas, 1987; Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985; R. J. Willis and
Rosen, 1979). In particular, Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) expand the model to
include utility (among other things) rather than computing choices based on
pure income maximisation. This family of models takes skills and ability into
account, which in combination with wage, determine the choice threshold for
an individual. However, I propose that an individual will gain utility directly
from a good personality match.
Personality has already been shown to have links with occupational choice.
Woods andHampson (2010) ￿￿nd thatOpenness andConscientiousness in child-
hood (as well as gender) are the strongest personality-based predictors of adult
occupational choice.However, since the cohortwereborn in the 1950s and 1960s,
Big Five structures had to be derived from the data they obtained. Hence these
results may be subject to measurement error. To the best of my knowledge, no
work has been done to extend these ￿￿ndings in order to discover the role of
personality in shaping overall industrial composition, and in in￿￿uencing cross-
country compositional di￿ferences.
The rest of this chapter is organised in the following way. Section 4.2 brie￿￿y
outlines theoretical ideas and uses these to serve as the basis for hypothesis for-
mation. Section 4.3 tests these hypotheses using empirical evidence from the
UK and Germany. Section 4.4 provides a discussion on robustness of results.
Section 4.5 concludes. Additional tables can be found in the Appendix.
4.2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Classic economic literature, following Roy (1951), has explained occupational
choice at an individual level using (expected) income. Output prices and wages
adjust to meet demand and supply requirements. As a result, the problem re-
duces to one of income maximisation. However, income maximisation is not
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the only motive for occupational choice. Many individuals have an intrinsic in-
clination or desire above and beyond their wages to do their job.4
Figure 22 proposes an outline of the high-level channels that determine career
choice. I do not claim to exhaust all of the intricate interdependencies here. Val-
ues and individual preferences are shaped bymany external and internal factors,
not all of which can be expressed in this diagram. I do claim, however, that in
broad terms, an individual’s career choice is in￿￿uenced directly by income, per-
sonality and values.
Career
Schooling
Ability /  
Fluid Intelligence
Skills
Productivity
Effort
Income 
Maximisation Values
Personality 
Traits
F￿￿￿￿￿ 22:A diagram showing proposed high-level determinants of an individual’s ca-
reer choice.
I conjecture that indirect links and other external in￿￿uences eventually af-
fect career choice through one of these three channels. Once values have been
4 Empirical evidence of this phenomenon can be found in previous research on job satisfaction,
e.g. A. E. Clark (1996). Morgan, Dill, and Kalleberg (2013) show the signi￿￿cance of intrinsic
motivation in explaining job satisfaction among frontline healthcare workers, such as nurses.
Job attrition, however, is still best explained by extrinsic rewards (or lack thereof).
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formed, they have a direct in￿￿uence on career selection: “I don’t want to work
for a company that sells tobacco products because I don’t approve of their con-
tribution to society”. Personality traits also have a similarly direct in￿￿uence. For
example, “I want to work in sales because I know I’m quite chatty, I love inter-
acting with people, and like the fast pace and high pressure,” might be a con-
clusion drawn by a highly Extraverted person. Hence, I form a ￿￿rst hypothesis
about personality traits and job selection:
Hypothesis 4.1 Big Five personality traits are related to the occupation chosen by
an individual.
This hypothesis is not new, and the literature (e.g. Woods and Hampson, 2010)
does provide some support.However, we should con￿￿rm this for the remainder
of the argument to be consistent.
Given that each industry has a distinctly di￿ferent pro￿￿le of individual occu-
pations contained within it, career choice at the individual level should shape
the industrial composition of a country. Hence, I form a second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.2 Big Five personality traits have a signi￿cant impact on the in-
dustry an individual works in, and therefore on the industrial composition of a
country.
In selecting an individual job, it may be that the relative importance of per-
sonality and values are low if one is simply working to survive. This can prove
problematic because not everyone will be in their optimal career at any given
time. However, at least for the developed world, an assumption I make is that,
over time, people will gravitate closer to their ‘ideal’ occupational area. Empir-
ically, this may suggest a need to look at workers above some age threshold in
order to observe a tangible relationship between an individual’s personality and
an industry. It also implies thatwe can test this idea by determiningwhether per-
sonality can predict an individual worker’s future movement across industries.
Finally, I consider the issue of industry di￿ferences across countries. If person-
ality traits a￿fect the industrial composition of an economy, then it follows that
countries will end up with di￿ferent industrial compositions given a di￿ferent
starting distribution of personalities.Whilst there are other factors in￿￿uencing a
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country’s specialisation, such as natural resource levels and climate, wewould ex-
pect personality traits to be independent of other country ￿￿xed e￿fects.5 Hence,
the ￿￿nal hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 4.3 Di￿erences between personality traits across countries are associ-
ated with di￿erences in their industrial compositions.
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This section represents a ￿￿rst, exploratory attempt at testing these admittedly
ambitious hypotheses. I use a combination of representative survey data from
the UK andGermany. At the time of data collection, these countries were both
part of the EuropeanUnion.They are similar enough in their development level
that we are unlikely to have to worry about large structural di￿ferences when
explaining the results.
For theUK, Iuse the 2005waveof theBritishHouseholdPanel Survey (BHPS),
fromUniversity of Essex Institute for Social and EconomicResearch (2010). For
Germany, I use both the 2005 and 2009 waves of the SOEP (Wagner, Frick, and
Schupp, 2007). These waves are selected as they contain a shorter version of
theNeuroticism-Extraversion-Openness Five-Factor-Inventory (NEO-FFI), orig-
inally by Costa and McCrae (1992). The short form used in both surveys was
developed by Benet-Martínez and John (1998).
The NEO-FFI is the most widely used and highly regarded measure of the Big
Five personality factors. The reduced form represents a compromise between
accurate measurement of Big Five traits and the desire for a shorter list of items
to reduce survey fatigue. Each individual rates the strength of 15 statements on
a 7-point scale (the statements are listed in Table A2). Three statements corre-
spond to each factor. The statements use simpli￿￿ed vocabulary, relative to the
NEO-FFI, in order to assist with comprehension after translation tomultiple lan-
guages. I compute the mean of these three scores to obtain one score per trait
for each individual.
5 These factors can be subsumed into a country dummy variable.
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After re￿￿ning the dataset to capture only the working population, the num-
ber of individual observations for SOEP 2005was 1,556.6 This is a slightly smaller
sample size than would be desirable. Hence, since the industry breakdown for
SOEP 2005 and 2009 is not vastly di￿ferent, I pool data from the two waves to-
gether.Doing this results in a total of 12,637 observations forGermany.Re￿￿ning
the 2005 BHPS results in 7,017 observations for the UK.
4.3.1 The Big Five and Occupational Choice
First, I testHypothesis 4.1 to seewhether Big Five factors in￿￿uence career choice
at the occupational level. For the UK, 317 di￿ferent occupations are represented
in the data. For Germany, there are 295. Of these, I eliminate all that have less
than 20 occurrences in order for probit estimation to be e￿fective.7 This leaves
83 occupations for the UK and 143 for Germany.
In addition to standard demographic control variables, I include a series of
variables that capture at least part of the values channel on job choice.Heckman,
Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) explain that personality traits have an in￿￿uence on
schooling choice. I echo this sentiment in Figure 22. This being the case, includ-
ing schooling choices as a regressor would likely absorb some of the variation
due to personality. Therefore, I do not include education variables in the regres-
sions.
6 I remove those who are unemployed, and also those for which there is missing data on person-
ality, educational status, or industry of employment.
7 Failing to do this means that probit regressions for occupations where a low number of workers
are reported in the data will have regressors perfectly predicting choice in a spurious manner.
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T￿￿￿￿ 25:The importance of Big Five personality factors in occupational choice regressions: UK and
Germany
Percentage of occupations with 95￿ signi￿￿cance in:
Any B5 factor Placebo trials A C E N O
UK, no values 56.6 22.3 12.0 12.0 10.8 9.6 32.5
UK, no values, age  30 50.6 - 8.4 10.8 7.2 9.6 31.3
UK, with values 47.0 - 9.6 9.6 7.2 8.4 16.9
Germany, no values 63.6 22.3 11.9 25.9 16.8 14.0 40.6
Germany, no values, age  30 62.9 - 10.5 23.8 15.4 14.7 36.4
Germany, with values 50.3 - 7.0 19.6 15.4 5.6 21.0
For example, in the right part of the table, the top-right number of 32.5 means ‘in the UK, when
omitting value variables from the speci￿￿cation, Openness is signi￿￿cantly related to choice for 32.5￿
of occupations’. In the left part, the number 56.6 means personality is signi￿￿cantly related to choice
for 56.6￿ of occupations, compared with only 22.3￿ using randomly generated data.
Table 25 shows a summary of results from probit regressions performed for
each occupation.8 Age, age squared, gender, and marital status were included
as independent variables alongside Big Five personality factors in all regressions.
I perform each set of these regressions twice - with and without controls for
values. Values are captured by variables such as closeness to political parties, and
membership of a particular club or society.
In the regressions that did not include value variables, over half of the occu-
pations in both theUK andGermany had at least one signi￿￿cant Big Five factor
at the 95￿ level. Whilst this is not proof of a causal relationship, it does indicate
that personality traits appear to be an important determinant of career choice.
Results are particularly strong for Germany. This is potentially due to sample
size - the minimum number of observations for a German probit (omitting
value variables) was 6,104, as opposed to 3,462 for the UK. I repeat the ‘no val-
ues’ regressions for each country forworkers that are at least 30 years of age, since
personality is more stable after young adulthood (Lucas and Donnellan, 2011).
The relationships between Big Five and choice in this case are only marginally
weaker than when all workers are included. This adds some robustness to the
￿￿ndings.
8 Detailed estimation results for each occupation are available upon request.
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Openness is the Big Five factor most closely associated with occupational
choice. This is consistent with personality theory, since Openness is related to
intellectualism, and therefore underpins schooling choices. For all regressions,
gender is still one of the strongest predictors of occupational choice. Woods
and Hampson (2010) reach a similar conclusion, but with longitudinal analy-
sis rather than the cross sectional analysis presented here. They do not measure
actual occupation choice, but occupational environment choice, usingRIASEC
classi￿￿cations (Holland, 1997).
Due to the multiple comparisons problem, it is not clear whether the signi￿￿-
cance percentages in the ￿￿rst column of Table 25 are occurring by chance alone.
Themultiple comparisons problem arises when testingmultiple hypotheses for
a successful outcome. The probability of success can be high by pure chance if
the number of hypotheses being tested simultaneously is large (see Abdi, 2007).
In our case, our hypothesis is that personality is related to occupational choice,
but we are simultaneously testing this hypothesis 83 times for the UK and 143
times for Germany. In order to assess the validity of our result, we need to be
able to show success is more frequent than we would observe due to random
noise alone.
Therefore, I ran a 100 trial placebo simulation of the simple regression speci-
￿￿cations for each country. From a population of 2 million randomly generated
observations, I draw a sample of 20,000 for each trial and run the required num-
ber of probit regressions.9 The average proportion of probits that had at least
one signi￿￿cant personality factor at the 95￿ level over the 100 trials was 22.3￿
for both the UK and German simulations (Table 25). As the simulations were
performed only on the model with the fewest variables, this ￿￿gure is an upper
bound. Therefore, quantity of data at the occupational level notwithstanding,
we can reject the null hypothesis that personality has no in￿￿uence on occupa-
tional choice. This result is consistent with general ￿￿ndings from previous liter-
ature (e.g. Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua, 2006; Woods and Hampson, 2010).
9 Speci￿￿cally, in place of dummy and categorical variables, I create a random variable with equal
probability on each of the binary values or categories. For age, I draw randomobservations from
a truncatednormal distributionwithmean, standarddeviation, and range de￿￿nedbymy sample
data. For personality traits, I also draw from a normal distribution, truncated between 1 and 7,
with a mean of 4 and variance 1. ‘Jobs’ are assigned uniformly from a pool of 200.
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The evidence suggests that there is likely to be a di￿ferent weighting between
the personality, values (such as political preference), and incomemotivators for
choosing each occupation. There also appears to be some overlap between the
Big Five and values, since predictive power of Big Five factors falls, in general,
when introducing value regressors. The exact nature of this relationship is not
clear and is beyond the scope of the present work.
An interesting ￿￿nding is that those occupations where the Big Five seems to
have the highest predictive power have a component of specialist skill involved.
This supports the idea that the personality motive is muchmore likely to play a
signi￿￿cant role in occupational choice where the cost of entry into that occupa-
tion (psychological as well as material) is non-trivial. An intuitive argument to
explain occupationswhere value variables andBig Five variables lacked inpredic-
tive power is that there are some occupational categories that are not end career
goals. Theymay be representing an interim occupation (a ‘stop gap’), where the
income motive dominates other channels shown in Figure 22.
4.3.2 Personality and Industrial Composition
4.3.2.1 Predicting Industrial Composition
In order to test Hypothesis 4.2, I use predictions from probit regressions run
for the reduced set of 83 occupations for the UK and 143 for Germany. In or-
der to assess the relative predictive power of the Big Five personality factors on
industrial composition, I use predicted probabilities from three probit speci￿￿ca-
tions. First, I include only the Big Five factors as independent variables. Second,
I include only a gender dummy, age and age-squared. This regression allows us
to compare the predictive power of personality to the classical exogenous demo-
graphic variables used in empirical analysis of individual di￿ferences. Third, I
include only two education dummies - whether the individual has a degree, and
whether they have a vocational quali￿￿cation.
The method for obtaining the predictions was as follows. For each of the
three probit speci￿￿cations, predicted probabilities were obtained, holding inde-
pendent variables at their mean levels for each occupation. The mean of these
predictions was taken over the individuals from each occupation j to obtain
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pˆsj for speci￿￿cation s 2 {Big Five,Demographic, Education}. As the pre-
dicted probabilities were very close to 0.5, I subtracted this common compo-
nent from each pˆsj, in order to highlight the di￿ferences between the predic-
tions. Each occupation canpotentiallymapontomultiple industries. Therefore,
weights were inferred from the sample. Occupation j is mapped onto industry
i 2 {1, 2, ..., 10} with weightwij, hence:
10
Â
i=1
wij = 1 (27)
The 10 industry categories were obtained from the German 2011 census.10
The overall prediction for each industry, given speci￿￿cation s, is:
Pˆsi =
J
Â
j=1
wij[ pˆsj   0.5] (28)
where J = 83 for theUKand 143 forGermany. Pˆsi has no interpretationby itself.
Instead, it is converted to a percentage in order to allow for a valid comparison
between predictions and true sample data:
Pˆ%si =
Pˆsi
10
Â
i=1
Pˆsi
(29)
Table 26 gives a breakdown of the raw industrial compositions for the UK
andGermany fromtheir 2011 censuses, and compares these to Pˆ%si from the three
probit speci￿￿cations, as described above.Whilst the bulk of the prediction in ab-
solute terms comes from the relative weights wij, one can see that there is vari-
ation between the three speci￿￿cations (albeit small). This allows us to compare
them in order to assess the relative strength of personality traits in determining
industrial composition.
Figure 23 plots the predictions and census data from Table 26 in graphs for
the UK and Germany respectively. If we view each industry in isolation, we see
10 TheUK 2011 census has a ￿￿ner classi￿￿cation, but it is relatively simple to subsume these into the
same 10 industry categories used in the German census.
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T￿￿￿￿ 26: Personality predictions of industry composition outperform predictions based upon demographics or education for some industries.
UK Germany
Industry Census Big Five Age, Sex Education Census Big Five Age, Sex Education
1 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 0.86 1.33 1.26* 1.35 1.69 1.31 1.28 1.44*
2 Mining, Manufacturing 9.11 11.02* 11.71 11.10 19.08 20.53 20.90 20.30*
3 Utilities, Water, Sewerage 1.28 1.06* 1.03 1.04 1.35 1.73 1.71* 1.72
4 Construction 7.70 6.58* 9.88 6.21 5.63 5.56* 6.80 5.72
5 Wholesale, Retail, Motoring, Accommodation, Food 21.51 19.11 18.19 21.99* 17.04 15.44 15.98* 15.88
6 Transportation, Storage, Information & Comms 8.93 7.51 7.32 7.91* 8.29 6.50 6.19 6.54*
7 Financial & Insurance 4.32 5.69 5.05* 5.54 3.15 4.57 4.40 4.33*
8 Real Estate, Professional, Scienti￿￿c, Admin & Support 12.91 8.55* 8.39 7.92 12.78 8.53* 8.22 8.43
9 Public Admin, Defence 6.00 8.04 7.30* 7.33 7.45 7.62 7.41* 7.54
10 Education, Health, Arts & Recreation, Other Services 27.39 31.10 29.86 29.60* 23.53 28.22 27.12* 28.09
* indicates the closest prediction for a given industry (viewed independently). Numbers are percentage shares for each industry. Census data is from 2011 for both countries.
4.3 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 131
0
.1
.2
.3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Industry Index
UK
Census Big Five Age, Sex Education
0
.1
.2
.3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Industry Index
Germany
Census Big Five Age, Sex Education
F￿￿￿￿￿ 23: Predicted industry proportions from three speci￿￿cations compared with
actual 2011 Census data.
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that the Big Five predictions are closest to more individual industries than the
other two speci￿￿cations for theUK. The Big Five predictions are outperformed
by both the demographic and education speci￿￿cations in Germany. However,
from these results, it appears that certain industries are more closely associated
with personality di￿ferences. In particular, we see that for both countries, Con-
struction, and the combined sector containing Real Estate, Professional, Tech-
nical, Scienti￿￿c andAdmin&Support services, have relative sizes best predicted
by the Big Five.
In order to obtain amore sophisticated comparison between the predictions,
we need to compare themmore holistically. I compare distributional di￿ferences
between each prediction speci￿￿cation and actual census data using the ES test
(Epps and Singleton, 1986). This is similar to, but generallymore powerful than,
a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Goerg and Kaiser, 2009). The results
are presented in Table 27.11 It is clear that the null hypothesis of no di￿ference
between actual and predicted distributions was not rejected for any of the three
speci￿￿cations. However, examination of the magnitudes of the ES test statis-
tics reveals the relative performance of each speci￿￿cation. The education spec-
i￿￿cation provides by far the best distributional prediction for the UK, whilst
the demographic speci￿￿cation appears to be the best for Germany. In particu-
lar, the education speci￿￿cation outperforms the Big Five speci￿￿cation in both
countries.
T￿￿￿￿ 27: Personality does not predict the overall distribution of industries better than
education.
UK Germany
Speci￿￿cation ES test statistic p-value ES test statistic p-value
Big Five 1.080 0.89737 0.920 0.92164
Age, Sex 1.289 0.86316 0.811 0.93703
Education 0.353 0.98616 0.867 0.92918
Results of test comparing the di￿erence between prediction distributions
and the true census distribution of industries.
11 ES statistics were evaluated at default parameter values (t1 = 0.4, t2 = 0.8), and a small sample
correction factor of 0.6014 was applied. See Goerg and Kaiser (2009) for further details.
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4.3.2.2 The Education Channel
Referring back to Figure 22, it may be the case that the channel linking person-
ality with ability and schooling has a much stronger role to play in determining
industrial composition than any direct in￿￿uence personality may have. If true,
this may ease themind of labour economists who have spent their careers study-
ing the e￿fects of schooling on occupational choice.However, it would also serve
to highlight the important role that personality plays as a more primitive deter-
mining factor of observed individual choice.
In their meta-analysis of the Big Five and academic performance, Poropat
(2009) ￿￿nds that Conscientiousness, Openness, and Agreeableness (in that or-
der) have the strongest correlations with Grade Point Average (GPA) scores. All
three of these factors have positive e￿fects on GPA, andConscientiousness has an
association similar inmagnitude to that of intelligence. This association appears
to become stronger for later levels of education, whereas the e￿fects of Agree-
ableness and Openness weaken. Conscientiousness, and to a degree Openness,
therefore are likely to be driving choices pertaining to higher education.
To test this, I ￿￿rst run OLS regressions tomeasure the relationship of Big Five
factors with respect to whether an individual has a degree, or a vocational qual-
i￿￿cation.12 Since heteroskedasticity is always present when estimating a linear
probability model, robust standard errors are used (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
The results are shown in speci￿￿cations (1) to (4) of Table 29. Conscientiousness
is highly signi￿￿cant both on whether an individual had a degree and whether
they had a vocational quali￿￿cation, for both the UK and Germany. Other Big
Five factorswere also highly signi￿￿cant, particularlyOpenness, whichwewould
expect from the previous research on academic performance.
Parameter estimates are unlikely to be reliable for simple OLS, since ability/in-
tellect is unobserved, but is certainly correlated with schooling choice, and very
likely to be correlated with personality factors (especially Openness). Previous
research has shied away fromusing an InstrumentalVariables (IV) approach, pri-
marily because reliable instruments for personality are di￿￿￿cult to ￿￿nd. Bowles,
Gintis, and Osborne (2001) explain that one can use childhood personality, or
12 In the UK, having a degree simply means an undergraduate or postgraduate university degree.
In Germany, the distinction is more nuanced. A degree includes one obtained from a ‘fach-
hochschule’ (an applied sciences institution); any other university degree; or a doctorate.
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personality prior to labour market entry as an instrument for current person-
ality. However, since childhood personality is unstable, this may prove to be a
weak instrument.On amore practical note, save for ambitious long-termpanels,
data on pre-labour market personality is often non-existent, as is the case with
the data used in the present study. The alternative is to construct instrumental
variables from other observable data, but the best way to do this is not clear.
I attempt to utilise the variables related to individual values used for some of
the occupational probit regressions. These predominantly capture political atti-
tudes, preferences related to leisure activities, and membership of social groups
(such as volunteering organisations or religious groups). A ￿￿rst stage regression
using the education dummies as dependent variables identi￿￿ed those value vari-
ables that had no signi￿￿cant relationship with schooling choice (i.e. those that
satisfy the exclusion restriction). These were then used as instruments for the
Big Five variables. IV estimates are shown in speci￿￿cations (5) to (8) of Table 29.
In general, the instruments used were quite weak. The correlations between
instruments and the Big Five were stronger for Germany than for the UK. The
best correlation between a personality factor and an IV for the UK was 0.1212,
whereas it was -0.3039 for Germany. This is likely to explain the weaker sig-
ni￿￿cance of Big Five coe￿￿￿cients in the IV regressions for the UK. However, it
does appear that if the transmission mechanism maps personality onto school-
ing choice, then onto occupation choice and industry, it may be more likely to
work through an academic educational channel rather than a vocational one.
The ￿￿nal interesting observation fromTable 29 concerns the direction of the
personality coe￿￿￿cients. Looking at speci￿￿cations (5) and (7), with the degree
dummy as the dependent variable, we see that the coe￿￿￿cient estimates for Con-
scientiousness, Extraversion, and Neuroticism are negative (although the latter
is non-signi￿￿cant for Germany). In the case of Conscientiousness, this is quite
surprising, since previous research has emphasised the positive relationship of
Conscientiousness with academic performance. This may be due to the mediat-
ing in￿￿uence of age or gender, but research has shown that these tends to lower
the magnitude correlations, and not ￿￿ip their direction completely (Poropat,
2009).
A more plausible explanation could be that academic performance does not
proxy well for academic choice. In other words, more Conscientious students
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who are already in a particular degree programmay do better, but would be less
likely to have elected to be in that program to begin with. This is supported by
the positive (although non-signi￿￿cant) coe￿￿￿cients for these three personality
factors in the vocational regressions (6) and (8). The implication is that more
Conscientious, more Extraverted, and more Neurotic people may ￿￿nd it more
bene￿￿cial for their underlying personality to opt for a more vocational career.
This is not entirely unintuitive. More Conscientious people may tend to like to
see some tangible outputs, which theymight not ￿￿nd in theoretical study.More
Extraverted people may be better suited to industry, and less suited to the self-
study that academic learning implies.MoreNeurotic peoplemay ￿￿nd academic
study and assessment to be too stressful. Though an in depth discussion here
would take us too far from the aim of this chapter, this is an interesting ￿￿nding
that warrants further research.
T￿￿￿￿ 28:Mean probit prediction errors from schooling regressions
Mean prediction error, using:
UKData German Data
Full speci￿cation
UKDegree 0.308 0.188
UK Vocational 0.471 0.441
Ger Degree 0.229 0.054
Ger Vocational 0.438 0.153
Big Five only
UKDegree 0.312 0.200
UK Vocational 0.488 0.457
Ger Degree 0.227 0.057
Ger Vocational 0.441 0.154
Notes: Bold indicates out-of-country predic-
tion.
All errors are signi￿￿cantly below 0.5, p<0.001.
We can obtain an idea of howuniversal our relationships betweenpersonality
and schooling are by using German schooling regressions to predict the proba-
bility of an individual in the UK data to have a particular quali￿￿cation, and vice
versa. I run probit versions of regression speci￿￿cations (1) - (4) from Table 29,
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T￿￿￿￿ 29:The relationship between education level and Big Five personality factors.
OLS IV
UK Germany UK Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Has degree? Has voc qual? Has degree? Has voc qual? Has degree? Has voc qual? Has degree? Has voc qual?
Age 0.0210*** 0.0525*** -0.0117*** 0.00678*** 0.0306 0.0489** -0.00916*** 0.0038
Age2 -0.000272*** -0.000607*** 0.000106*** -6.13e-05*** -0.000403* -0.000500*** 8.06e-05*** -3.14e-05
Male? -0.0455*** 0.00624 -0.00184 0.0115** -0.797** 0.345 0.00517 0.897
Agreeableness -0.0143*** 0.00587 0.00201 0.00487* -0.107 0.0707 0.0730*** 1.075
Conscientiousness -0.0340*** 0.0259*** -0.0119*** 0.0145*** -0.600* 0.0916 -0.0928*** 0.559
Extraversion -0.0297*** 0.00259 0.000923 0.00312 -0.365* 0.202 -0.0205** 1.078
Neuroticism 0.00629 -0.000399 -0.00105 -0.00430* -0.681* 0.349 -0.00416 0.386
Openness 0.0823*** -0.00227 0.00810*** 0.00617*** 0.591** -0.161 0.0430*** -0.0927
Constant -0.145** -0.796*** 0.343*** -0.227*** 5.343* -3.173 0.341** -15.71
Observations 7017 7017 12637 12637 3252 3252 10537 10537
R2 0.058 0.04 0.067 0.014 - - - -
Robust standard errors used, but omitted for brevity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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and calculate predicted probabilities. I also run probit versions of (1) - (4) but
using only the Big Five variables as regressors.
The mean di￿ferences between predictions and actual educational dummies
are shown in Table 28. Bold numbers in the table indicate where an out-of-
country prediction has been made i.e. from a model inferred using the other
country’s data. A simple t-test rejects the null hypothesis that the mean error is
equal to 0.5 for all prediction errors in the table, with p < 0.001 in all cases. This
means that our out-of-country predictions of educational quali￿￿cation status
are better than random. One can see that this is particularly true when predict-
ing degree status, since the prediction error is close to 0.2 when predicting Ger-
man data from aUK regression or UK data from aGerman regression. In other
words, this is closer to 0 (perfect prediction) than it is to 0.5 (completely ran-
dom prediction). This represents greater predictive power than the vocational
quali￿￿cation regressions provide, as we would expect from the results in Table
29. Furthermore, we see that there is very little di￿ference between the full speci-
￿￿cation, and the speci￿￿cation that only takes personality into account. This sug-
gests that demographic variables have less power in predicting education choice,
relative to the Big Five factors.13
Therefore, the relationship between Big Five factors and higher education
choice appears to be relatively stable across similar countries. The implication is
that the in￿￿uence of personality on schooling choice is likely to have some form
of general validity, and that this relationship is not restricted to a single country.
4.3.2.3 Industry Switching
We can test whether there is a predictive link between personality traits and in-
dustrial distribution within a country by looking at whether personality has an
impact on the likelihood to switch to a di￿ferent industry.14 If personality does
determine industry choice and all individuals are rational and choose optimally,
then everyone should be in the correct industry already. There would be no
switching, and we would observe equilibrium. However, in labour market re-
13 This is con￿￿rmedby comparing probits only including demographic variableswith probits only
including Big Five variables.
14 Causality is more di￿￿￿cult to establish, due largely to the lack of availability of large scale panel
data on personality over time.
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ality, it is likely that individuals have imperfect information about the true type
of an industry, and will switch in future if they are mismatched today.
The following speci￿￿cation is used for estimation:
SWITCHEDw = bXw + gBIGFIVEw + dVALUESw
+ q INCOMEw + ew
(30)
Regressors are all taken from 2005 data. The dependent variable is a dummy
with a value of 1 if worker w has a di￿ferent industry category in a given year,
compared with 2005. X includes demographic factors and a constant.
In Table 30, I estimate the above regression for the German SOEP, with all
years of the panel post-2005.Neuroticism is predictive of industry switching 3-4
years into the future. Openness has a signi￿￿cant in￿￿uence on switching beyond
5 years.However, sample sizes for the 2010 and 2012 regressions are very low.The
most consistent predictor of industry change is grosswage.These results suggest
that although there does not appear to be any systematic pattern, personality
does appear to play a role in determining which industry an individual ends up
in.
To explore this relationship inmore depth, I focus on data from 2009, which
is the year with the largest pool of observations. Onemight expect that younger
individuals with less information about occupations and industries are guided
more by their personality traits than individuals later in their life cycle. At the
same time, younger individuals are also more likely to be motivated by higher
incomes since they have had less time to accumulate wealth. Therefore, I split
the data into two groups by age. Themean age of the full German sample from
both years is 42 (to the nearest year). Table 31 shows results fromOLS regressions
for individuals less than the mean age, and those greater than or equal to the
mean.15 I also estimated each speci￿￿cation using a probit model to ensure con-
sistency. Estimates were virtually identical between the two estimationmethods.
Therefore, only OLS estimates are reported.
15 I omit the degree dummy variable from these regressions. Repeating the regressions with the
dummy included did not change the results.
4.3
￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿
139
T￿￿￿￿ 30: Predictive power of the Big Five on German industry switching.
Dependent variables: did individual change industry in year below, relative to 2005?
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Age 0.0177 0.0108 -0.0140 -0.0162 -0.0606 -0.00534 0.0344
Age2 -7.84e-05 -6.41e-05 0.000151 0.000240 0.000990 4.90e-05 -0.000617
Male 0.129 0.0508 0.0515 0.0542 0.151 0.0504 0.0773
Been married? 0.00454 -0.0575 0.126 -0.0166 -0.114 -0.0478 -0.0989
Agreeableness 0.000702 0.0381* 0.0506 0.0232 0.0198 0.0102 -0.120
Conscientiousness 0.0424 -0.0172 0.0650 0.00239 0.00854 0.00245 0.153*
Extraversion -0.0399 0.0124 0.0331 -0.0128 -0.00738 -0.0228 -0.0743
Neuroticism 0.0254 0.0189 0.0846** 0.0303* 0.0354 0.0185 0.0216
Openness -0.00702 -0.0160 -0.0101 0.0209 -0.00276 0.0423** 0.167**
Satisfaction with income 0.00777 -0.0133 -0.0208 -0.0261*** -0.0276 -0.00362 -0.0228
Gross wage in 2004-05 -6.11e-05* -4.73e-05*** -8.19e-05* -4.22e-05** -0.000100** -6.65e-05*** -8.87e-05
Political attitude 0.0161 0.00698 0.0216 0.00115 -0.0320 0.00782 0.0481
Freq of sport activity (-ve) 0.0630** -0.000217 0.0153 -0.00843 -0.0551 -0.0215 -0.0982*
Freq of artistic activity (-ve) -0.0435 -0.0185 -0.0151 -0.00810 0.0270 0.0293 0.116
Optimism towards future (-ve) -0.0237 -0.00873 -0.0390 -0.0328 -0.127* -0.0235 0.0635
Constant -0.334 0.0157 -0.226 0.595* 1.804* 0.369 -0.809
Observations 163 568 148 622 88 470 68
R2 0.112 0.042 0.110 0.058 0.190 0.077 0.371
Robust standard errors are omitted for brevity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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T￿￿￿￿ 31:The predictive power of the Big Five on German industry switching, by age.
Dep variable: Changed industry between 2005 and 2009?
Age< 42 Age  42 Age< 42 Age  42 Age< 42 Age  42
Age 0.0320 0.0706 0.0271 0.0506 0.0328 0.0227
Age2 -0.000538 -0.000536 -0.000437 -0.000336 -0.000550 -9.24e-05
Male 0.0652 -0.0167 0.0730 -0.0407 0.0772* -0.0325
Been married? -0.00734 0.0795 -0.0181 0.0501 -0.0160 0.0590
Agreeableness 0.0652*** -0.0811* 0.0554** -0.0854* 0.0530** -0.0965*
Conscientiousness 0.00529 -0.0123 0.0110 -0.0130 0.00230 -0.00101
Extraversion -7.87e-05 -0.0520 -0.00597 -0.0696* -0.00759 -0.0789*
Neuroticism 0.0242 0.00472 0.0353* 0.000898 0.0450** 0.00366
Openness 0.0242 0.0384 0.0133 0.0737* 0.0130 0.0767
Satisfaction with income -0.0308*** 0.00108 -0.0359*** 0.00446 -0.0377*** 0.00174
Gross wage in 2004-05 -5.48e-05*** -3.79e-05 -6.40e-05*** -3.61e-05 -4.88e-05** -4.84e-05
Political attitude - - -0.00155 0.0235 -0.00276 0.0184
Freq of sport activity (-ve) - - -0.00351 -0.0299 -0.00159 -0.0324
Freq of artistic activity (-ve) - - -0.0194 0.0356 -0.0184 0.0423
Optimism towards future (-ve) - - -0.0705** 0.0738 -0.0525 0.0646
Current health (-ve) - - - - 0.000146 -0.0272
Satisfaction with health - - - - 0.0199 -0.00553
Life satisfaction - - - - 0.00642 -0.00135
Constant -0.474 -1.248 -0.110 -1.073 -0.389 -0.101
Observations 474 167 461 161 471 149
R2 0.077 0.075 0.093 0.095 0.090 0.092
Robust standard errors are omitted for brevity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
First, onenotices that the relationshipbetween switching and income is stron-
gly signi￿￿cant only for those younger than themean.Thehigher the income and
the more satis￿￿ed one is with their income, the less likely one is to switch indus-
tries. This is consistent with the wealth accumulation argument made earlier.
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Second, for this lower age group, individuals with higher Agreeableness are
more likely to switch industries. A one point higher Agreeableness score (for
an individual under 42) increases the likelihood of being in a di￿ferent indus-
try in 4 years by 5-7￿, depending on the speci￿￿cation used. Theoretically, it is
not immediately obvious why this is the case. One possible explanation is that
Agreeable people are more mobile, due to their more accommodating nature.
Neuroticism has weak positive signi￿￿cance on the probability of switching in
the ￿￿nal two speci￿￿cations for the younger age group. This is theoretically easier
to justify. Since Neuroticism is related to the degree of responsiveness to nega-
tive a￿fect, an industrymismatch is likely to havemore of a detrimental e￿fect on
utility for individuals that are more Neurotic.
Results for those aged 42 and over are weaker. Income and optimism appear
to have little predictive power. Personality traits do seem to have e￿fects of some
signi￿￿cance, although the relationship is not strong. If we look at the fourth re-
gression in Table 31, we see that the predictiveness of Agreeableness is reversed,
relative to the younger age group. This is more intuitive. Less Agreeable people
are less likely to have a need to please others, and so wemight expect them to be
more ready to leave an industry which they perceive as not suiting their best in-
terests. However, since the sample size is quite low for this age group, we cannot
rule out the fact that this could have been a spurious result.
In the last pair of regressions in Table 31, I add variables corresponding to
health and life satisfaction to determine whether these are the missing determi-
nants of switching for the older age group. None of the coe￿￿￿cients for these
variableswere signi￿￿cant.However, for the younger age group, including health
and life satisfaction variables increases the predictive power of Neuroticism. A
worker with one extra unit of Neuroticism has a 4.5￿ higher probability of
switching industries in future. From the same regression we also see that a unit
increase in Agreeableness for a worker means that they would be 5.3￿ more
likely to switch industry in future.
A similar analysiswas performed for theUK.Table 32 showsOLS linear proba-
bility regressions for three separate years after the personality data was obtained.
As was the case with Germany, the strongest predictive factors on the probabil-
ity of switching industries in future are due to labour income levels and satisfac-
tion with this income. However, personality also has strong predictive power.
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Conscientiousness is a strong negative predictor of switching in all three future
years.Aonepoint increase in one’sConscientiousness reduces the probability of
switching industry by just over 1￿. This e￿fect becomes less signi￿￿cant (though
the point estimates are similar) when value-related variables are added. After
controlling for factors such as political preference and groupmembership, Neu-
roticism and Openness, in particular, positively predict industry switching in
the following year. Neuroticism is also predictive in following years, though to
a lesser extent
From these regressions, it appears that values and preferences have more pre-
dictive power than personality. In particular, political preference, trade union
membership, desire for one’s own business and sports club membership signi￿￿-
cantly predict industry switching. However, as with the argument put forward
related to schooling, from a theoretical basis, it is quite likely that personality
has a causal e￿fect on the formation of some of these values.
Performing simple pairwise correlations between the Big Five and these value
variables ￿￿nds signi￿￿cant relationships at the 1￿ level. The strongest of these is
a positive correlation between the desire to own one’s own business and Open-
ness. Therefore, although the predictive power of personality is not consistently
high, we may not be capturing all of its impact due to input into preferences.
Finally, the UK regressions were separated for age. Results of the regressions
performed without value variables are given in Table 33.16 Income and values
are the most signi￿￿cant predictors of industry switching. Personality is strongly
predictive when values are omitted. The strength of these relationships, how-
ever, are smaller than those in Germany. With the age separated regressions, it
is Conscientiousness that appears to have the strongest relationship with future
industry switching in the majority of cases, though Agreeableness also appears
strongly for the older age group. This is slightly di￿ferent to the results observed
for Germany, where Agreeableness dominates in general. Therefore, it is not
clear that the same personality traits have the same e￿fects on industry move-
ment in di￿ferent countries.
16 Remaining regression results are excluded due to brevity and a lack of additional insight. The
￿￿ndings are qualitatively similar to the results in Table 32.
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T￿￿￿￿ 32: Predictive power of the Big Five on UK industry switching, using OLS.
Dependent variables: did individual change industry in year below, relative to 2005?
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
Age -0.0126*** -0.0202*** -0.0212*** -0.00634 -0.0165*** -0.0206***
Age2 0.000134*** 0.000215*** 0.000214*** 5.89e-05 0.000175** 0.000213***
Male 0.0156 0.0110 0.00590 0.0109 0.00642 0.00545
Been married? -0.00189 0.00950 0.00975 0.000284 0.00633 0.0247
Agreeableness 0.0128** 0.0122* 0.00892 0.00218 -0.00145 0.000162
Conscientiousness -0.0119** -0.0142** -0.0152** -0.00855 -0.0119 -0.0148*
Extraversion 0.00363 0.00583 0.00697 0.00869 0.0127* 0.0127*
Neuroticism 0.00578 0.00387 0.00365 0.0117** 0.0105* 0.00729
Openness 0.00380 0.00203 0.00332 0.0148** 0.0103 0.00763
Wage in 2004-05 -4.75e-07** -8.51e-07** -9.93e-07** -1.03e-06*** -1.40e-06*** -1.42e-06***
Satisfaction with pay -0.0140*** -0.0195*** -0.0172*** -0.0131*** -0.0171*** -0.0159***
Closest to:
- Tory party - - - 0.0898*** 0.0676*** 0.0626***
- Labour party - - - 0.0465*** 0.0411** 0.0299
- Lib Dem party - - - 0.0624*** 0.0496** 0.0448
Belong to a social class? - - - -0.0142 0.00262 0.000607
Member of :
- Trade union - - - -0.0346** -0.0454*** -0.0564***
- Environmental group - - - 0.0501 0.0485 0.119**
- Parents association - - - 0.00714 -0.0223 0.00431
- Tenants group - - - 0.00425 0.00127 0.0575
- Religious group - - - -0.0150 -0.0166 -0.0146
- Voluntary service grp - - - -0.0108 0.0391 0.0319
- Sports club - - - -0.00904 -0.0340** -0.0322*
- Women’s group - - - 0.0444 0.00926 -0.0912
Would like own business - - - 0.0120 0.0664*** 0.0675**
Constant 0.433*** 0.688*** 0.766*** 0.226* 0.548*** 0.690***
Observations 4,994 4,921 4,783 2,778 2,723 2,654
R2 0.015 0.025 0.028 0.028 0.040 0.043
Robust standard errors are omitted for brevity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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T￿￿￿￿ 33: Predictive power of the Big Five on UK industry switching, by age.
Switched 2006? Switched 2007? Switched 2008?
Age < 40 Age  40 Age < 40 Age  40 Age < 40 Age  40
Age -0.0467*** -0.0131 -0.0487*** -0.0271 -0.0585*** -0.0200
Age2 0.000729*** 0.000138 0.000690*** 0.000272 0.000830*** 0.000185
Male 0.00671 0.0234* -0.0133 0.0360** -0.00479 0.0193
Been married? -0.00227 0.0192 0.0155 0.0169 0.0219 0.00639
Agreeableness 0.00492 0.0213*** 0.00424 0.0201** 0.00333 0.0142
Conscientiousness -0.0132 -0.0126* -0.0184* -0.0119 -0.0181* -0.0130
Extraversion 0.00354 0.00325 0.00186 0.00881 0.00578 0.00743
Neuroticism 0.00517 0.00606 -0.00158 0.00853 0.00297 0.00422
Openness 0.00483 0.00338 0.00258 0.00270 -0.000397 0.00820
Wage in 2004-05 -5.08e-07* -3.58e-07 -8.28e-07* -9.01e-07** -9.27e-07* -1.09e-06***
Satisfaction with pay -0.0144** -0.0148*** -0.0173*** -0.0221*** -0.0146** -0.0197***
Constant 0.955*** 0.385 1.192*** 0.792 1.357*** 0.725
Observations 2,446 2,548 2,429 2,492 2,375 2,408
R2 0.016 0.010 0.027 0.016 0.030 0.013
Robust standard errors are omitted for brevity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4.3 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 145
4.3.3 Cross-Country Big Five Di￿erences and Di￿erences in Industrial Compo-
sition
4.3.3.1 Cross-country Big Five comparisons
I ￿￿rst conduct a simple comparison of the means of the Big Five traits for both
the full sample and the minimum age sample using t-tests. Schmitt et al. (2007)
explain that cultural biases that a￿fect responses are di￿￿￿cult to control for and
rule out completely. The primary form of this is known as acquiescence bias - a
predisposition to agree with statements. However, they reference a number of
studies that support the fact that a comparison of means across cultures is valid.
Since the personality measure used in the BHPS and the SOEP is identical, save
for language, we can compare mean trait scores between the UK and Germany
directly.
Table 34 shows that mean Big Five scores are signi￿￿cantly di￿ferent between
the two countries for all ￿￿ve factors (p < 0.01 in all cases). I also performed
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Epps-Singleton test of distributional di￿ference.
Both tests show a highly signi￿￿cant di￿ference in personality trait distributions
between countries for all Big Five factors.17
In particular, mean Conscientiousness is very di￿ferent between the UK and
Germany (as con￿￿rmed by the large t-statistic). This can be seen visually in Fig-
ure 24. To the best of my knowledge, this is the ￿￿rst report of such a large di￿fer-
ence in Conscientiousness between these countries. The di￿ference is also large
for Extraversion, which is less obvious from visual inspection alone. We can see
from the graphs that Conscientiousness seems to have a larger rightward (nega-
tive) skewness in theGerman sample, relative to theUK. Explicitly, the skewness
of Conscientiousness is -0.74 for the Germany, but -0.36 for the UK.
This ￿￿nding is in contrast toprevious research,which ￿￿nds similar traitmeans
for historically and geographically close countries. Schmitt et al. (2007) use a
slightly more comprehensive 44 item personality inventory, but with smaller
sample sizes.18 They ￿￿nd Conscientiousness scores of 46.52 for Germany and
46.89 for the UK (where mean = 50, standard deviation = 10). This is opposed
17 The details are omitted, as they are not important for the present analysis.
18 Inparticular, 483 fromtheUKand790 fromGermany.Thiswas a convenience sample of college
students and those from the wider community.
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T￿￿￿￿ 34:There is a signi￿￿cant di￿ference in the means of personality traits between the UK and
Germany.
Agreeableness Conscientiousness Extraversion Neuroticism Openness
Full Sample
UKmean 5.428 5.417 4.578 3.622 4.592
UK s.d. (0.947) (0.964) (1.119) (1.236) (1.095)
German mean 5.312 5.883 4.868 3.729 4.492
German s.d. (0.972) (0.892) (1.150) (1.203) (1.180)
t-statistic -8.145*** 33.340*** 17.220*** 5.883*** -5.994***
Age   30
UKmean 5.437 5.482 4.500 3.602 4.551
UK s.d (0.945) (0.965) (1.130) (1.238) (1.103)
German mean 5.309 5.954 4.829 3.731 4.481
German s.d (0.976) (0.861) (1.146) (1.202) (1.189)
t-statistic -7.962*** 30.258*** 17.223*** 6.297*** -3.665***
t-tests are performed under the assumption of di￿erent variances for the UK and Germany.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
to my ￿￿nding that Germans have signi￿￿cantly higher mean Conscientiousness.
Furthermore, they ￿￿nd the UK has slightly higher acquiescence bias. This sug-
gests that respondents from theUKwould be expected to answermore strongly
in agreement with positively worded Conscientiousness items, therefore theo-
retically biasing the mean UKConscientiousness score upwards.19 If we were to
adjust for this bias here, it would suggest an even greater di￿ference between the
UK and Germany.
19 There were two positively worded items and one negatively worded item for Conscientiousness
in the survey.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 24:A comparison of the di￿ferent distributions of Big 5 factors in the UK and
German workforces. UK data is from BHPS 2005; n=7,017. German data
is from SOEP 2005 & 2009 combined; n=12,637.
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One key di￿ference from existing research is that the sample in the present
study is considerably larger, representative, and concerns only those in the labour
force. However, even setting aside data concerns, previous research would still
predict similar means due to the relative historical and geographic similarities
between the UK and Germany. Therefore, the ￿￿nding of signi￿￿cant mean trait
score di￿ferences for all Big Five factors may be considered as surprising. Since
Conscientiousness has strong predictive implications for a number of economic
variables (such as unemployment probability and job satisfaction), large cross-
country di￿ferences may be of particular interest to economists.
4.3.3.2 Paired Regression
We can now test the ￿￿nal hypothesis of this chapter - whether personality trait
di￿ferences predict di￿ferences in industrial composition between the UK and
Germany (Hypothesis 4.3). In order to test this, we need to obtain trait di￿fer-
ences at the individual level. This requires the pairing of observations from the
two datasets.
There are twomainways to achieve this. The ￿￿rst is through propensity score
matching (seeRosenbaumandRubin, 1983).This involves ￿￿tting abinary choice
model with a dummydi￿ferentiating between two groups as the dependent vari-
able (in our case, this would be a country dummy). The regressors are variables
that should be taken into account to indicate matching proximity. Predicted
probabilities from this model are calculated for each observation - these are the
propensity scores. Finally, observations are paired using an appropriate algo-
rithm to compare propensity scores. The second is by exact matching. This di-
rectly matches observations based on speci￿￿ed observed covariates, but is more
computationally expensive as a result. As a result of this I focus on the propen-
sity score method.20
A logit model is estimated that has a country dummy as the dependent vari-
able, and independent variables that re￿￿ect the individual characteristicswewant
to take into account for optimal pairing. While it is tempting to include every
conceivable covariate as a regressor in calculating the propensity score, this is not
advisable as it can reduce precision of estimates (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).
20 I discuss a variant of exact matching in Section 4.4.
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Therefore, I include age, gender, whether an individual has been married, and
education dummies. Tomatch the resulting propensity scores, I use the one-to-
one nearest neighbour algorithm, as implemented byLeuven and Sianesi (2014).
Calipers of 1 and 0 were used in order to provide added precision, but there was
nodi￿ference in thematches from reducing the caliper value.21 This suggests that
the algorithm provided relatively good matches.
Absolute di￿ferences between the personality traits were calculated and used
as independent variables. In addition, all ￿￿ve factors were taken as a single vec-
tor for each individual. The Euclidian distance between the two personality vec-
tors in a pairing was calculated, and this was used as an alternative independent
variable.22 Table 35 shows results of linear probability regressions that estimate
whether the fact that two individuals in a pair work in a di￿ferent industry is
related to di￿ferences in personality traits.
Overall model ￿￿t, in general, was quite poor for all speci￿￿cations estimated,
suggesting (as we would expect) that personality is not the only determinant
of industry di￿ferences. When estimating both the vector di￿ference and com-
ponent di￿ference speci￿￿cations on the full paired sample, coe￿￿￿cients were not
signi￿￿cantly di￿ferent from zero. However, as we have seen from previous anal-
ysis, personality in￿￿uences are stronger when separating young from old. The
regressions were repeated for those below 40 and those greater than or equal to
40 years of age.
First, we notice that the vector personality di￿ference is signi￿￿cantly associ-
ated with greater industry di￿ference for both age groups. This suggests Big Five
personality di￿ference does have some in￿￿uence on industry di￿ferences across
countries. A one point increase in the di￿ference between the personality vec-
tors of a British and a German individual corresponds to a 1￿ higher likelihood
of the individuals working in di￿ferent industries. To put this into perspective,
if two individuals di￿fered exactly by one point on all ￿￿ve personality dimen-
sions, they would be approximately 2.24￿ more likely to be in di￿ferent indus-
tries than if their personalities were identical. If we compare someone with an
extreme personality (i.e. with all trait scores either 1 or 7) to someone with a cen-
21 A caliper de￿￿nes a maximum distance between propensity scores, beyond which a match is not
made.
22 Regressions using relative di￿ferences and quadratic terms were also performed - the ￿￿t of these
models was similar to the absolute di￿ference models.
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T￿￿￿￿ 35:Relationship between Big Five di￿ferences and industry di￿ferences, using propensity score
matched data fromUK and Germany.
Dep variable: Are paired individuals in di￿ferent industries?
Full Sample Age < 40 Age  40
Abs di￿f in A -0.00264 - 0.00883 - -0.0124 -
(0.00562) (0.00727) (0.00790)
Abs di￿f in C -0.00586 - 0.00390 - 0.0125 -
(0.00568) (0.00741) (0.00784)
Abs di￿f in E -0.00304 - 0.00644 - 0.00879 -
(0.00486) (0.00641) (0.00662)
Abs di￿f in N 0.00135 - 0.000137 - 0.0125** -
(0.00444) (0.00595) (0.00621)
Abs di￿f in O 0.000358 - 0.00888 - 0.00376 -
(0.00469) (0.00643) (0.00654)
Euclidian dist - -0.00269 - 0.0105** - 0.0111**
between B5 vectors (0.00401) (0.00536) (0.00557)
Constant 0.829*** 0.827*** 0.806*** 0.806*** 0.782*** 0.779***
(0.0131) (0.0138) (0.0179) (0.0188) (0.0186) (0.0200)
Observations 7,017 7,017 3,475 3,475 3,542 3,542
R2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
tred personality (all trait scores at 4), they would be approximately 6.7￿ more
likely to be in di￿ferent industries.
Wewould expect that older individuals, having found abetter industrymatch
as a result of industrymovementwhen young, would show stronger personality
di￿ference in￿￿uences on industry di￿ference, relative to the young. This is con-
sistent with what we see in Table 35. In particular, one-point di￿ferences in Con-
scientiousness and Neuroticism both account for 1.25￿ higher likelihoods of
being in di￿ferent industries for those at least 40 years of age.Whilst the Consci-
entiousness coe￿￿￿cient is not signi￿￿cant, wewould have expected it to be among
the largest due to the large di￿ferences that were found in this factor between the
UKandGermany. It is also consistentwith the fact thatConscientiousness plays
a strong role in determining education choice. For the same reason, we might
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also have expected a stronger relationship for Openness di￿ferences. However,
this was not found in the data.
The strong in￿￿uence ofNeuroticism, relative to other factors, ismore surpris-
ing. However, it is consistent with intuition. Since Neurotic people are more
sensitive to negative a￿fect, it is likely that individuals with high values of this
trait would avoid highly stressful work environments.With the white-collar na-
ture of themajority of jobs inmodern society, Neuroticism di￿ferences are likely
to play a more crucial role than they may have in a subsistence economy, for
example. Absolute di￿ference in Agreeableness acts in the opposite direction,
which is contrary to what we would expect. However, the coe￿￿￿cient is not sig-
ni￿￿cantly di￿ferent from zero, and so the point estimate may be incorrect. Over-
all, it appears that di￿ferences in personality between two countries are related
to di￿ferences in industrial composition, albeit weakly.
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Themajority of studies onpersonality focus on correlations and somepredictive
e￿fects. Conti and Heckman (2014) warn that many studies claiming causality
of personality have been premature in doing so. They explain that causality is
di￿￿￿cult to establish and often neglected due to the combination of a lack of
theory regarding individual choices, and an unclear treatment of endogeneity
issues. Whilst the aim of this chapter is to provide an initial exploration of a
new relationship, I address two relevant forms of endogeneity for a subset of
my results.
First, the personality item responses may be subject to measurement error.
This is a common concern with all such subjective or self-reported behavioural
response, where the true values are unobserved. Heineck and Anger (2010) cal-
culate Cronbach’s a to measure the internal reliability of the Big Five items in
the 2005 SOEP wave. They ￿￿nd relatively low internal consistency scores for the
items in the survey. I calculate Cronbach’s a scores for my data and obtain sim-
ilar results. For the pooled 2005 and 2009 SOEP data, I obtain scores of 0.50,
0.58, 0.69, 0.62, and 0.59 for Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion,
Neuroticism andOpenness respectively. For the 2005 SOEP alone in my sample,
I obtain corresponding scores of 0.49, 0.61, 0.63, 0.69, and 0.61. For the 2005
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UK BHPS data, I obtain corresponding scores of 0.56, 0.53, 0.60, 0.69, and 0.66.
One rule of thumb for psychometric tests is that good consistency is indicated
by a scores of at least 0.7. This is what is usually found in the personality lit-
erature (Heineck and Anger, 2010). However, as explained at the beginning of
Section 4.3, some consistency is inevitably sacri￿￿ced for the convenience of hav-
ing a shorter list of items.
Heineck and Anger (2010) use a scores as reliability scores for each of the Big
Five variables to perform Errors-in-Variables (EIV) regressions, which corrects
for themeasurement error bias that onewould observe inOLS estimates.We can
use EIV as an alternative to the linear probabilityOLSmodels thatwere estimated
in order to test the robustness of the results.
First, I perform EIV versions of models estimated in Table 31. The results are
shown in Table A3. If we compare the age-separated EIV regressions with those
fromTable 31, the story is very di￿ferent.Whilst we found signi￿￿cant personality
coe￿￿￿cients before, the EIV dramatically increases themagnitudes of these coe￿￿￿-
cients. Recall that inTable 31, we ￿￿nd that a one-point increase inAgreeableness
for those below the age of 42 increases the probability of switching by 5.3￿. Ac-
cording to the EIV regression, this coe￿￿￿cient has now beenmagni￿￿ed to a 15.6￿
increase. This suggests that OLS estimates are likely to be biased towards zero as
a result of measurement error. These magnitude increases are dramatic in the
￿￿nal EIV regression for the older age group. The R2 for this regression is unusu-
ally high at 0.336, as many of the value variables are now also signi￿￿cant. The
result that Agreeableness, Extraversion and Openness have e￿fects on the prob-
ability of changing industry near or in excess of 50￿warrants serious attention.
However, the sample size is low, and so we should be cautious of this result as it
is possible that we have an unrepresentative subsample.
InTableA4, I estimate EIV coe￿￿￿cients for theUKBHPSOLS regressions from
Table 32. As with the SOEP EIV regressions, the absolute value of coe￿￿￿cient
estimates tends to be larger in the BHPS EIV regressions, compared to OLS. In
the regressions that omit value-related variables, the marginal (negative) impact
of Conscientiousness on industry switching has increased from approximately
1.8￿ to over 5￿ in absolute terms. However, in the regressions that include val-
ues, some of the Big 5 EIV estimates are less signi￿￿cant than they were using OLS.
This could be due to the fact that EIV does not allow for robust standard errors.
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Standard errors are larger with the EIV estimates than OLS, and heteroskedastic-
ity may be present. In sum, the EIV results suggest that measurement error is
likely to be biasing coe￿￿￿cients towards zero.
The second endogeneity concern is whether reverse causality between per-
sonality and industry exists, a￿fecting parameter estimates. Theoretically, in the
present analysis, it appears di￿￿￿cult for industry to in￿￿uence personality. This is
because the relationships tested here are either cross-sectional, or where person-
ality measures precede industry choice. Borghans et al. (2008) suggest reverse
causality is possible even when the outcome variable is measured after person-
ality. The reasons cited for this are related to anticipation or expectation of fu-
ture outcomes causing changes in current personality. In the case of industry
choice, this explanation seems unlikely. One would expect to change industry
in future because of personality issues in the current period (as well as value/in-
come issues). Married with the ￿￿ndings from Terracciano et al. (2005) and Na
et al. (2010), this suggests reverse causality should not be an issue in our analysis
of industry switching. Controlling for age and age-squared in every regression
mitigates problems that could arise due to personality traits evolving over the
life-cycle. In an ideal scenario, we would want strong instrumental variables to
mitigate endogeneity problems. Whilst I have attempted to use value variables
as instruments for personality, they make for relatively weak instruments. As
discussed in Section 4.3, it is di￿￿￿cult to ￿￿nd suitable instruments for personal-
ity.
A ￿￿nal note on endogeneity concerns omitted variable bias. Following the
mechanism described in Figure 22, one variable that we have not accounted for
is ability. Whilst this is generally assumed to be unobservable, measures such
as IQ tests and the Raven Progressive Matrix test have been used to shed some
light on innate ￿￿uid intelligence (see Almlund et al., 2011). These measures are
unfortunately not available in the data and therefore cannot be included in the
regressions. Although intelligence is a separate concept to personality, the most
obvious link between the two would be through Openness. One would expect
intelligence to be positively correlated with Openness. However, since the pre-
cise interactions of all other variables with intelligence are unknown, it is di￿￿￿-
cult to make a con￿￿dent assessment of the size or direction of the bias.
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Finally, I look at an alternative to propensity score matching to test Hypoth-
esis 4.3. The approach used is a variant of exact matching, due to Blackwell et
al. (2009), known as Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM). CEM takes the same co-
variates that are used to generate the propensity score, but assigns observation
into strata based on exact matching. Continuous variables, or variables with a
large number of distinct values, arematched ‘coarsely’ based on a speci￿￿ed num-
ber of intervals. In our case, only age needs to be coarsened, as the remaining
covariates are simply indicator variables. The disadvantage of this approach is
that observations which cannot be matched exactly are lost. Additionally, each
stratum does not necessarily contain equal numbers of British and German in-
dividuals. Therefore, I wrote a script in R (R Development Core Team, 2016)
to randomly match individuals within each stratum and perform robust linear
probability regressions.23 This process was repeated 500 times, and means of re-
gression coe￿￿￿cients and robust t-statistics were recorded. Results are shown in
Table A6.
Due to the randomness of the matching process within a stratum and a re-
duced number of observations, results using this method were far weaker than
whenmatching using the propensity score. The strongest personality di￿ference
in￿￿uence from this method is in Openness, rather than Conscientiousness. Di-
rections of estimates for these two factors are consistent between methods, but
not for the remaining three. Determining which method best measures the im-
pact of di￿ferences in personality across countries on outcomes is left for future
work.
4.5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
In this chapter, I o￿fer a new perspective on the determinants of comparative ad-
vantage. Unlike long periods of history where production was primarily driven
bynatural resource availability,modern industry is largely service-oriented.Hen-
ce, personal characteristics are increasingly relevant.
The main ￿￿ndings are as follows. First, Big Five personality traits help to ex-
plain the probability of an individual working in a given occupation. Openness
23 The code is available upon request.
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plays a particularly important role due to its in￿￿uence on schooling choice and
connection with ability.
Second, Big Five personality in￿￿uences industry choice through educational
choice, andpredicts the likelihoodof future career switchingbetween industries.
This suggests that personality is likely to be a determinant of an economy’s in-
dustrial composition (though certainly not the strongest one). A one point in-
crease inAgreeableness orNeuroticism increases the probability of switching in-
dustry in four years time by approximately 5 percentage points in Germany, for
those below themean age of 42. These in￿￿uences are strongerwhen adjusted for
measurement error. For example, the predictive power of a one point increase in
Agreeableness on industry switching increases from approximately 5 percentage
points to 15.6 percentage points.
Third, a one point increase in the personality di￿ference betweenmatched in-
dividuals from theUK andGermany leads to an increase in probability of work-
ing in di￿ferent industries by 0.01. Hence, di￿ferences in personality are corre-
lated with di￿ferences in industry composition. When separating for individual
traits, the strongest personality in￿￿uences come from di￿ferences in Conscien-
tiousness andNeuroticism for those at least 40 years of age (who aremore likely
than younger individuals to be in equilibrium regarding their career choice).
Whilst traditional market forces and structural di￿ferences may be more suc-
cessful in predicting relative industry di￿ferences between countries, this chap-
ter ￿￿nds that Big Five personality traits have a role to play alongside them.These
￿￿ndings represent a ￿￿rst step towardsunderstanding the role ofpersonality traits
in explaining the di￿ferences in industrial activity across economies. Although
more work needs to be done in this area, this chapter highlights the potential
importance of personality formacroeconomic problems, and not just economic
issues at the individual level.

A
APPEND ICE S
￿.1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2
Script for survey 1
WHERESHOULDSOCIETYFOCUS ITSEFFORTSTOIMPROVE
WELLBEING?
We are interested in people’s opinions on the quality of a society.
The UK government is collecting information on the four well-being
questions on the following page. These measure happiness, satisfaction
with life, how worthwhile life is, and people’s anxiety. We would like to
knowyour viewon the relative importance of these for assessing howwell
a society is doing.
We would like you to imagine that you have 100 points to allocate as an
indication of the importance ofmeasures of well-being. Howwould you
personally allocate the 100 points across the four measures below? [for
example, if you believe all four are equally important, youwould allocate
25￿ to each of the four measures]:
• Happiness – “Overall, howhappy did you feel yesterday?”: Person-
ally I would allocate ......￿ of my e￿forts to improving this.
• Satisfaction – “Overall, how satis￿￿ed are you with your life nowa-
days?”: Personally I would allocate ...... ￿ of my e￿forts to improv-
ing this.
• Worthwhile – “Overall, to what extent do you feel that your life is
worthwhile?”: Personally I would allocate ...... ￿ of my e￿forts to
improving this.
• Anxiety – “On a scale where nought is “Not at all anxious” and ten
is “Completely anxious”. Personally I would allocate ...... ￿ of my
e￿forts to improving this.
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PLEASE REMEMBER THAT YOUR FOUR CHOSEN NUMBERS
SHOULDADDUP TO 100￿. THANK YOU FOR YOURVIEWS
￿.2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3
T￿￿￿￿A1: Summary of results forWTP, and accuracy of model predictions. Predicted order-
ings for each model can be found in Table 21.
Result Did model prediction match result?
Good Actual order (WTP) Mean µw µw threshold µw 1-star µw 5-star RF
1 e>o=m Yes No Yes No No Yes
2 o>m>e No Yes No No No No
3 o=m=e No No No No No No
4 o=m>e Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
5 o=m=e No No No No No No
6 e>m>o No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
7 o=m>e Yes No Yes No No No
8 e>o=m Yes No No Yes No No
9 o=m>e Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
10 o=m=e No No No No No No
Key:
= - the means of two treatments are not signi￿￿cantly di￿ferent at the 5￿ level.
o - original review scores; m - mean preserving treatment; e - extreme treatment; WTP - (max-
imum) willingness to pay.
For example, “e>o=m” means the good has signi￿￿cantly higher mean WTP in the extreme
treatment than the other two treatments (which are not signi￿￿cantly di￿ferent from each
other at the 5￿ level).
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(￿)Good 3 - Headphones
●
●
●
0
100
200
300
Orig M−P Ext
(￿)Good 4 - TV
●
●
●
0
100
200
300
Orig M−P Ext
(￿)Good 5 - Laptop
●
●
●
0
100
200
Orig M−P Ext
(￿)Good 6 - Hotel
●
●
●
0
100
200
Orig M−P Ext
(￿)Good 7 - Hotel
●
●
●
0
20
40
Orig M−P Ext
(￿)Good 8 - Book
● ●
●
0
20
40
Orig M−P Ext
(￿)Good 9 - Book
●
●
●
0
20
40
Orig M−P Ext
(￿)Good 10 - Restaurant
F￿￿￿￿￿A1:Mean of maximumwillingness to pay for each good and treatment (original, mean-preserving, extreme), with 95￿ con￿￿dence inter-
vals.
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T￿￿￿￿A2: Big Five items used in the BHPS and SOEP surveys.
I see myself as someone who: Factor Polarity
is sometimes rude to others A -
does a thorough job C +
is talkative E +
worries a lot N +
is original, comes up with ideas O +
has a forgiving nature A +
tends to be lazy C -
is outgoing, sociable E +
gets nervous easily N +
values artistic, aesthetic experiences O +
is considerate and kind A +
does things e￿￿￿ciently C +
is reserved E -
is relaxed, handles stress well N -
has an active imagination O +
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T￿￿￿￿A3: EIV regressions to test robustness of SOEP industry switching results from
Table 31.
Changed industry between 2005 and 2009?
Age < 42 Age  42 Age < 42 Age  42
Age 0.0424 0.142 0.0357 0.127
Age2 -0.000717 -0.00123 -0.000581 -0.00103
Male 0.105** -0.0432 0.123* -0.122
Been married? -0.00247 0.133 -0.0213 0.215
Agreeableness 0.175** -0.328** 0.156** -0.551***
Conscientiousness -0.0297 0.0233 -0.00742 -0.121
Extraversion 0.00181 -0.203* 0.00145 -0.499***
Neuroticism 0.0557 -0.0653 0.0798* -0.227*
Openness 0.0317 0.180 0.00517 0.636**
Satisfaction with income -0.0362*** 0.0144 -0.0393*** 0.0487**
Gross wage in previous year -4.41e-05** -8.10e-05** -5.37e-05** -0.000146***
Political attitude - - 0.000846 0.0774**
Freq of sport activity (-ve) - - 0.000693 -0.0556
Freq of artistic activity (-ve) - - -0.0291 0.235**
Optimism towards future (-ve) - - -0.0820** 0.295***
Constant -1.186* -1.542 -0.835 -0.903
Observations 474 167 461 161
R2 0.104 0.159 0.116 0.336
Standard errors are omitted for brevity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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T￿￿￿￿A4: EIV regressions to test robustness of BHPS industry switching results fromTables 32 and
33.
Changed industry between 2005 and 2008?
Age < 40 Age  40 Age < 40 Age  40
Age -0.0557*** -0.0203 -0.113*** -0.0149
Age2 0.000797*** 0.000192 0.00177*** 0.000132
Male -0.00382 0.0282 0.00403 0.0188
Been married? 0.023 0.0111 0.0514 0.0364
Agreeableness 0.0224 0.0850* 0.0229 0.00642
Conscientiousness -0.0521 -0.0843* -0.044 -0.0364
Extraversion 0.0152 0.0156 0.0500* 0.0118
Neuroticism 0.00257 0.00446 0.0356* 9.56e-06
Openness -0.000819 0.00933 0.00549 0.014
Labour income in prev yr -9.27e-07** -9.78e-07** -2.42e-06* -1.14e-06**
Satisfaction with pay -0.0133** -0.0205*** -0.00772 -0.0194***
Closest to Tory party? - - 0.0757** 0.0652**
Closest to Labour party? - - 0.0101 0.0286
Closest to Lib Dem party? - - 0.0648 0.0212
Belong to a social class? - - 0.000859 -0.00527
Member of trade union - - -0.0772*** -0.0410*
Member of environmental group - - 0.113 0.131**
Member of parents association - - -0.0285 0.00389
Member of tenants group - - -0.00886 0.0738
Member of religious group - - -0.00786 -0.0132
Member of voluntary service group - - 0.068 0.00437
Member of sports club - - -0.0185 -0.0450*
Member of women’s group - - -0.398* -0.00248
Would like own business? - - 0.0708** 0.0579
Constant 1.335*** 0.675 1.734*** 0.696
Observations 2,375 2,408 1,186 1,468
R2 0.033 0.02 0.076 0.033
Standard errors are omitted for brevity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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T￿￿￿￿A5: EIV for propensity score matched regressions from Table 35.
Dep variable: Is in di￿f industry?
Full Age < 40 Age  40
Absolute di￿f in A -0.00418 0.0156 -0.0286*
(0.0111) (0.0151) (0.0162)
Absolute di￿f in C -0.0102 0.00539 0.0265*
(0.0106) (0.0140) (0.0153)
Absolute di￿f in E -0.00469 0.00921 0.0116
(0.00756) (0.0103) (0.0108)
Absolute di￿f in N 0.00220 -0.000584 0.0198**
(0.00690) (0.00935) (0.00971)
Absolute di￿f in O 0.00129 0.0132 0.00621
(0.00787) (0.0107) (0.0112)
Constant 0.835*** 0.789*** 0.767***
(0.0189) (0.0257) (0.0259)
Observations 7,017 3,475 3,542
R2 0.000 0.002 0.005
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
T￿￿￿￿A6:Mean of 500 bootstrapped OLS coe￿￿￿cients using CEM.
Dep variable: In di￿ferent industries?
Full sample Age < 40 Age  40
Absolute di￿f in A 0.00412 0.00180 0.00682
Absolute di￿f in C 0.00438 0.00584 0.00314
Absolute di￿f in E 0.00164 0.00224 0.00192
Absolute di￿f in N -0.00076 -0.00223 0.00040
Absolute di￿f in O -0.00080 0.00073 -0.00263
Constant 0.796*** 0.798*** 0.793***
Observations 3938 1825 2112
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (Robust s.e.)
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